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Abstract 
Critical Incident Stress has the potential to affect emergency services personnel to the 
degree that it can change the way the responder acts and reacts in all facets of his or her 
life, including the job and his or her family. Research into these potential effects has 
produced a greater understanding of the responders experiences within a short period of 
time after the perceived critical incident. This study investigates the long-term effects of 
critical incident stress among emergency responders, including Firefighters, Paramedics, 
and Police Officers. Eleven emergency responders from two cities in the three emergency 
services professions were interviewed to determine what their experiences were at least 
six months post critical incident. A structured interview was utilized to gain knowledge 
about the impact that the critical incident had in three areas of the emergency responders 
lives: impact on job, impact on the individual responder, and perceived impact on 
emergency responders families. For participants, symptoms of Critical Incident Stress 
lasted between 6 months and 2 years after the perceived critical incident. Analysis of the 
data indicates that single responder critical incidents have the potential to negatively 
affect emergency responders resulting in the loss of enthusiasm and passion for their 
work, debilitating psychological distress, and isolation from valued support systems. 
Long-term effects of Critical Incident Stress change the perceptions that responders have 
about the job, about themselves, and the relationships with their families. The culture of 
emergency services, changing identities, and the lack of support from both within the 
system and outside of the system were seen as variables that contribute to the long-term 
effects of Critical Incident Stress. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In 1988, the United States Surgeon General stated that if accidental death were 
not considered, 80 percent of the population would die from stress-related diseases (US 
Surgeon General, as cited in Mitchell & Bray, 1990). According to the International 
Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) (1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998), emergency services 
personnel are at higher risk for stress related disease and death than almost any other 
occupation in the world. In 2002 alone, 262 firefighters, police officers, and paramedics 
across North America died in the line of duty with hundreds more resigning and taking 
early retirement due to stress-related illness (Retrieved November 02, 2002, from 
http://www.usfa.fema.gov/dhtml/fire-service/health-pubs.cfm). Next to soldiers during 
wartime, few occupations in the world are as dangerous as that of emergency services 
(IAFF, 2002). It is because of the prevalence of this stress related disease and its effects 
particularly upon emergency services personnel that further research into Critical Incident 
Stress is warranted. 
A critical incident is defined as an event that occurs in the life of individuals that 
" . . . causes them to experience unusually strong emotional reactions which have the 
potential to interfere with their ability to function either at the scene or later" (Mitchell, 
1983). Critical Incident Stress (CIS) is defined as the consequential thoughts, emotions, 
and behaviors that the individuals may experience after a critical incident. Critical 
Incident Stress may be experienced by anyone, but the focus of this study will be on 
Critical Incident Stress that is experienced by emergency services personnel, including 
firefighters, paramedics, and police officers. 
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Symptoms of Critical Incident Stress may last only 30 days after a perceived 
critical incident, however, without intervention, and over time, symptoms may present as 
the more pervasive Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Critical Incident Stress, then, may be 
a potential indicator for a diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. In this study, the 
term Critical Incident Stress is utilized only as an indicator and does not attempt to 
diagnose Critical Incident Stress or Post Traumatic Stress Disorder that may have been 
experienced by emergency services personnel that participated. 
The study of stress and the stress response has a long history (see Lazarus, 1966; 
Lazarus and Folkman, 1984; Selye, 1956, 1974). The study of emergency mental health, 
however, is a fairly young paradigm in psychology, and it has only been in the past 20 
years that research has focused on the effects of stress in the profession of emergency 
services (Blake, Albano, Keane, 1992; Everly, & Rosenfeld, 1981; Gibbs, 1989; 
Horowitz, 1991; Mitchell, 1983, 1985). To date, most of the research that investigates 
Critical Incident Stress is focused on stressors, critical incidents, and the response to 
critical incidents (Beaton & Murray, 1993; Dyregrov, 1998; Dyregrov & Mitchell, 1992; 
Everly, 1995; Hodgkinson & Shepard, 1994; Mitchell, 1983, 1995; Mitchell & Everly, 
1995; Mitchell, Everly, & Mitchell, 1999) within a short time frame of the occurrence of 
the critical incident. There is a distinct lack of available research regarding the long-term 
effect of critical incident stress specifically with regards to emergency responders. 
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) recognizes that exposure to 
traumatic events, whether directly (primary victims) or indirectly (secondary victims) 
experienced, can result in symptoms such as re-experiencing the traumatic event, 
numbing, avoidance, and increased arousal (APA, 2000). Depressive symptoms may 
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occur within the first few weeks of a critical incident and continue to affect emergency 
responders over a long period of time. Symptoms such as loss of energy, anhedonia, guilt, 
diminished focus, avoidance, and indecisiveness may affect a responder to such a degree 
that they are no longer able to directly confront life stressors and would rather walk away 
than attempt to resolve the issue. 
Rationale 
Even though the available research presents invaluable information into the area 
of long-term effects of Critical Incident Stress on emergency services personnel, the 
focus of the studies are on disasters, such as the Interstate 880 collapse (Marmar, Weiss, 
Meltzler, Ronfeldt, and Foreman, 1996) or South Australian bushfires (McFarlane, 1986). 
Disasters of this magnitude demand the deployment of perhaps hundreds of emergency 
service personnel and various immediate interventions attempt to mitigate possible 
negative stress reactions to these events. However, a critical incident does not always 
occur to a group nor does the incident have to be classified as a disaster. An individual 
may experience a critical incident at a structure fire, while others that he/she works with 
at the same scene are not affected; yet the symptoms of Critical Incident Stress may be as 
debilitating to this individual as it is to a group who work a disaster. 
Few departments in emergency services experience large-scale operations on a 
regular basis and as such, the majority of emergency responders may experience the 
critical incident alone. There are various reasons why the responder may not access 
available resources. The most important reason being the fear that management or 
coworkers will find out and label them as weak and unable to do the job. While certain 
departments have acknowledged the potential for Critical Incident Stress among its 
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members, the implementation of programs to assist has been slow. An individual 
responder who experiences a critical incident may perceive that they do not have the 
same supports that are available to a group, leaving him or her to suffer in silence. 
Over the past twenty years, various interventions such as Critical Incident Stress 
Management (CISM) (Mitchell, 1983; Mitchell & Everly, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997) were 
created in order to minimize the potential for an incident to become a responder's critical 
incident. Most interventions, such as debriefing, attempt to mitigate the symptoms of CIS 
a short time after the incident has occurred. The programs adapt and change as needs 
change and are very effective in most circumstances. These interventions focus on a 
group process and work well when a group experiences an incident; however, Critical 
Incident Stress does not only occur if a group of responders are involved in the incident. 
Critical Incident Stress Management is a comprehensive, multi-component long-
term management program that assists individuals and groups of emergency responders, 
not just after a critical incident, but throughout their careers. Unfortunately, in many 
cases, the management aspect of CISM has been ignored, with CISM teams focusing 
solely on the debriefing component. Individual responders, who are affected by a critical 
incident when no other members are, are virtually left to find support by themselves. 
Responders may, consciously or unconsciously, deny symptoms of Critical Incident 
Stress if they perceive that there is no support, and these symptoms may become so 
pervasive that the responder is no longer able to do the job. 
Research Method 
In order to understand how an individual responder has been affected by his or her 
critical incident, it is necessary to hear the responder's own story. An individual 
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responder's experience is of primary importance to this study and the narrative by those 
having the experience is the best source to understand the experience (Chamaz, 2001). In 
order to best understand these experiences, the stories, told in the responder's own words, 
can then be used for the opportunity to explore and understand what the experiences are 
at least six months after the critical incident. 
Research Question. 
The present study will be conducted to determine if emergency responders, 
including fire fighters, paramedics, and police officers suffer any long-term effects after 
experiencing what they perceive to be a critical incident. Experiences are subjective and 
to understand the experience, thoughts, emotions and behaviors must be examined. 
Specifically, this study will explore what emergency services personnel are experiencing 
at least six months after the critical incident. In order to provide a deeper understanding 
of the impact of Critical Incident Stress, three areas of experience will be explored: 
1. What impact did the critical incident have on the emergency responder's 
perception of his/her job? 
2. What impact did the critical incident have on the individual emergency 
responder? 
3. What is the perceived impact the critical incident has had on the emergency 
responder's family? 
Goal 
By exploring these three important areas of an emergency responder's life at least 
six months after the critical incident, the data collected from this study will promote 
understanding of the long-term implications of Critical Incident Stress. By understanding 
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what the long-term implications are, the development and implementation of appropriate 
interventions that care for emergency responders throughout their careers could only be 
of benefit to the emergency services professions. 
Conclusion 
The concept of trauma and the trauma response will be explored in detail in 
Chapter 2; first as it applies to the general population, then the focus will shift to Critical 
Incident Stress and why the affects of CIS may have such a devastating impact on 
emergency services personnel. A review of the literature into both short term and long-
term effects of Critical Incident Stress among emergency responders will follow. In 
Chapter 3, the method of investigation used for this study will be explained as well as the 
process of access to the membership of fire/paramedic services and the police 
departments. Following is a detailed presentation of the process used for analysis of the 
interviews. Chapter 4 presents the results of the qualitative investigation using the 
emergency responders' own stories for confirmation of the results. In Chapter 5, a 
discussion of the results, limitations, implications for future research and counselling 
emergency responders are presented. Chapter 5 is followed by references and appendices. 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
In order to understand the effects of Critical Incident Stress, it is first necessary to 
understand human trauma, the human trauma response, and how a trauma event may 
become, for an emergency responder, his or her critical incident. Once a basic 
understanding of human trauma is explained, the focus will change to how the human 
trauma response may affect an emergency responder both cognitively and behaviorally, 
which may result in Critical Incident Stress. Positive responses and outcomes will then be 
explored, which includes social support and family support. Short-term interventions will 
then be investigated with a focus on Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM). The 
chapter will end with an exploration into current research regarding the long-term 
implications of Critical Incident Stress among emergency responders and why it is 
important to continue research into this area. 
Definition of Terms 
In a field that is as new as trauma within the emergency services professions, the 
following definitions will be provided " . . . to promote some consistency in the use of 
several fundamental terms in the field of emergency mental health" (Everly, 1999, p. 77). 
Crisis 
Crisis is a heightened state of emotional vulnerability that produces an acute need 
to regain a sense of psychic control and mind-body equilibrium, that is, to reduce the 
profound tension and return the person to some pre-crisis level of adaptation. The event 
will overwhelm an individual's usual coping mechanisms and produce evidence of 
functional impairment. 
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Crisis Intervention 
Crisis intervention is acute psychological first aid that reduces anxiety resulting 
from the crisis event. There are four standard principles for crisis intervention: 
immediacy, proximity, expectancy, and brevity. The goals of crisis intervention are to 
mitigate the impact that the crisis has had on the individual, facilitate recovery, and 
identify those who may need additional service. 
Critical Incident 
A critical incident is the stimulus or stressor event that is beyond the daily 
experiences of an emergency responder and has the potential to produce a crisis response. 
For the purposes of this paper, the terms "trauma event" and "critical incident" will be 
considered synonymous. Stimulus and stressor will also be considered synonymous. 
Trauma may be experienced by anyone, but the focus of this paper will be on emergency 
services personnel, including firefighters, paramedics, and police officers. 
Critical Incident Stress 
Critical Incident Stress is the psychological consequence of a critical incident that 
is perceived by the emergency responder to be outside the normal range of his or her 
daily experience. Critical Incident Stress can have a profound impact on the cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioral realms of an emergency responder, potentially resulting in 
long-term distress. Critical Incident Stress is a subspecialty of psychotraumatology. 
Emergency Mental Health 
Emergency Mental Health defines the field of mental health that deals specifically 
with emergency services personnel, including, but not restricted to, firefighters, 
paramedics, police officers, dispatchers, and disaster workers. Emergency Mental Health 
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also provides on-scene and off-scene prevention, crisis intervention, follow-up and 
referrals, emergency psychology and psychiatry, the re-establishment of mental health 
systems and Critical Incident Stress Management. 
Psychotraumatology 
Psychotraumatology is the study of "the processes and factors that lie a) 
antecedent to, b) concomitant with, and c) subsequent to psychological traumatization" 
(Everly, 1995a). 
Trauma 
Trauma is both physiological and psychological. Physiological trauma occurs 
when the body reacts to a situation involving intense fear, helplessness or horror. 
Psychological trauma occurs to an individual who is exposed to real or perceived danger 
that may result in an extreme set of psychological responses. 
Human Trauma 
Human trauma occurs when an individual is faced with an event that has the 
potential to cause harm to that individual (Janik, 1992). The event itself does not have to 
be of disastrous proportions, in fact, the event may be nothing out of the ordinary range 
of the individual's experience (Mitchell, 1983; Mitchell & Everly, 1993). It is the 
individual's response, or perception of the event that will determine if it is negative or not 
(Selye, 1956), but not all trauma events result in a negative outcome. An individual may 
perceive the event as negative but use the response as a positive growth motivator. 
Regardless of whether the outcome of the trauma event is positive or negative, the initial 
physiological reaction to the trauma event is the same. 
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Hans Selye (1956) first applied the term stress to human systems to describe "the 
sum of all nonspecific changes (within an organism) caused by function or damage" (p. 
14). Selye believed that psychological and physiological changes occurred regardless of 
the stimuli. While recent research (Everly, 1995b) has argued that there may be 
specificity in the response when faced with certain stimuli, the nature of stress and the 
stress response is invariably the same: irrespective of timing, either we respond or we do 
not. The stress response, positive or negative, is designed to promote life. Positive stress, 
or eustress (Selye, 1974), assists individuals to make the positive changes needed to 
preserve life, which in turn promotes growth within the individual. Distress, or negative 
stress, may become destructive, causing changes in self-perception, work, and family 
(Janik, 1992; Ursano, Fullerton, & Norwood, 1995; Valent, 1998). In order to understand 
how stress can have negative consequences on an individual, it is necessary to look at 
how we respond to stress both physiologically and psychologically, and the impact that it 
can have on an individual's life. 
Physiological Responses to Stress 
The physiological response to stress begins with sensory stimuli which may be 
interpreted as a threat, which may place a high demand on the individual's resources. 
Information about the event is gathered by the cortex in the brain and then shared with 
the limbic system (van der Kolk, 1994). If together these two systems perceive that the 
stimulus may be a threat, physiological changes begin and the response shifts to a state of 
arousal (Gelhorn, 1965). The hypothalamus is then alerted and if the message is one of 
challenge or threat, the adrenal gland releases norepinephrine into the bloodstream. 
Norepinephrine in the bloodstream alerts the rest of the body to react and sends a 
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message back to the cortex and limbic system. Adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH) 
then releases catecholamines which initiates the full body response (Davidson & Braum, 
1986; Everly & Lating, 1995). The individual may perceive threat and a decision is made 
to either confront or avoid the threat. Only milliseconds have passed since the original 
stimulus or stressor was acknowledged. While this process can occur without conscious 
awareness, several bodily changes occur such as an increased heart rate, shortness of 
breath, muscle tension, and feelings of panic that alert us that the stimuli is a threat or 
challenge (Everly, 1995b). 
The stressful stimulus raises a psychological reaction in the individual (Gelhorn, 
1965). Effort is made to resist, or cope, with the high demands placed upon the 
individual. How the individual responds to the stressful event depends on how the 
individual perceives the event (Selye, 1956; Everly, 1995b). If the individual is able to 
cope with the high demands, he or she will use the event as a positive motivating force 
for change. If the individual perceives the event as negative, then he or she will react 
negatively. Either way, the stress reaction gives us what we need in order to defend 
ourselves or withdraw from the situation (Selye, 1956). 
The stress response, then, is both physiological and psychological. It is a 
reciprocating system in that how the mind perceives the stressor will determine how the 
body will react. In extreme cases, the physical response will inhibit the cognitive 
response (Everly & Lating, 1995). If the physical response is extreme, the mind may shut 
down until it is capable of dealing with the stressor. In the majority of cases though, the 
mind and body will attempt to adjust to the stressor together. 
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General Cognitive Responses to Stress 
Changes in cognitive functioning depend on the mind's ability to adapt to the 
stimulus. If the individual perceives the stressor as negative, he or she will attempt to 
adapt the stressor to his or her present cognitive schemas (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Lazarus 
& Folkman, 1984), which are "knowledge structures that guide a person's perception, 
organization, and recall of information" (Yates, Axsom, Bickman, & Howe, 1989, p. 
167). Schemas develop from experience and are influenced by the social environment 
and as new information is received, the individual attempts to adapt the new information 
to existing schemata. If the individual is not able to fit the new information into existing 
schemas, he or she will experience cognitive dissonance, or conflict. While schemas deal 
with the theories of categories of events, assumptions (Parkes, 1975) deal with how 
individuals perceive themselves and their world. Assumptions are built on years of 
experience that "guide our perceptions and actions" (Janoff-Bulman, 1995) and are not 
easily changed. When an individual experiences a trauma event, basic assumptions about 
his or her world may change. 
As coping attempts are made, and if the distress level persists, individuals will 
continuously reassess both the problem and alternative coping strategies in an effort to 
reduce the level of distress (Yates, Axsom, Bickman, & Howe, 1989). Interpretation of a 
trauma event may create a state of painful cognitive distress. The experience may not fit 
with the individual's world view and can overwhelm his or her normal coping 
mechanisms, leaving the individual to feel that his or her world is out of control (Gibbs, 
1989). Unable to process the event with customary coping strategies, individuals may 
react with a feeling of numbness and attempt to deny the reality of the situation (Janik, 
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1992). The perception of threat may become so strong that maladaptive thought patterns 
ensue (Markowitz, Gutterman, Link & Rivera, 1987). 
An individual's ability to adapt to the stressor will depend on how rigid or flexible 
an individual's schemata or assumptions are. The greater the level of perceived distress, 
the more the perception of the stressor changes and the individual may lose mental 
efficiency (Mitchell & Bray, 1990). As the ability to retain new information decreases, 
tasks become more difficult that in turn causes an increase in the level of distress, and so 
on. As we become less flexible, coping strategies such as humor are also lost. According 
to Mitchell and Bray (1990), the loss of humor leaves us more vulnerable and unable to 
cope with stress. Another coping strategy that is lost is the ability to think clearly, which 
" . . . intensifies our vulnerability to additional stress" (p. 12). 
As we become more rigid and humorless, the fear that no one can help us affects 
the trust we have for others (Figley, 1985b). Trust is one of our most basic needs, and 
with increased cognitive and or/perceptual rigidity, trust in others decreases. When we 
perceive that our primary supports cannot be trusted to help, individuals will become 
isolated from the people that could help them through the traumatic time (Jenkins, 1996). 
To the primary supports, the individual may appear more detached and not open to 
emotional support (Mitchell & Bray, 1990). This creates a cycle in which the individual 
perceives his or her major supports as insensitive while the supporting people perceive 
the individual as unapproachable. The more the supports withdraw because of the 
perception of inapproachability, the more the individual withdraws from seeking the 
supports. 
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Mitchell and Bray posit that the changes in cognitive function may actually assist 
the individual in functioning with "a minimum of distracting emotional energy during a 
period of intense stress" and that "lessening the chances of emotional overload allows a 
stressed person to concentrate on his or her energies in the physical fight or flight 
response" (p. 13), yet it is the cognitive ability to accept the stressor that will lessen any 
physical response. The emotional response triggers when the degree of cognitive distress 
becomes overwhelming to the individual. 
General Emotional Responses to Stress 
In the aftermath of an event that an individual perceives as traumatic, he or she 
may become more aware of the feeling of vulnerability and become overwhelmed by the 
scope of the emotion he or she is experiencing (Budd, 1997). The emotional aftereffect is 
a normal reaction given the intensity of the perceived traumatic event the individual has 
experienced, yet he or she may not perceive it to be normal at all and react with emotions 
that are unfamiliar to him or her (Figley, 1985a). Attempts may be made to hide the 
emotional symptoms of distress, and the individual may continue on as though nothing 
has occurred. If an individual does not attend to these cognitive and emotional symptoms 
of trauma, the symptoms may become more detrimental and intervention becomes 
difficult (Mitchell, Everly, & Mitchell, 1999). 
The consequences of suppressing emotion can be devastating to the individual 
and result in symptoms such as depression, guilt, anxiety and excessive anger (Leonard & 
Alison, 1999). As symptoms become more intense, the individual may begin to behave in 
ways that affect his or her work and family. Relationships change with those whom the 
individual trusts and, as in cognitive responses, the individual could withdraw from those 
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who might be of support to him or her (Figley, 1985b; Jenkins, 1996). The individual 
may begin to behave in ways that are more aggressive, angry, and harmful, both to 
themselves and to others, which could result in further withdrawal and isolation. 
In summary, an individual will react physiologically, cognitively, emotionally, 
and behaviorally to what is perceived as a challenging or life-threatening situation. Given 
both the physiological and psychological effects of the trauma experience, and given that 
emergency responders may face these challenging, if not potential life threatening 
experiences each shift, it is necessary to understand why the trauma experience is unique 
to emergency services personnel. 
Crisis, the Crisis Response, and Crisis Intervention 
Following Green (1982), three categories of studies will be reviewed for the type 
of information they provide: 
1. Understanding different traumatic stress syndromes. 
2. Identifying particular personality characteristics for possible vulnerability 
factors. 
3. Interventions and potential long-term outcomes. 
According to Everly (1999), crisis is defined as a response to a perceived stressor 
that overwhelms an individual's usual coping mechanisms, disrupts homeostasis, and 
may cause "functional impairment" (p. 77) within the individual. Crisis theory posits that 
significant threat or challenge to an individual that overwhelms that individual's coping 
resources may be construed as crisis (Caplan, 1969). There are two different types of 
crises, normative or situational (Caplan, 1990). Normative crisis is the loss or threat of 
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loss that can overwhelm an individual's coping mechanisms. Situational crisis may result 
in "the loss of oneself, in the safety of the world, and in the trust of others" (p. 19). 
Crisis intervention calls for the reduction of tension or anxiety that results from 
the crisis event and restoration of the individual to a pre-crisis level of functioning 
(Aguilara, 1990; Mitchell & Everly, 1993; Robinson, 2000). Crisis interventions, 
according to Aguilera, "are designed to be effective for all members of a given group, 
rather than the unique differences of one individual" (p. 21). Morley, Messick, and 
Aguilera (1967) state that the objectives of crisis intervention should include immediacy 
of the intervention, cognitive understanding of the event, ventilation of emotion in order 
to reduce anxiety, exploration of alternative coping skills, and strategies and family/social 
support. 
The intention of crisis intervention is stabilization of the individual, relief of acute 
distress and exploration of personal resources. Those who support early group crisis 
intervention (Caplan, 1964; Dyregrov, 1998; Everly, & Lating, 1995; Flannery, Hanson, 
Penk, Flannery, & Gallagher, 1998; Mitchell, 1983; Raphael, 1986; Wollman, 1993) after 
a critical incident strongly believe that if the goals mentioned above are reached, there is 
less chance that the symptoms of trauma will be long-term. An immediate decrease in the 
intensity of the emotional symptoms can assist the individual to put the incident into 
some perspective, allow for cognitive restructuring or reframing of the incident, and 
facilitate an eventual return to normalization. 
Not all responders negatively react to the same incident at the same time and the 
way that each individual deals with crisis is unique to his or her own coping ability, the 
values that he or she holds, fears, expectations, beliefs, and antecedent conditions 
(Mitchell, 1983; Mitchell & Bray, 1990; Mitchell & Everly, 1993, 1997; Raphael & 
Wilson, 2000; Spitzer and Neely, 1992; Werner, Bates, Bell, Murdoch, & Robinson, 
1992). There is constant interplay between the incident, the stressor, the stress response, 
and the assumptions that an individual holds about the world. An individual may 
experience maladaptive thoughts and emotions that may be beyond his or her coping 
abilities, yet may not understand that what they are experiencing is normal given the 
circumstances. Traumatic stress reactions are the natural and consequent behaviors and 
emotions of the critical incident. Figley (1995), as well as Mitchell and Bray (1990), 
claim that there are consequent behaviors associated with both the event and the 
memories of the event. Both the response and the behaviors may place such a high 
demand on the individual's resources as to create pathology. The resulting pathologies 
may range from traumatic stress disorders to depression and anxiety disorders. 
Wormian and Silver (as cited in Pennebaker, 2000) argue that approximately 50% 
of individuals who face a critical incident will have high levels of psychological distress 
in the weeks following the critical incident and that over half of the individuals will 
return to normal functioning within a year. One year is a long time in emergency 
services. During that year, emergency responders will experience more than one critical 
incident (Corneil, as cited in DeAngelis, 1995) and without incident resolution, a second 
or third critical incident could shift the emergency responder from suffering Critical 
Incident Stress to the more pervasive and detrimental Post Traumatic Stress Disorder or 
Acute Stress Disorder. 
18 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Acute Stress Disorder 
Without mitigation of the symptoms of Critical Incident Stress through early 
crisis intervention, it is possible that the symptoms may become more pervasive, 
potentially resulting in a diagnosable mental disorder. The American Psychiatric 
Association (1994, 2000) has characterized two primary psychological disorders in 
response to a traumatic stressor: Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Acute Stress 
Disorder (ASD). Acute Stress Disorder was first included in the DSM-IV (1994) more as 
a time specific difference than a difference in diagnostic criteria. For a diagnosis of Acute 
Stress Disorder, the disturbance lasts for two days to a maximum of thirty days and 
occurs within a month of the event. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, on the other hand, is 
diagnosed when the onset of symptoms is at least six months after the stressor has 
occurred and the distress lasts more than a month. 
The main diagnostic criteria for both PTSD and ASD are as follows: 
1. Exposure to a traumatic event through actual experience of the event, witnessing 
the event, or confrontation of actual threat or challenge to one's self or others; 
2. The trauma is persistently re-experienced through intrusive recollections of the 
event, distressing dreams, sense of reliving the event, and psychological distress 
when exposed to cues resembling the event. 
3. Persistent avoidance of the stimuli associated with the event such as effort to 
avoid thoughts or feelings, concerted effort to avoid places or situations that may 
be reminiscent of the event, lack of interest in pleasurable activities, and 
detachment. 
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4. Symptoms of increased arousal that were not present before the trauma such as 
hypervigilance, exaggerated startle response, difficulty falling or staying asleep, 
difficulty concentrating, and irritability and anger. 
5. The duration of the symptoms for ASD are no more than 30 days, the duration for 
PTSD is more than a month. 
6. The disturbance causes significant disruption and impairment in daily living. 
Secondary Traumatic Stress Disorder 
Primary trauma is trauma that occurs directly to an individual, such as personal 
violence. Secondary trauma is trauma that occurs when one is empathically engaged with 
victims of a traumatic event such as the police officer who investigates the personal 
violence. It should be noted here that the use of the terms primary and secondary stress is 
for operational definition only and is not meant to imply that the symptoms of secondary 
trauma are in any way less harmful than those of primary trauma. 
Figley (1995) suggests that family, friends, and professionals are susceptible to 
developing traumatic stress symptoms. Learning about another's trauma and in the 
process experiencing traumatic stress is what Figley calls Secondary Traumatic Stress 
(STS). Secondary Traumatic Stress is defined as the "natural, consequent behaviors and 
emotions resulting from knowledge about a traumatizing event experienced by another 
pe r son . . . . [it is] the stress resulting from helping or wanting to help a traumatized 
person" (p. 7). 
Figley identifies specific types of secondary traumatic stress. One type of trauma 
is called simultaneous trauma, when all members of a group are directly affected by a 
single trauma, for example, a tornado touching down in a community. Another type is 
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vicarious trauma, a term most often used to refer to therapists whose clients experience 
direct trauma. The therapist is not directly involved with the trauma event, but may 
become traumatized after listening to his or her clients talk about their trauma events day 
after day. The last type of trauma that Figley identified is secondary trauma. Secondary 
trauma occurs when a traumatic event affects another indirectly. An example of this 
would be when firefighters are working a fire and there are serious injuries or death to the 
civilians in the fire. The firefighters may not be directly affected by the fire, but are 
affected by the primary trauma suffered by the civilian. Figley refers to this phenomenon 
both as Secondary Traumatic Stress and Secondary Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
Secondary Traumatic Stress Disorder (STSD) is a "syndrome of symptoms nearly 
identical to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder except that exposure to knowledge about a 
traumatizing event is associated with a set of STSD symptoms" (Figley, 1995, p. 8). STS 
symptoms can occur, according to Figley, when an individual has been traumatized and 
another individual wants to help. Emergency responders face human suffering and the 
possible destruction of their communities; therefore, it would seem only logical that they 
are as vulnerable to trauma as those who suffer the primary trauma. 
There are many different types of trauma that individuals may experience after a 
traumatic event, as well as other psychological disorders such as depression and anxiety. 
Depression and anxiety are both symptoms of more pervasive stress disorders as well as 
psychological diagnoses in and of themselves. Emergency responders may experience 
any of the stress disorders mentioned above but because of the unique experiences that 
emergency responders are exposed to, a subspecialty within the field of stress and trauma 
was developed to focus specifically on this population. 
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Critical Incident Stress 
Cognitive. Emotional, and Behavioral Response 
Research into adverse psychological reactions among emergency services 
personnel (c. f. DeAngelis, 1995; Mitchell, 1983, 1985; Mitchell & Everly, 1993, 1997; 
Raphael, Singh, Bradbury, & Lambert, 1983-1984; Ravenscroft, 1994; Schlenger, Kulka, 
Fairbank, Hough, et al., 1992) indicates that stress is a significant occupational hazard 
and that emergency responders can experience the same strong, pervasive symptoms as 
civilians given the same trauma event. The recognition that emergency services personnel 
can be potentially vulnerable to the effects of post-trauma stress is now referred to as 
Critical Incident Stress. 
Everly and Lating (1995) call emergency services and other various public safety 
organizations the "lost generation" (p. 5) of psychotraumatology. Acknowledging that 
emergency responders may suffer Critical Incident Stress will be of benefit to the 
profession; recognizing that emergency services personnel are indeed human and have a 
human response to the suffering and loss of others will only ensure that responders have 
the opportunity to experience long and healthy careers. The role of helping others during 
a critical event may be accompanied by not only physical but psychological risk as well. 
According to Everly and Lating, "Those who choose to help others in the midst of, or in 
the wake of, crisis expose themselves to an increased risk of suffering some form of 
dysphoric reaction such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder" (p. 65). Considering that each 
day emergency responders' primary goal is to protect and save lives and property, it is 
crucial to understand their reactions and the consequences of their reaction to critical 
incidents. 
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Critical Incident Stress is different than general daily stress, cumulative stress, or 
even distress (Mitchell, 1983; Mitchell & Everly, 1993, 1997; Raphael, 1986). Critical 
incident stress occurs outside the range of an emergency responders' everyday life 
experience that can have long-term consequences on victims, families, and the 
community. Mitchell (1983) defined Critical Incident Stress as "any situation faced by 
emergency services personnel that causes them to experience unusually strong emotional 
reactions which have the potential to interfere with their ability to function either at the 
scene or later" (p. 6). 
Emergency responders exposed to trauma events may experience the same array 
of symptoms that civilians experience when exposed to a trauma event. It has generally 
been assumed that because of the nature of their work, emergency responders are 
somehow capable of absorbing exposure to events the general public would consider 
traumatic (Moran & Britton, 1994). The theory of habituation and desensitization after 
multiple exposures to traumatic events should promote appropriate coping skills needed 
to insulate the responder during future trauma events; however, according to Moran and 
Britton, research has not supported this assumption and it is unlikely that any coping skill 
can defend against continuous exposure to critical incidents. Responders that have been 
able to absorb the impact of trauma events in the past may begin to " . . . decompensate 
upon continued exposure to severe stress" (Mitchell, 1988a, p. 205). 
The nature of the incident can have a profound effect on an emergency 
responder's world view, identity, and basic beliefs about self and others (Everly & 
Rosenfeld, 1981; Krupnick & Horowitz, 1980; Violanti & Patton, 1999). Pearlman and 
Saakvitne (1995) found that while helpers acknowledge the daily reality of trauma and 
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are fully aware of the potential for hurt and loss in their own lives, a particular incident 
may have such an impact on an individual as to create difficult images and thoughts 
about the incident. Each individual will react to stress in a unique way and most times, 
emergency responders will recover within days or weeks of the incident (Mitchell & 
Bray, 1990), however, responders may become so overwhelmed by the symptoms that 
their ability to function both on and off the job may be jeopardized (Patterson & Violanti, 
n.d.). In a study of 1,154 firefighters in an urban setting, Corneil (as cited in DeAngelis, 
1995), found that compared to a 1 to 3% diagnosable rate of PTSD found in the general 
public, the diagnosable rate of PTSD in the fire service alone is 16.5%, so emergency 
services personnel are at a higher risk for primary and secondary trauma than the general 
population. 
Society expects emergency responders to provide assistance to victims of 
traumatic events and the more emergency responders identify with those who need their 
help, the greater their vulnerability to Critical Incident Stress (Fullerton, McCarroll, 
Ursano, & Wright, 1992). Identification does not necessarily mean that the responder 
personally knows the victim, although that may occur. Identification, according to 
Fullerton, et al., is a process by which responders see themselves as being similar to those 
he or she is trying to save. For example, if a paramedic works a multi-vehicle accident 
and identifies with the children he or she is trying to save because the children remind 
him or her of their own children, identification then becomes a part of how the 
emergency responder perceives and reacts to the critical incident. 
A number of studies have been undertaken to determine to what extent a 
perceived critical incident will affect emergency responders. Moran and Colless (1995), 
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surveyed Australian firefighters to determine firefighters' perception of work stress. 
Nearly 30% of firefighters responded that they had experienced incidents that were 
severe enough that they would seek help; however, just over a third of the firefighters, for 
reasons that are not clear, did not seek the help needed to work through the incident. 
Death, motor vehicle accidents, fire, and situations involving children were perceived as 
the most stressful incidents on the job, with over half of the respondents reporting that 
they had had no initial training to inoculate themselves against the response to perceived 
critical incidents. Better training, according to Alexander and Klein (2001), would 
"reinforce the individual's sense of control when faced with difficult and challenging 
situations, and are likely to help in the development of effective coping strategies" (p. 
80). 
Mistakes on scene need to be as close to zero as humanly possible given that 
mistakes in the emergency services profession may result in death of civilians and 
destruction of property. Unfortunately, tasks are not always completed to the satisfaction 
of the responder; for example, a firefighter/paramedic may be called to evacuate a 
building before it has been cleared; people may die or suffer serious injury. Marmar, 
Weiss, Metzler, Delucchi, et al. (1999) found that the threat of inability to complete the 
tasks, perception of threat during the incident, and perceived lack of control over the 
situation produced intrusive thoughts, nightmares, and behavioral reenactments. 
McFarlane (1993) found that if an individual perceives that he or she is unable to 
complete the task, the perception will have some effect on the use of avoidance behavior, 
which may carry over into all aspects of a responder's life. 
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Fullerton, McCarroll, Ursano, and Wright (1992) found that feelings of 
helplessness and guilt, when task completion is not possible, reflects the desire of victims 
wanting life to return to a pre-incident state where they had some perceived sense of 
control over life. For responders, the desired sense of control is to complete the task in 
order to continue protecting and saving lives and property. 
Other sources of stress that may contribute to a responder's negative reaction to 
stress response include perceived support, or lack thereof, from administration. Beaton 
and Murphy (1993) investigated sources of occupational stress among firefighter/EMT's 
and firefighter/paramedics and found that sleep disturbances, management/labor conflicts 
and perceived personal safety are high sources of stress among both groups. In a study of 
ambulance personnel, Alexander and Klein (2001) found that nearly three-quarters of the 
respondents "viewed the ambulance service as never concerned about their staff (p. 80), 
which confirms Neale's (1991) findings that administration may be out of touch with the 
needs of their members. Alexander (1993) found that ambulance personnel may not 
report any distress because of concerns about administration confidentiality. Robinson, 
Sigman, and Wilson (1997), in a study of suburban police officers, found that a 
significant number of police officers were hesitant to access their Employee Assistance 
Program (EAP) because of a lack of trust and the perceived connection of the EAP to 
their administration. 
There are varying factors that precipitate the longevity and severity of the 
symptoms. Researchers have found a positive correlation between longevity of career, 
large numbers of emergency calls, increased contact with the victims and long work 
hours, and the longevity and severity of CIS symptoms (Beaton & Murphy, 1993; 
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Hodgkinson & Shepard, 1994; Marmar, Weiss, Meltzler, Ronfeldt, & Foreman, 1996; 
Moran & Britton, 1994). In a study of firefighters, police officers, and paramedics who 
responded to the Loma Prieta earthquake, Marmar, Weiss, Metzler, Delucchi, et al. 
(1999) found working long shifts, less experience with critical incidents, and external 
locus of control were associated with greater depersonalization, memory disturbances, 
rumination and difficulty mastering the incident. Responders continued to report distress 
eighteen months later. 
Exposure to sustained stress may lead to a decreased resistance to stress (Moran 
& Briton, 1994), possible diminished work performance (Spitzer & Neely, 1992), an 
increase in risk-taking behaviors (Mitchell, 1986a), and impaired cognitive and emotional 
functioning (Gibbs, 1989). Emergency responders are more likely to suppress their 
emotions in order to complete the task, which may delay any further response. A delayed 
response or no response may ultimately result in self-destructive behaviors, and in the 
extreme, suicidal ideation and attempts (Mitchell, 1986b). The most reliable predictors of 
stress reactions are duration of exposure and the intensity of exposure (Green, Wilson, & 
Lindy, 1985). The intensity is of a subjective nature, and the critical incident may be the 
result of an accumulation of perceived stressors from numerous incidents in the 
responder's work history. 
The consequences of intentionally suppressing thoughts and emotions may cause, 
in the responder, a wide range of emotional and behavioral symptomology (Table 1) and 
cognitive and physical symptomology (Table 2). It should be noted that these thought 
processes are expected and should be seen as normal reactions for emergency responders 
(McFarlane, 1993; Mitchell, 1983, 1985; Mitchell & Everly, 1993, 1995, 1997). 
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Table 1: Emotional and Behavioral Symptoms of Response to a Critical Incident 
Emotional Symptoms 
Shock 
Sadness 
Humiliation 
Suicidal ideation 
Denial 
Confusion 
Grief 
Guilt 
Reactive depression Nightmares 
Phobic reactions 
Anger 
Terror 
Sorrow 
Blame 
Hypervigilance 
Rage 
Shame 
Fear 
Moodiness 
Anxiety 
Exaggerated startle Emotional numbing Depression 
response 
Behavioral Symptoms 
Dreams of event Sadness 
Frustration 
Irritability 
Fatigue and 
lethargy 
Bothered by 
publicity 
Motivational change 
Memory problems 
Feelings of 
inadequacy 
Altered social 
activities 
Mood swings 
Personal risk 
Resentment 
Need for team 
support 
Difficulty 
concentrating 
Work problems 
Helplessness 
Loss of sexual desire 
Altered sleep 
patterns 
Repeated 
recollections of the 
event 
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Table 2: Cognitive and Physical Symptoms of Response to a Critical Incident 
Cognitive Symptoms 
Confusion in thinking 
Loss of attention span 
Problems with abstract thinking 
Memory dysfunction 
Physical Symptoms 
Difficulty making decisions 
Lowered concentration 
Calculation problems 
Lowering of all higher cognitive functions 
Difficulty breathing 
Chest pain 
Headaches 
Light headedness 
Increased heart rate and blood pressure 
Hunger 
Cardiac arrest 
Fatigue 
Dizzy spells 
Thirst 
Mania 
Excessive sweating 
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Durham, McCammon and Allison (1985) found that 70% of those who responded 
to the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel collapse experienced intrusive, repetitive 
thoughts and images and used denial as a coping strategy to lessen the psychic intrusion. 
Yet avoidance of the stressor, according to Mitchell, Everly, and Mitchell (1999), may be 
seen as a necessity to the responder for fear of appearing weak. The general emotional 
response after the critical incident was withdrawal from other people. In a study of 
emergency responders in Australia, Werner, Bates, Bell, Murdoch and Robinson (1992) 
also found that withdrawal is a coping strategy to a critical incident, as well as vigilance 
over safety concerns, although it was not clear if the vigilance is carried over to any other 
aspect of a responder's life. 
Personality Factors 
It appears then, that the role of helping others may be accompanied by 
psychological risk. What makes an individual choose an occupation when mind, body, 
and spirit are at risk for potentially pervasive psychological trauma and perhaps death? 
According to Coffey (T. Coffey, personal communication, January 18, 2002), 
there is no choice to make whether or not one will perhaps be a firefighter, police officer, 
or paramedic. It is a deep need within that has to be filled, says Coffey, a state of mind 
that either one has or does not have. If there is no choice, emergency services' is a 
vocation then, as opposed to an occupation, and the vocation of emergency services may 
define who responders are as people. Mitchell and Bray (1990) stated that individuals 
who work in a vocation " . . . with inherent powerful stressors have personalities that 
match them to the work or they would find it intolerable" (p. 19). Personality factors 
influence occupational choice and how responders react to occupational risk. If the world 
30 
Rescue personality Control needs Obsessive traits Compulsive traits 
Action-oriented Risk takers Internally motivated Highly dedicated 
Family-oriented Difficulty saying High tolerance for A need to be 
no Stress Needed 
Positive Outcomes of a Critical Incident 
Personality characteristics of emergency responders may help them to cope in 
situations the general population would consider extreme. The various personality factors 
that are enmeshed within an individual responder may produce a negative response to a 
critical incident but the same various personality factors could, in fact, produce a very 
positive response as well. The following research explores the various factors and ways 
that emergency responders may employ to cope with a critical incident. 
view and basic beliefs about oneself and others change, an emergency responder's 
perception of who he or she is will change as well. Responders may no longer present 
themselves as "police officer" or "paramedic" or "firefighter," rather, they may be unsure 
of who they are both on the job and off. 
Although the personality of each individual is unique, it would seem that there are 
certain characteristics that most emergency responders possess. Without these traits, 
including the high tolerance for stress, would it be possible, day after day to face 
'abnormal' events? While each of us may possess certain personality traits or degrees of 
these personality traits, the traits are, as shown in Table 3, consistent in emergency 
responders (Mitchell, 1986a; Mitchell & Everly, 1993) 
Table 3: Personality Factors of Emergency Services Personnel 
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In a study of occupational stress and job satisfaction among California Fire 
Service personnel, Giatras (2000) measured personality hardiness to determine if this 
construct serves as a buffer against occupational stress and job satisfaction, defining 
hardiness as "a personality construct based in existential personality theory, which 
consists of a person's tendency toward control, commitment, and challenge in facing life 
strenuously and authentically" (p. 29). He found that firefighters who scored high on 
personality hardiness were less susceptible to job stressors, and more able to adapt and 
cope with new stressors compared to those who were low on personality hardiness. 
The results of Giatras' (2000) study confirms the results of Tedeschi & Calhoun's 
(1996) research, who found that effective coping skills and a positive outlook are 
correlated to personal hardiness and resiliency. Hardiness was again measured by three 
traits: commitment, control, and challenge, and responders who are high in hardiness 
should be shielded against disturbing events. The participants in the study that scored 
high on hardiness perceived the incident as being under their control, as a challenge 
rather than threat, and as meaningful rather than pointless (commitment). 
Violanti (2001) describes a method called scripting as a way to achieve a positive 
outcome of a critical incident. The use of scripting refocuses the individual from the 
pathology of the response to inner strengths and resources to work through the incident. 
An individual who has characteristics such as effective coping skills and a positive 
outlook may be more resilient and hardy to resist stress and will most likely use the 
incident as an opportunity to grow. 
Alexander and Klein (2001) found hardiness to be correlated with less burnout in 
a survey of 160 paramedics and EMT's. Hardiness is not a trait of personality, according 
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to Alexander and Klein, but rather a result of personal development, which includes 
many factors such as past history and world view. They did notice, however, that if there 
was not sufficient recovery time between incidents in which to challenge and take control 
of the incident, the responders were less likely to adapt effectively. Positive coping skills 
that include flexibility, will assist the responder in developing new unique coping skills, 
become more resilient, and gain some mastery over future incidents as well as reduce the 
potential for more severe symptoms. 
Fullerton, McCarroll, Ursano, and Wright (1992), found that the use of humor and 
rituals create a boundary around the responders, which is considered a supportive 
interaction and emotional sharing of the incident. Although it may be seen as an 
inappropriate method of coping to those who do not share in the experience or are not 
directly involved in the experience, shared humor can be seen as a way of achieving 
group closeness, which may promote other adaptive coping mechanisms such as rituals 
and talking about the experience with others. Rituals give meaning to incidents that may 
seem meaningless or preventable and promote "a feeling of safeness and confidence for 
the traumatized person in a situation of inner psychic chaos" (Lundin, 1994, p. 386). The 
opportunity to share in another's rituals, or beliefs, creates group cohesion and by 
sharing, a responder may feel more attached to the group rather than perceive that they 
face the incident alone. 
Support 
Social Support and Stress 
Social support is viewed as a mediator in positive adaptation to stress. Jenkins 
(1996) found that strong social support among emergency medical workers decreased the 
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chance of Post Traumatic Stress symptoms and increased responders' ability to recover. 
Emergency medical workers who perceived less empathy and understanding from 
outsiders and kept their emotions hidden had increased acute stress symptoms and began 
to trust less, withdrawing further. This confirms Mitchell and Bray's (1990) assertion that 
trust is a most basic human need and if the responder perceives his or her social support 
as less than empathetic and unapproachable, the individual will continue to withdraw 
from those who may be able to best help. As a responder withdraws from contact with 
those around them, either at home or at work, responders may become quick to anger and 
more suspicious and distrustful of those around them. 
In a review of social support and psychological trauma, Flannery (1990) 
concluded that there is a link between the perception of availability of positive social 
support and decreased symptoms of distress. Social support is not just a value for an 
opportunity for talking; rather, it is also the perception of connectedness to someone 
when a responder may feel most alone. Humor, rituals, and empathic support can assist 
responders in integrating the present incident with positive adaptive behaviors, lessening 
the chance of the negative aspects spilling into the other areas of his or her life such as 
family. 
Family Support and Stress 
There is concern among researchers that it is difficult for the main support outside 
of the service, for example, spouses and families, to provide the support needed in order 
to assist the responder after a critical incident (Bledin, 1994; McCubbin & McCubbin, 
1989). Corneil (as cited in DeAngelis, 1995) found that if the individual responder 
perceived support from family and coworkers, he or she is 40% less likely to experience 
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PTSD symptoms. However, families may not be able to provide assistance because of 
their own fears about the incident or changes within the responder affected (Stein & 
Eisen, 1996). 
When looking at coping patterns among emergency responders that attended the 
Hyatt Regency Hotel collapse, Wilkinson (1983) found that 20% of responders perceived 
their families as not helpful in the aftermath, while 79% perceived their friends as 
supportive and caring. In a different study, 35% of responders reported that the reaction 
of their families after a critical incident was neutral rather than supportive or non-
supportive (Durham, McCammon, & Allison, 1985). It is unclear in either of these 
studies if emergency responders intentionally kept their families from knowing about the 
more gruesome aspects of their work or whether they perceived their families as 
unapproachable. However, responders who rated their spouses and families as supportive 
(Wilkinson, 1983) still have concerns that they are intentionally harming their families, 
but feel that in order to keep the stress from becoming harmful; they talk openly about 
their thoughts and feelings anyway. 
Patterson and Violanti (n.d.) investigated police officers perception of stress 
spillover between work and home life and vice versa. The study showed that the majority 
of police officers perceived that spillover from work affected their home life, while 40% 
of the police officers perceived that home life spilled over into their work. The outcomes 
of the spillover are marital conflict, health problems, and an increase in alcoholism. 
Families need to learn how to cope with the situations that emergency responders 
face. Gisa (as cited in Figley, 1985b) found that it was not the safety issue of the spouse 
who was in emergency response that was of concern, but the personality changes that 
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came with the job. The profession of emergency services tends to be clannish and 
spouses that work outside the profession may feel like an outsider and begin to isolate 
themselves (Besner & Robinson, 1982). 
The extent of the impact of a critical incident on an emergency responder's family 
may be enormous. Stratton (1976) has identified six potential areas of impact: emotional 
suppression, overprotection of the family, displaced anger and frustration, fear, the need 
to be taken care of by family members, and ineffective coping mechanisms. Besner and 
Robinson (1982) include three more areas of impact that a critical incident may have on 
family members: restrictions on family freedom, increased use of alcohol and drugs, and 
an unwillingness to attend to the families needs. 
It is clear that a critical incident that is perceived by the emergency responder to 
be a negative event does not only impact the emergency responder, but those around him 
as well, whether on the job or off. 
Short-term Interventions 
Critical Incident Stress Management 
It is evident that when a responder experiences a critical incident, the aftermath is 
not limited only to the job but has the potential to permeate all areas of his or her life. To 
meet the demands of this high-risk population, early interventions have been developed 
in order to mitigate the effects of a critical incident and return emergency services 
personnel to normal functioning. Although there is some disagreement among researchers 
regarding the efficacy of early interventions such as Critical Incident Stress Management 
(CISM) (Mitchell, 1983; Mitchell & Everly, 1993), debriefing remains the most utilized 
early intervention with emergency responders. 
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The development of the Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) program is 
a response to the effects of trauma and the need for appropriate interventions that focus 
specifically on emergency responders. Interventions such as CISM may, in times of 
crisis, promote a "powerful sense of group identity, and group cohesion" (0rner, 1995, p. 
515). This management program is a multi-component intervention that includes pre-
incident training, debriefing, family and pastoral care, one-to-one crisis counselling, and 
follow-up for referral and possible further treatment. The following explanation of CISM 
is based on the Mitchell Model of CISM (Mitchell, 1983; Mitchell and Everly, 1993, 
1995, 1997). 
Pre-incident training is thought to be inoculation or pre-incident education about 
the effects and consequences of stress particularly as it pertains to emergency services. 
The more knowledge and understanding emergency responders have regarding both the 
positive and negative responses to stress, the more he or she will see the stress as a 
normal response to a stressor, rather than seeing the pathology of the response (Mitchell 
& Dyregrov, 1993). 
Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) is perhaps the most well-known 
component of CISM. Debriefing is utilized when a homogenous group of emergency 
responders have experienced a critical incident, perhaps shootings, deadly fires, multi-
vehicle accidents, or disasters, among other types of incidents. Debriefing is not 
psychotherapy; it is an opportunity for emergency responders to talk openly and honestly 
about their thoughts and feelings regarding the incident they experienced as a group. 
CISD teams are comprised of peer team members from various emergency response 
groups as well as mental health professionals. While a mental health professional 
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oversees the meetings, it is the peer team members that may be team leaders during the 
process of a debriefing. As with crisis intervention, CISD is based upon immediacy, 
proximity and expectancy. A formal debriefing may be implemented up to two weeks 
after the scene is cleared, however, in mass disaster situations, debriefmgs may be 
provided up to three weeks or more after the scene is cleared (Mitchell & Everly, 1997). 
Following the protocol in the Mitchell Model (1983) (Mitchell & Everly, 1993), 
debriefmgs usually last between two and four hours. 
The intention of a debriefing is to normalize the stress response within the group 
by moving through a seven stage process intended to "achieve the goal of psychological 
closure subsequent to a critical incident or traumatic event" (Mitchell & Everly, 1997, p. 
7), as well as cognitive refraining and normalization of thoughts and emotions. In a safe 
and secure environment, responders are encouraged to describe and talk about what 
happened during the incident, their thoughts during the incident, what the worst part of 
the incident was for them, and the emotions they are experiencing. The last stages 
provide more information about stress and stress reduction methods, as well as answering 
questions the responders may have regarding the process or further clarification about the 
process. 
As stated earlier, the consequences of CIS have the ability to invade all aspects of 
a responder's life. The family of an emergency responder is not immune to the effects 
that CIS has on their spouse or partner. Family crisis intervention is another component 
of CISM meant to educate families about stress and the potential changes that may occur 
when the emergency responder experiences a critical incident. Family knowledge and 
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understanding about the impact of CIS creates a more proactive support system rather 
than a reactive system. 
One-to-one counselling focuses on the individual rather than the group and may 
be accessed when an individual emergency responder perceives an incident to be critical. 
This is not psychotherapy; rather, it is the opportunity to discuss the incident with 
someone whom the effected responder trusts, whether it is a peer team member, a mental 
health professional or a chaplain. 
Pastoral care is often available through the respective departments and the CISM 
program. Chaplains provide individual or family spiritual counselling rather than a focus 
on the psychological reaction and are an important component for long-term care of the 
responder who may question his or her faith after a critical incident, or needs spiritual 
support in addition to psychological support. 
Follow-up services and referral services are available for those who may need 
more individualized interventions after the debriefing process if symptoms become more 
pervasive and ongoing and the responder is not able to return to a normal level of 
functioning. Follow-up services include referrals to qualified psychologists/therapists 
who are trained in trauma and the trauma response as it pertains to emergency services. 
Just as no type of training will completely eliminate the potential for stress 
(Duffy, 1979) there are no interventions that will completely eliminate stress reactions, 
which are based on many factors such as personality and past trauma history, as 
discussed earlier. Recent research into the debriefing process in the field of trauma has 
created a debate of whether the intervention is efficacious (see Dyregrov, 1998; Everly & 
Boyd, 1999; Flannery, 1998; Larsson, Tedfelt, & Anderson, 1999; Mitchell, 2003; 
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Robinson & Mitchell, 1993; Wee, Mills, & Koelher, 1999, Wollman, 1993) or not (see 
Carlier, Voerman, & Gersons, 2000; Kenardy, Webster, Lewin, Carr, et al., 1996; 
McFarlane, 1988; Rose & Bisson, 1998; Rose, Bisson, & Wessely, 2002) 1 that should be 
expected with any new intervention if it is to be accepted as valid. 
Although it is not within the scope of this paper to determine if the process of 
debriefing is efficacious or not, it is hard to ignore the literature on both sides of the 
debate. It is not easy to conduct studies regarding the efficacy of debriefing; ethical issues 
must take precedence over scientific study. For example, if emergency responders 
experience a critical incident, it would be ethically irresponsible to separate responders 
into a debriefed group and a non-debriefed group for a randomized controlled study just 
to determine if the process is efficacious or not. Those who support the process of 
debriefing rely on meta-analysis, anecdotal evidence, comparison studies, and responder 
self-report to determine the efficacy of the intervention with the population the 
intervention is intended for: emergency responders, disaster workers, and other groups 
[italics added] who experience a critical incident. 
Those who oppose the process of debriefing support their conclusions based on 
studies that focus on populations the intervention of debriefing is not intended for: single 
primary trauma victims as opposed to group secondary trauma victims. As well, the 
interventions used in the studies by those who oppose debriefing were one-to one, one­
time interventions (psychotherapy), which cannot be compared to group, long-term 
management programs. 
Whether one believes the process of debriefing is efficacious or not, any 
intervention that deals with human life should undergo professional scrutiny as it is in the 
1
 For an exhaustive list of research regarding the efficacy of debriefing, see Mitchell (2003). 
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best interest of the consumer for the profession to do so. The debate should continue 
using valid, scientifically and ethically sound methods that is demanded when 
determining the efficacy of any intervention. 
While the focus of research has been on symptoms of short term effects and the 
development of immediate interventions that minimize and perhaps eliminate the effects, 
there has been a shortage of research into the area of long-term effects of CIS. 
Long-Term Effects of Critical Incident Stress 
For whatever reasons, whether it is ethical considerations or simply that the field 
is so new, few studies have investigated whether or not CIS has long-term effects on 
some responders and if it does what those effects might be. Recent research, in an attempt 
to determine what the long-term effects may be, focus on disaster studies where 
implementation of a group, short-term intervention has been applied. Few studies actually 
focus on single responder critical incidents. Considering that disasters are a rare 
occurrence, research into single responder critical incidents and the long-term effects of 
Critical Incident Stress resulting from single responder critical incidents would only serve 
to add to our knowledge and understanding of Critical Incident Stress. 
At an average rate of approximately four critical incidents per year (Corneil, as 
cited in De Angelis, 1995), there may not be enough recovery time between incidents 
(Alexander & Klein, 2001). If the effects of one critical incident are not resolved, another 
critical incident will likely compound the first and the symptoms may become more 
invasive and debilitating. The long-term effects of trauma are "numerous and 
complicated" (van der Kolk, 1996, p. 184) which not only puts the individual responder 
at risk, but may put his or her crew or partner at risk as well. Understanding the potential 
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for long-term effects and what the effects are is essential to keeping emergency 
responders healthy, both psychologically and physically. 
In a longitudinal study of emergency responders after the collapse of the double-
decker Interstate 880 during the 1989 San Francisco Bay area earthquake, Marmar, et al., 
(1999) found that rescue workers, including fire, police and EMS personnel were at risk 
for continuing symptomatic distress approximately 18 months after exposure. Although it 
is rare that disasters of this magnitude occur, Marmar et al. found that individuals with 
less exposure to critical incidents, such as less experienced personnel, regardless of task, 
had a higher stress response, regardless of training. Those who were less experienced or 
had not been exposed to the severity of some scenes may have disconnected emotionally 
at the time of the trauma, perhaps because of the severity of the scene. The emergency 
responder may be able to complete his or her tasks, but at the price of long-term 
difficulties and mastery of the traumatic event. According to Marmar et al., some of the 
more intrusive experiences may express themselves as imagery of the scene or a 
particular victim, or affective states such as intrusive thoughts, and nightmares. 
Fullerton, McCarroll, Ursano, and Wright (1992) found that 29 months after 
working bushfires in South Australia, 2 1 % of fire, police, and EMS personnel were still 
experiencing recurring imagery that interfered with their lives. Emergency responders not 
only have to deal with being exposed to the stress of the event, but the stress of the role of 
rescuer. Repeated exposure to destruction, death, and life-threatening situations as well as 
the psychological and physical demands of the job leads to feelings of fear, resentment, 
and anger, which may then lead to interference with effective functioning. Markowitz, 
Gutterman, Link, & Rivera (1987) also found that firefighters who had been subjected to 
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chemical fires experienced high levels of threat to physical safety that resulted in extreme 
emotional reactions and maladaptive patterns of thought. 
Raphael, Singh, Bradbury, and Lambert (1983) investigated the effects of a rail 
disaster on emergency responders. The findings suggested that fear of physical threat and 
longevity and severity of the scene caused emotional disturbances such as depression and 
anxiety. Raphael, et al. also found that support workers who did not work the scene had a 
higher level of feelings of helplessness and frustration, as well as higher levels of 
depressive symptoms. Raphael, et al. posit that off-scene support workers felt a higher 
level of helplessness because of the longer period of time that elapsed before they could 
help the victims, whereas on-scene rescue workers were able to assist immediately. 
Raphael, et al. considered frustration a result of support workers inability to help victims 
they were trained to help, rather than an inability to do a job they were not qualified to 
do. This confirms Figley's (1995) theory that those who are not directly involved in the 
initial rescue work, but are aware of the trauma occurring to others, may experience 
symptoms of Secondary Traumatic Stress. 
Marmar, Weiss, Metzler, and Delucchi (1996) found that level of exposure at a 
critical incident is related to both immediate and long-term post-exposure response. If an 
individual has higher levels of perceived threat and uses avoidant coping strategies, the 
individual will have greater difficulty in confronting and disclosing their trauma. The 
more the individual avoids disclosing his or her thoughts and feelings about the trauma, 
the more internalized these thoughts and feelings will become. The more internalized the 
thoughts and feelings become, the greater the risk for developing symptomology of Acute 
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Stress Disorder and/or Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Recovery then becomes a long 
term process. 
Wee, Mills, and Koehler (1999), in a longitudinal study of emergency medical 
services personnel involved in the 1993 Los Angeles Civil Disturbance, found that at 
three months, EMS personnel experienced symptoms in the mild to mid range of PTSD. 
EMS workers reported feelings of fear for personal safety, distress at the longevity and 
severity of calls, and the number of calls during the riots as well as feeling overwhelmed 
generally by the riots. In a related study, Scott and Jordan (1993) found that nearly a third 
of firefighters that were exposed to the Los Angeles Civil Disturbance still experienced 
distress six months following the riots. Specific stress symptoms also included feeling 
overwhelmed by the severity of the calls and personal safety. 
In a study of post-traumatic stress symptomology in police officers, Carlier, 
Voerman, and Gersons (2000) found that at one week after a critical incident, officers had 
a significantly higher rate of distress, including re-experiencing of the incident as well as 
avoidance behaviors. Six months after the critical incident, none of the officers met the 
criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD. However, it is possible the officers were experiencing 
symptomology corresponding to the diagnosis of Critical Incident Stress, rather than 
meeting the criteria for PTSD, which was the standard set for this study. 
Werner, Bates, Bell, Murdoch, and Robinson (1992) found that numbing might 
delay any reaction to a critical incident. Sights, sounds, or smells that may be reminiscent 
of the critical incident can trigger delayed responses. Studying Victoria State emergency 
responders, Werner et al., found that two to six months after a critical incident, 20% of 
emergency responders reported triggers of the critical incident and 44% reported weekly 
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to monthly triggering of the incident. Responses were varied, including negative thought 
avoidance, sleep and appetite disturbances, agitation and depression, awareness of one's 
own mortality, duty avoidance, and withdrawal. 
In a two-year follow up after the crash of an air ambulance, Macnab, Russell, 
Lowe, and Gagnon (1999) reported that many of the paramedics were still negatively 
affected by the events of the crash. The most commonly reported symptoms of Critical 
Incident Stress were grief and sleep patterns. However, in emergency services, disturbed 
sleep patterns are part of the norm for shift work and should be expected. 
Critical incidents are unexpected and time-limited (Flannery, 1999; Wollman, 
1993), but the consequences of the critical incident on emergency responders are not 
time-limited. Flannery found that most emergency responders positively cope with 
critical incidents with few disruptions in their lives, and that CISD can help emergency 
responders address the initial incident. However, Flannery states that some individuals 
may have a difficult time processing the event and become anxious, depressed, and 
physically ill. 
The Center for Disease Control (1999) has researched the impact of Critical 
Incident Stress and found that after six months, 20% of emergency services personnel 
who experienced either the death of a coworker on the job (line of duty death) or a 
disaster, still suffered from severe Critical Incident Stress. Out of this twenty percent, 3 % 
continued to experience permanent profound distress, and 3% suffered from Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
It is possible that the effects of Critical Incident Stress are cumulative, and that 
over time, issues from past incidents that are not fully resolved may become critical at the 
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next incident. According to Moran and Briton (1994), time does not necessarily mitigate 
the reactions generated by emergency responders. They state that there are many 
variables that may cause an individual to react more negatively at one incident even 
though it may not be an incident that is particularly challenging, life-threatening or 
gruesome. The incident will only have to produce intense reactions such as fear or anger 
to make the incident critical for that one individual. It is difficult to study long-term 
effects of Critical Incident Stress, according to Moran and Briton; simply because of the 
unique nature of the trauma response for each individual that has experienced an incident 
he or she perceives is critical. 
Conclusion 
Protocols for debriefing within the multi-component CISM program demand that 
the process be utilized with groups of emergency responders. If only one individual 
experiences a particular situation that he or she perceives to be a critical incident, this 
individual may not have the opportunity to discuss the event, since no other crew 
member, partner, or supervisor has experienced the situation as a critical incident. If the 
individual suffering stress does not have any outward symptoms, it may not be visibly 
apparent that they are experiencing Critical Incident Stress. If there are no supports in 
place for the individual to deal with the critical incident, the symptoms may become 
severe enough to result in possible suspension, forced leave, and in the extreme, suicidal 
ideation and attempts. In certain occupations, the reported rate of long-term reactions of 
Critical Incident Stress may not seem all that high. In emergency services, however, the 
very nature of their work demands emergency responders be psychologically able to cope 
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with the demands of their job. Therefore, it is not only necessary to understand the short-
term effects a critical incident may have on a responder, but the long-term effects as well. 
The review of literature has shown that emergency responders may be affected by 
symptoms of Critical Incident Stress after a critical incident occurs. The incident may be 
perceived as critical by groups of responders, or by a single responder, depending on each 
responder's perception of the incident. Various factors such as perceptions of their jobs, 
perceptions of themselves, and levels of administration, coworker, and family support 
will also determine how the responder will respond to the incident. Short-term 
interventions as well as strong support from administration, coworkers, and family may 
help responders cope with the incident. The results of research that explores long-term 
effects have found that some responders continue to experience pervasive effects of 
Critical Incident Stress for months after the critical incident. This study focuses on 
responders who continue to experience Critical Incident Stress at least six months post 
critical incident and the perceptions they have regarding their jobs, themselves, and 
perceived support from family, coworkers, and administration. 
Chapter 3 will explore the method chosen for this study as well as participant 
demographics, the protocol followed to gain access to the pool of participants, interview 
question development, data analysis, researcher validity, and ethical considerations. 
Chapter 3 
Method 
The experiences of emergency responders are of primary importance to this study, 
and in-depth reports by responders are needed to gain an understanding of their 
experiences. Their experiences cannot be removed from their contexts. Qualitative 
research seeks to identify the deeper structures and common elements in experiences 
while valuing the uniqueness of each responder's experience. 
Qualitative research was chosen for this project because of the lack of research 
and understanding in the area of long-term effects of Critical Incident Stress among 
emergency responders. As well, most research into the area of Critical Incident Stress is 
of a quantitative nature, focusing on a specific research question, such as "Did you 
experience nightmares?" or "Do you feel supported by administration?" or "How 
bothered are you by [particular] stressors on the job?" Quantitative research has done 
much toward the understanding of specific stressors and specific reactions to stressors 
within the emergency services professions. However, in order to understand what the 
experiences of emergency responders are, a qualitative research approach gives a deeper 
understanding of the perceptions and emotions an individual responder may still be 
experiencing after his or her critical incident. This qualitative study, as opposed to 
quantitative research, gave responders the opportunity to tell their own stories, in their 
own words, which in turn helps to understand responders and the social and cultural 
contexts within which they live, from their point of view, which is largely lost when 
textual data are quantified (Kaplan & Maxwell, 1994). 
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All good scientific research attempts to avoid personal bias and dogma, regardless 
of philosophical stance. The major argument against human science research and 
qualitative methods is that qualitative methods lack rigor and therefore are open to bias. 
Ragin (1987) argues that since all research is guided by one's paradigms and beliefs 
about nature or reality and research, there is always an element of one's own bias in all 
research, whether qualitative or quantitative. The issue comes to the fore when 
researchers from both philosophies fail to recognize that there is a potential for bias in all 
research dealing with human science and neglect to preserve researcher and method 
integrity. 
While there are many methods of qualitative research, the approach utilized for 
this specific study is grounded theory. Grounded theory begins by focusing on an area of 
interest and gathers data from a variety of sources such as interviews, case studies, or 
observation, and seeks to develop theory that is grounded in data systematically gathered 
and analyzed (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). While quantitative methods start with theories 
and end in generalizations, the general goals of grounded theory is to construct theories 
from a question in order to understand the phenomenon, such as in this study, "What are 
the experiences of emergency responders at least six months post critical incident'.''" 
Chamaz (2001) posits that the purpose of grounded theory is to understand and describe 
participants' life experiences by understanding the common themes that emerge when 
participants describe their experiences in their own words. 
The goal in this study is to understand the common themes to produce an account 
of an emergency responder's experience that is faithful to what he has reported. 
According to Lee (1999), good grounded theory should inductively derive theories from 
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data while simultaneously grounding the account into empirical observations. From the 
observations, theory can be built by making comparisons. For example, if a paramedic 
states that he always checks a scene for potential dangers before moving to the patient, 
the question arises: "Do all paramedics check the scene for dangers before approaching 
the patient?" New data arises through each individual's experience and suggests future 
observation with other participants. Questions were developed to address the responders 
concerns and were constantly revised in order to learn of and understand their 
experiences. 
Qualitative research into emergency responders' experiences is a difficult and 
complex process. The ethical considerations must always take precedent. Yet, there is a 
need to explore and describe the phenomenon of single responder critical incidents and 
qualitative methodology would permit that exploration and description. For this study, 
quantitative methodology would have produced another set of numbers that would not 
have been able to describe the depth of thought and emotion that emergency responders' 
may experience after a critical incident. A quantitative method would ask "How much did 
that incident bother you?" rather than "Can you describe, in your own words, that 
incident for me?" 
With the implementation of immediate crisis interventions such as CISM, it is 
possible that the effects of Critical Incident Stress are mitigated. The question is then, 
"What are emergency responders' experiences six months post critical incident?" and, 
"Are the effects of Critical Incident Stress mitigated by early intervention?" If immediate 
crisis intervention is not available or the incident is a single responder critical incident, it 
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was also important to determine "Are emergency responders continuing to experience 
negative effects of Critical Incident Stress at least six months post critical incident?" 
Participants 
Method of Securing Access to Participants 
The nature of this study involved asking emergency responders about the critical 
incident that they have experienced and their experiences at least six months post critical 
incident. Therefore, it was necessary to contact and discuss the nature of the study with 
Fire/Paramedic and Police Service administrations and association representatives by 
phone and letter. 
Five departments in two cities were initially contacted by telephone: two police 
services, one fire department, one fire/paramedic department and one ambulance service. 
The administration of the ambulance service as well as the corresponding ambulance 
association declined to participate. Letters were then sent to the departments and 
associations that agreed to consider participation outlining the study with a request for 
approval to access the members of their respective departments (Appendix A). Approval 
for this study and access to members was granted in writing by the following departments 
and associations (Appendix B): 
1. Medicine Hat Local 263 of the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF). 
2. Medicine Hat Fire Department Deputy Fire Chief. 
3. Lethbridge Local 237 of the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF). 
4. Lethbridge Fire Department Deputy Fire Chief. 
5. Medicine Hat Police Association. 
6. Medicine Hat Police Service. 
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7. Lethbridge Police Association. 
8. Lethbridge Police Service. 
Establishing and Validating Interview Questions 
A working relationship was developed with the two Association members with whom 
initial contact had been made after concerns were expressed that the interview questions 
may elicit troubling reactions for the participants. Initial questions developed for the 
interview protocol were sent to Medicine Hat IAFF Local 263 and the Medicine Hat 
Police Association for suggestions and input. As suggestions and changes were received 
from the two Association representatives, appropriate changes were made without loss of 
integrity to the study. The changes were then sent back to the two Association 
representatives and further suggestions were made. Telephone discussions regarding the 
suggestions were held and final interview questions were sent back to the two 
Association representatives for approval. The final interview questions were accepted and 
approved by the two Associations. The final interview questions were also sent to the 
Lethbridge Fire Department and Lethbridge IAFF Local 237 for validation, and approval 
was received. These guiding questions were used to ensure that all relevant topics were 
covered (Appendix C). 
Method of Inviting the Participants 
Members of the departments were initially contacted by email through their 
respective Associations requesting participation in the study. A brief description of the 
study was sent to the members with the request for participation and assurances of 
confidentiality (Appendix D). Posters with the same request and assurances of 
confidentiality were then printed and mailed to Medicine Hat Local 263 and the Medicine 
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Hat Police Association and were placed in the stations and Associations halls. Copies of 
the posters were dropped off at Lethbridge Local 237 and the Lethbridge Police Service 
to be placed in the departments and Association halls (Appendix E). A request for 
demographic information such as age, sex, and years of services was included in both the 
email and the posters. 
Method for Selection 
The criteria for participation in this study were as follows: 
1. The responder must have experienced a critical incident while on the job before 
April 1, 2002, which was chosen as the cut off date to provide the minimum 
requirement to determine what the emergency responders experiences were at 
least six months post critical incident. 
2. The responder must be male. Participants were limited to male only because of 
the potential for confounding variables in the results of the study. It is unclear 
from available research whether female responders react differently than male 
responders after a critical incident. 
3. The responder must have been living with his family at the time of the critical 
incident. The interaction between the responder and his family during and after 
the critical incident is crucial to understanding the impact the critical incident may 
have had on the family, as well as the changes in the relationship between the 
responder and his family. 
Demographic information was obtained from each potential participant that included 
age, sex, and years of service. The intention was to split the years of service into two 
categories: novice (between 2 and 5 years) and experienced (5 years and up) to determine 
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if the experiences between the two groups of responders were different because of years 
of service. One possible factor that may influence coping response could be years of 
service. It may be that more experienced personnel are better able to handle high stress 
demands. However, only experienced personnel responded (e.g., 11 plus years of 
service). Therefore, it was not possible to explore this factor. 
Participants from each service in the City of Lethbridge and the City of Medicine 
Hat were invited to participate. Two police officers from Medicine Hat and two police 
officers from Lethbridge who fit the criteria were interviewed. One police officer, during 
initial contact, stated that he fit the criteria but, in fact, had not experienced a critical 
incident on the job; rather, his traumatic event occurred during childhood. Although the 
incident he experienced as a child may certainly have influenced the way he conducts 
himself as a police officer, the criteria set out for this study were adhered to and his 
interview was not included in the study. Another police officer who fit the criteria was 
interviewed, bringing the total number of police officers to four. 
Lethbridge is amalgamated with both Fire and Paramedic Services, as opposed to 
Medicine Hat, which is Fire Service only. Since the ambulance service in Medicine Hat 
declined to participate, it was necessary to make up the loss by interviewing four primary 
trained paramedics in Lethbridge. Four primary trained paramedics were interviewed, but 
no primary trained firefighters had contacted the interviewer. A second request for 
participation was then sent out through email with the additional criteria for primary 
trained firefighters only (Appendix F). Two primary trained firefighters from Medicine 
Hat, as well as two primary trained firefighters from Lethbridge who fit the criteria were 
interviewed. One primary trained firefighter, who upon initial contact stated that he had 
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experienced a critical incident while on the job, actually experienced his critical incident 
as a result of leaving the floor of the Fire Service and moving to a different position 
within the Fire Service. The incident itself that he experienced was as a result of leaving a 
job that he had worked for over 20 years, and once he was no longer in a rescuer position, 
the change forced him to redefine who he was. It was thought that since it was more of an 
accumulation of his years of service rather than one specific critical incident, this 
participant would not be included in the final data. Due to time constraints, it was decided 
that the number of primary trained firefighters interviewed would remain at three. A 
summary of the final distribution of participants is presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Participant Representation 
City Firefighters Police Officers Paramedics 
Novice Experienced Novice Experienced Novice Experienced 
Lethbridge 0 1 0 2 0 4 
Medicine Hat 0 2 0 2 0 0 
n= l l 
Interview Format 
Letters of consent were read and signed by each participant and the interviewer 
before each interview. Each participant was informed of the process of the interview 
before the interview began: they were free to take breaks whenever they wanted to and 
that if at any time they wanted to stop the interview, there would be no repercussions or 
penalties for doing so. Interviews were conducted using the interview protocol that was 
developed with and validated by participating emergency services (Appendix C). 
Additional questions arose but the framework of the interview protocol was consulted. 
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Open-ended questions were added as they arose in order to get the emergency responder 
to talk openly about his particular incident. 
Given the research topic, it was necessary to provide a safe environment for the 
emergency responder. This was accomplished in two ways. First, in order to ensure that 
the responders felt safe and comfortable during the interviews, the responders decided 
where they would prefer to be interviewed. Interviews in Lethbridge were held in the 
home of the researcher. After individual discussion and agreement with the participants 
in Medicine Hat, a church in Medicine Hat was contacted and the interviews were held in 
a private room at the church. Second, during the interviews, appropriate listening skills, 
prompts, and probes were used to encourage the responder to talk openly. The goal was 
to allow the responder to openly describe his experience regarding the critical incident 
and the impact it had on his job, on the individual responder, and the perceived impact on 
his family. 
Notes were taken to refer to non-verbal communication and aspects of the 
participant's responses that needed clarification. For example, if a responder began to 
show some anxiousness through body language, a note about the subject that was 
eliciting the emotion was made in order to a) monitor the responder's emotions; b) to 
refer back with the responder at a less anxious time if necessary and; c) for a reference 
point for other interviews. After the interview was over, responders were asked if there 
were any thoughts or emotions that had come up during the interview that they would 
like to talk about. Referral services were available, and are discussed in the section on 
ethical considerations however; no responder interviewed requested a referral. 
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Data Recording and Analysis 
Interviews were held between November, 2002 and March, 2003. All interviews 
were audio taped and lasted between 1.5 and 4 hours. Interviews were then transcribed. 
The intention had been to conduct the interviews until data saturation (i.e., until no new 
themes emerged). However, the experiences of the responders were unique not just from 
the perspective of the individual responder, but from within each service as well (fire, 
paramedic, and police) so that the total number of interviews reached was eleven (Table 
3). Within two hours of each interview, a summary of the interview was written along 
with the interviewer's thoughts and feelings regarding the interview. 
Once the interviews were transcribed, three copies of each transcript were made, 
with one copy held intact. A transcript was randomly selected and read while listening to 
the taped interview, noting emotions and reactions in one margin. The transcript was 
separated into four sections: 
1. Impact on the job. 
2. Impact on the individual. 
3. Perceived impact on the family. 
4. Other comments. 
Responses were coded in each section by interview question. The interview 
transcription was then cut into sections by question. Using a constant comparison 
method, responses were compared within each section and between sections, noting 
emerging concepts. For example, if it was noticed that a police officer had not spoken to 
his colleagues about the emotions he was experiencing regarding his critical incident, this 
response was compared to see if the officer kept silent outside of the job and/or with his 
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family. Silence was then noted on an index card as an emerging concept. The constant 
comparison method was used within sections and between sections until no new concepts 
emerged, including the "other comments" section. The third copy of the transcript was 
cut into coded sections to compare with other transcripts. 
A second interview was randomly chosen and cut, separated into the same 
sections and coded in the same manner as the first transcript, by interview question. 
Responses within and between sections were compared and emerging concepts were 
noted on a separate index card. Again, the third copy of the second transcript was cut into 
coded sections and each section was compared to the first transcript to search for 
connections and emerging themes. The themes that appeared as possible major themes 
were written on separated index cards that were prepared to document the categories and 
search for connections and major themes. The transcripts were often reexamined to 
ensure that the actual data remained the basis of the themes. 
The remaining nine transcripts were then prepared and analyzed in the same 
manner for their appearance of main themes and connections between the themes. As 
new themes emerged, they were used to analyze all other data. By constantly comparing 
the data, categories were raised to concepts in the emerging theory and an index of 
themes was created. 
When the index of themes was created, accounts were constructed of what the 
responder's experiences were. Importance came from the high frequency of being 
reported or for having a particularly powerful or meaningful impact on the responder. A 
theory or the identification of the deeper structure or common elements in experience 
emerged, explaining the uniqueness of each responder's experience. When this procedure 
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was completed, the categories and themes were checked with selected colleagues in order 
to preserve researcher integrity, which is discussed below in ethical considerations. 
Ethical Considerations 
Ethical considerations during this process were emphasized. The general plan of 
the study, as well as possible known risks were explained to each participant before the 
interview began. The known risks may have been negative reactions such as anxiety, 
frustration, and anger. All participants signed an informed consent before the interview 
(Appendix G). Both the participant and the interviewer determined the length of time that 
the participant continued in the interview. If at any time the interviewer sensed anxiety, 
confirmation was sought and then a decision about what the participant wanted to do was 
decided. The following options were to be given to the participant: to continue, continue 
after a break, continue at another time, or withdraw from the process completely. If the 
participant had, at any time, wanted to end the interview, it would have ended 
immediately. At no time did any participant request to end the interview, with three 
participants requesting short breaks before continuing with the interview. 
Referral Process 
Due to the potential implications of discussing the responder's critical incident, a 
referral protocol was put in place. Two referral sources were available to the participants. 
Before the letter of request for participation had been sent to potential participants, the 
interviewer contacted CISM trained peer team members within each department and 
explained the study. The purpose of this step was to inform the peer team member that 
the study was taking place and to request the peer team member be available if needed or 
requested. Confidentiality was also discussed. Unless the responder requested access to 
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the peer team member, the peer team member would not know who was participating in 
the study. A peer team member from each of the four participating departments agreed to 
the request. A qualified psychologist from each of the participating departments 
Employee Assistance Program (EAP) was notified of the study. Again, confidentiality 
was stressed and the EAP psychologist would not know who was participating in the 
study unless the responder requested referral to this source. One EAP psychologist from 
each of the participating cities agreed to the request. 
Again, due to the potential implications of discussing a responder's critical 
incident, a referral protocol was also put in place for the interviewer. A CISM trained 
peer team member from the Medicine Hat Fire Department was contacted by telephone 
and a process to discuss the interviews was jointly agreed upon. Confidentiality was 
strictly maintained. When an interview was scheduled with an emergency responder, the 
peer team member would be notified. When the interview was completed, the peer team 
member was contacted and if necessary, the interviewer was given the opportunity to 
discuss her experience, or the peer team member would be informed that no discussion 
was necessary. 
Researcher Integrity 
In order to ensure the integrity of the research, it was necessary to look at two 
domains. To preserve researcher integrity, it was important to be aware of interviewer 
biases before data analysis began so the data did not become skewed. This was 
accomplished by laying out, or bracketing, any biases before data analysis began. The 
biases that the interviewer needed to be aware of are: 
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1. Having several close friends in the Fire/Paramedic Service who are 
aware of this study and may influence the interviewer's perception of 
those in emergency services. 
2. Admiration for those in emergency services as they make a difference 
each time they leave the station to help someone. The interviewer has 
the perception that a making a difference was not always possible in the 
lives of those she worked with. 
3. The ability of emergency responders to not allow emotion to prevent 
them from completing their tasks. The interviewer's emotions could not 
always be hidden when working with families in crisis and it is unclear 
if the tasks were completed because of the emotions experienced. 
During the process of data analysis, thoughts and feelings were tracked and 
recorded so that there was an awareness of any further biases that may have influenced 
the choice of themes and sub-themes. These thoughts and feelings helped the interviewer 
to become more aware of further biases as the data was analyzed. 
The second domain of research integrity was the integrity of the themes. 
Grounded theory demands a constant comparison method that was used to compare 
themes as they arose. Confirmation by colleagues was utilized as a reality check to see if 
the themes discovered were indeed there. 
Maintenance of Confidentiality 
The interviews were held where the responder believed he was most comfortable 
in order to maintain confidentiality. The interviewer protected the participant by 
removing any identifying information such as names, cities, and telephone numbers from 
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the interview transcriptions and assigned the interview a number. Both the data and 
identifying information are locked in a fire-safe cabinet in the interviewer's home to be 
held for one year after publication of this thesis. The data is to be used for this thesis only 
and possible submission for publication with the author's permission only. Results of the 
study will be available to the participants upon request. The general findings of this study 
may be presented to the participating Fire, Police, and Paramedic Associations and 
Departments. 
Conclusion 
The results of the analysis are reported in Chapter 4. The main themes produced 
by the analysis are explained, followed by a discussion of the sub-themes and their 
components. 
Chapter 4 
Results 
This study investigated the impact of a critical incident on three areas of an 
emergency responder's life: the job, on the individual responder, and the perceived 
impact that the critical incident has had on the responder's family. After analysis of the 
transcripts, five main themes have emerged: pervasive service culture, changes in 
responder identity within the service, role confusion, isolation from valued support 
relationships, and reconstruction and assimilation of experience. Several other sub-
themes, such as culture of emergency services, communication, and perceived support 
emerged as threads through each main theme, reinforcing the idea that these are not 
limited to one area of an emergency responder's life but carry over into all aspects of the 
emergency responder's life. However, even though these sub-themes are central threads 
throughout, the components of the threads, in each of the three areas of an emergency 
responder's life were different and demanded further exploration. 
Even though five of the emergency responders work within the same department 
with seven of the responders working within the same city, no responder from any 
department reported experiencing the same incident as any other participant. This 
confirms previous research that has found that an emergency responder's critical incident 
is unique to him or her and that how the responder perceives the incident will determine 
if it is critical or not. Six of the eleven participants, all from the fire and paramedic 
service, reported that their critical incidents involved children. Five of the seven 
responders from the fire and paramedic service worked incidents that involved the death 
of children, with the one remaining incident involving the successful rescue of children. 
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The four police officers who participated in the study reported their incidents involved 
shootings, with one responder describing having to take the life of another individual. 
Each responder, including the police officer involved in the fatal shooting, 
experienced symptoms of Critical Incident Stress for a long period of time after the 
incident. Some of the individuals began experiencing symptoms within days of the 
incident. For others, symptoms did not appear until months after the incident. All 
responders who participated in this study still experience some residual effects of Critical 
Incident Stress although nine of the eleven responders have, for the most part, 
successfully resolved the incident within 18 months after the critical incident. The 
remaining two responders, both police officers, still experience severe symptoms of 
Critical Incident Stress two years after their critical incident. 
The question of whether or not the responders had participated in a debriefing 
after their critical incident was asked to determine what kind of an impact the process had 
on the responder. All responders involved in the study commented on the process of 
debriefing and the need for a complete management program, which is further discussed 
in Chapter Five. 
Pervasive Service Culture 
The experiences of the responders working within the emergency services culture 
are presented in Table 5. Under the main theme of pervasive service culture, there were 
four sub-themes with a number of components in each sub-theme that address emergency 
responders' long-term experiences. 
Table 5: Pervasive Service Culture: Sub-themes and their components 
Sub-themes Components 
Emergency Responder Insight into Identity State of mind 
Avoid appearing weak 
Systemic Cultural Perception Recognition of the need for change 
Responders frustrations 
Risking the lives of responders 
Idealized Community Perception The idol 
Fear of loss of image 
The Brotherhood Family of the brothers 
False perception of isolation 
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Emergency Responder Insight into Role Identity 
The sub-theme of emergency responder insight into role identity produced two 
components of identity on the job: by state of mind and avoid appearing weak. 
State of mind. The culture of emergency response has been seen as a way to 
insulate each emergency response profession from the community in which they serve. 
Slogans such as "to serve and protect" and "saving lives and property" create a natural 
boundary around emergency services, setting them apart from occupations that the 
majority of community members hold. This boundary is seen as both positive and 
negative by those in the emergency service professions: positive in that it brings 
closeness between members that is needed in order to continue to do the job that they do, 
and negative in that it was a boundary created before the participants time and is now 
considered systemic and perpetuating and difficult to change. The culture of emergency 
services does not just encompass the job but the individual responder's ability to do the 
job as well. As one responder stated: 
If you don't have the state of mind, then you can't do the job. If you can't do the 
job, there is no trust. If there is no trust, you can't watch my back. If you can't 
watch my back, then I won't go through a door with you. If I can't go through a 
door with you, then I don't want you working the scene with me. If you can't 
work the scene with me, then get the hell out of the service because one of us will 
die because you don't have the state of mind to do the job. 
Another responder related how the state of mind defines the responder: 
To be a [responder], it takes a certain frame of mind to be in. It's not just a job, its 
life and death and how you define yourself around that possibility. You may have 
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different roles in your life but the sum total of all those roles is who you are as a 
[responder]. It encompasses your life and it is your way of looking at the world. 
It's not easy to explain if you aren't in the service. 
Avoid appearing weak. The role of an emergency responder is unique in that few 
professions demand their members potentially put their own lives on the line each shift 
the responder works. The need for the state of mind, according to the participants, is a 
necessary evil; it keeps them alive but does not allow for the emotion that affects all 
humans in the face of tragedy. Emotion is seen as a weakness, both from the perspective 
of the individual responder and the system as well. Anyone who is seen as emotional is 
perceived as weak and the relationships between responders will begin to change. As one 
responder vehemently stated: 
Are you kidding? Just mentioning that you are affected by a particular fire or 
whatever you are labeled as weak and no one, I mean, no one, would want to 
work with you. There is a state of mind that we have to maintain between us all 
that keeps us alive, keeps us kicking. Anyone sees you respond with emotion then 
you can see the rest begin to shift away from you, they don't know if they can 
trust you anymore. It's easier to maintain the toughness and the state of mind than 
it is to try to change our perceptions. We're very hard on one another, we 
sometimes eat our young. 
A second responder had a more global perspective in how he perceived his 
coworkers may react to someone who they thought was weak, "You know as well as I do 
that you have got to have 200 percent confidence in the guys you go through a door with. 
If they perceive you to be weak, you can't do your job." 
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Systemic Cultural Perception 
The perceptions that emergency responders hold regarding the culture within the 
service produced three distinct views: recognition of the need for change, responder 
frustrations, and risking the lives of responders. 
Recognition of the need for change. As difficult as it is to get into emergency 
services, it is just as difficult to stay within the profession if one does not have the state of 
mind, even though the participants know that it is not healthy and can, in the long run, 
cost the responder his job or life. The participants acknowledge the need for change, but 
see little change occurring within the system. The participants believe that the change 
must come from within the system, both verbally and a physical show of support from 
administration, although some responders continue to believe that the culture is so 
embedded within the profession that any real change will not occur. 
We tell administration nothing. Even if all the guys were like I was [experiencing 
Critical Incident Stress], we'd never let admin know. They would actually have to 
acknowledge that their members suffer from stress because then they will have to 
change from the good old boys days and that would kill who they are [as 
individuals]. Sure they pay lip service and have gotten good at it too. Until they 
show more support to us than they have, both verbally and in a physical way by 
actually showing up after a particular incident to make sure their members are all 
okay and to give assistance because they truly care, nothing about the culture of 
emergency services will change. 
Responder frustrations. Responders, even though they want change, on the whole 
do not believe that the system is set up for change, and that administration, for whatever 
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reason, is not willing to take the risk to take on the task of change. The cost of 
maintaining the culture far outweighs the cost of caring for the members throughout their 
careers. The responders themselves are beginning to become more educated about stress 
and stress responses only because they are more educated now than even twenty years 
ago. Police officers are more likely to have degrees, paramedics are in school for up to 
four years before signing on with departments, and career firefighters, now more often 
than not, are likely to have degrees and are constantly trained to stay up to date in fire 
technology. The more knowledgeable they have become, the more they have chosen to 
stay away from lifestyles that could affect their abilities as responders, such as alcohol 
and drugs, which in the past has ended careers and lives. As members become more 
aware of the potential for stress, they have also become more aware of the costs, "divorce 
rates were high, we lost our children, our physical health deteriorated, and we drank more 
to shove all of our pain deeper inside . . . it is all going to come out. God help those who 
are at the receiving end." 
Risking the lives of the responders. The cost of ignoring the needs of the 
responders in order to perpetuate the culture (purposefully or not) is not, according to one 
responder, good business. The long-term implications that occur can be debilitating to 
responders and end their careers and lives far sooner than is necessary. As one responder 
stated: 
It costs more to keep unhealthy responders on the job than if administration had 
implemented programs that made it acceptable to experience the emotion that is a 
natural human response to trauma. We have had to teach ourselves about the 
negative responses through experience with incident after incident. And yet we 
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still suffer psychologically, take longer leave, take more sick days, and are not 
necessarily always 100% on the job. Bad things can happen when we aren't 100% 
on the job, and we potentially put others at risk, not just the community, but our 
coworkers as well. The more they ignore our needs, the more we have to retire 
before our time and the more they have to train new guys to take our place. It 
becomes more costly to keep up the facade, but that is the chance they are willing 
to take, I guess, in order to protect the perception of who they think we are. 
It is unclear if the administration of emergency services are unaware of their 
responders needs because of the perception of the prevalence of the culture, or if the 
resistance to breaking down the barriers of the culture is due to the fact that it is so 
pervasive within each service that it seems to be an overwhelming task. Most responders 
agree that it can only be done slowly, over time, as new police officers, paramedics, and 
firefighters are trained and educated in the potential for stress-related outcomes of their 
professions. 
Idealized Community Perception 
There are two separate components that appeared when responders spoke to how 
they perceive the community views the culture of emergency services and the possible 
reaction to responders that experience Critical Incident Stress: the idol and fear of loss of 
image. 
The idol. Other responders believe another reason for the lack of change is 
because of the community's perception of those who work in emergency services, and 
that change can only come when all the groups are willing to work at the change. 
Participants stated that the community perception of those who work in emergency 
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services is that they have to be able to handle, physically and mentally, whatever is asked 
of them, whether it be crime, fire, or medical calls. The community depends on 
emergency responders to protect them and save their lives and property and move onto 
the next call as well as show up for various community events to help raise money. 
Responders find it very hard to say no, especially when there are children involved in the 
charities that they donate their time to, "Most of the time it is just a thrill to see the look 
on the little ones f aces . . . . They see us and have their own perception of who we are." 
The perception that children in the community have of responders has to be maintained, 
according to one responder, "They need to see that we are strong, that we can do the job 
and nothing will prevent us from doing everything we can to save them. We can't let 
them see the other side." 
Fear of loss of image. One responder looked at community work as something 
one just does, as an extension of being in the department they work for. He states, "It's 
not for glory or satisfaction, rather, it is a part of who we are, a continuation of what we 
do." Several responders said that the amount of self-fulfillment that they gain from 
continuing the image, or culture, is enormous. "It's a chance to be proactive in the 
community rather than reactive." But the longer the participants experience critical 
incident stress, the more they turn away from the involvement in community work. The 
interest that they once had in continuing to give their time and effort towards the 
community is lost. 
I felt like all the kids would have to do is look into my eyes and they would know 
that the spark isn't there. It would be a betrayal to them I think, to see that I am 
not who they perceive me to be. 
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The Brotherhood 
Responders spoke to the culture of the brotherhood of emergency services in two 
distinct ways: family of brothers and false perception of isolation. 
Family of brothers. While the culture may be seen by responders as antiquated 
and self-perpetuated, as well as an added stressor when they are experiencing long-term 
stress, the participants also spoke of culture in a positive way. Responders are dependent 
on one another not only on scene, but during down time and personal time as well. They 
naturally gravitate to one another because, as one responder put it, "No one else seems to 
understand who it is that we are as people. So we hang out together, give of our time to 
each other and each other's families. Our experiences can't be shared with anyone else." 
Coworkers are referred to as brothers and sisters, not just as a result of spending an 
enormous amount of time together, but because they are dependent on each other in all 
facets of their lives. Responders spoke of how important the culture of the brotherhood 
was to them to keep them alive, and how, during the time that they were experiencing 
Critical Incident Stress, their perception of the brotherhood changed. 
The brotherhood is not easily explained. The participants spoke of the 
brotherhood often and how integral a part it plays in their lives, but it was difficult to get 
any real sense of what it was, perhaps because the researcher is not in emergency services 
and does not have the state of mind. The concept of the state of mind can be understood, 
yet it is difficult to experience the depth to which the responders feel this bond with those 
they work with. 
When you meet someone in the profession, you know how they think, you know 
how they feel, you know they can do the job, it doesn't change. One minute a guy 
72 
can be talking about his baby getting their first tooth and the next you'll be 
standing at a closed door next to the guy with your guns drawn with shooters on 
the other side. You spend so much time together, you share everything, you laugh, 
you cry, you feel the other guy's pain, you are connected to them on a level that 
most people can't understand. You know that he is going to risk his life to save 
you and he knows that you will risk your life to save his. What other profession is 
like that? 
Another responder stated that it is not just within a particular city or station that 
the brotherhood occurs, but all over the world as well. 
The brotherhood of a firefighter means where ever you are and no matter what the 
circumstances are, a fellow firefighter will willingly stop what they are doing to 
help a fellow firefighter out. We work in an occupation that tomorrow we may be 
attending a complete stranger's funeral in a place miles from home, or even a 
continent away for no other reason than we are firefighters and we respect each 
other that way. 
False perception of isolation. The culture of emergency services creates a 
boundary around those who work within the profession, and while it may be perceived as 
a perpetuation of the macho myth that may no longer fit with what we know about 
Critical Incident Stress, it is also inherently positive. No matter how isolated the 
responders perceived themselves to be when they were experiencing long-term effects of 
Critical Incident Stress, for those who participated in this study, knowing that they were 
still a part of the brotherhood was seen as an anchor. To this, one responder eloquently 
used this analogy: 
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It was . . . a rope to help me pull myself back to where I wanted and needed to be. 
No matter how alone and desperate I felt, I knew that the rope was being held by 
my brothers and they wouldn't let it go. 
The same culture that isolates the responders is perceived to be their saving grace 
as well. Yet it was the individual's perception of how the brothers will react to what they 
were experiencing, rather than knowing with any surety of how their brothers would 
actually react, that caused the perceived break in the bond, which in turn caused the 
responder to isolate himself. The isolation the responder experienced began to change the 
way he reacted to situations and interacted with those whom he depends on the most. 
Changes in Responder Identity within the Service 
Responders who experienced a critical incident spoke to how, over time, the 
effects of Critical Incident Stress began to change the way they perceived their work. The 
changes were unexpected and frightening, as the responders in this study identify 
themselves by the work that they do. Under the main theme of changes in responder 
identity within the service, there are ten sub-themes that explore these changes as 
presented below in Table 6. 
It's Not just a Job 
There were two distinct but related ways of viewing the work emergency 
responders do. Both views spoke to the level of excitement and passion they held for the 
job. The two views are: the adventure and the calling. 
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Table 6: Changes in Responder Identity within the Service: Sub-themes and their 
Components 
Sub-themes Components 
Its Not Just a Job 
Painful Emotions of the Critical Incident 
Perception of the Outcome of the Critical 
Incident 
Inappropriate Behavioral Reactions 
Cognitive Meltdown 
The Fallout for Accessing Support 
The adventure 
The calling 
Senselessness and helplessness 
Anger 
Impending sense of doom 
False sense of the outcome 
Loss of enthusiasm 
Lost passion 
Alarming behaviors 
Denial of hesitation 
Inability to make instant decisions 
Inability to shake intrusive thoughts of CI 
Fear of confronting similar scenes 
Extreme exaggeration of regular duties 
Amplification of minor hassles 
Dehumanization 
Driving force behind refusal to access 
support 
The perception of the need for silence 
Table 6: Cont' 
Sub-themes Components 
The Fallout for Accessing Support cont' Overwhelming sense of responsibility 
Fear of appearing weak 
Perception of Administration Support Lack of faith in administration 
Perception that administration is 
unapproachable 
Perception of Employee Assistance Lack of trust in rules of confidentiality 
Programs 
Let us tell our story 
Refusal to Consider Career Changes Born to do the job 
Degree of the identification with the job 
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The adventure. The level of enthusiasm that all participants have for the job was 
not static when responders were experiencing long-term effects of Critical Incident 
Stress. The responders spoke of their experiences before their critical incident and the 
passion that they had for their job. The perception of one responder about the work that 
he does was summed up this way: "My job, I don't know that I look at it like a job. I 
think that it 's something that I've always known I would do. Sort of like it's not just a 
job, it's an adventure." 
The calling: Several of the responders that participated in this study spoke of 
occupations that they had before moving into emergency services. They stated that they 
had also volunteered with emergency departments while others talked about working 
with private organizations such as security. Once they had the opportunity to "get a 
taste," they knew that they had found the career that would give them great satisfaction. 
"It's a clan you know, we all experience the same thing, we hang out together. It is a 
constant rather than a job." One responder, while once working in a civilian profession, 
spoke to the enthusiasm he had for the job, "I felt like I had won the lo t tery . . . . Took my 
EMT course and got pretty jacked about t h a t . . . I never had so much fun." For other 
responders, they had known since childhood that they were going to become emergency 
responders although they don't specifically remember that "ah hah" moment. "It's not 
easily explained, I guess. I just knew that this was what I was going to do [police officer] 
for the rest of my life." 
After a critical incident, responders don't necessarily lose the level of enthusiasm 
for the job that they begin the job with. "It is what I do. I am a firefighter . . . I don't think 
of it as a job. I think of it as my life" One paramedic stated that as soon as he knew what 
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it was he wanted to do, he focused his life on becoming a paramedic and never wavered 
in that focus. 
It all comes back to the state of mind. When I was young I saw a guy being tossed 
into an ambo (ambulance) they just slid him in there, all cut up and bleeding, both 
guys get into the front leaving the guy in the back alone. I think those were the 
guys that were the glorified taxi drivers. But I remember so clearly saying to 
myself that yes, this was what I was going to do. And it seems that from that 
moment on, I worked towards being a Paramedic. There was nothing, and I mean 
nothing, that I wouldn't have done in order to be a Paramedic. 
Painful Emotions of the Critical Incident 
The emotions that the responders experienced during the incident they perceived 
as critical were viewed in three ways: senselessness and helplessness, anger, and 
impending sense of doom. 
Senselessness and helplessness. All of the participants in this study stated that the 
perception they had of the job was extremely positive before their critical incident. Some 
spoke of the stressors that were difficult to deal with, such as changes in administration, 
but the added stressors were tolerable and they never lost their passion for the job. 
Responders spoke openly about the incident that they perceived as critical and their 
immediate reactions while working the scene. One responder spoke to his reaction while 
working the scene: 
. . . the sadness at the senselessness, the loss of two innocent children, for no 
reason. You do your job and hope that you do it well enough to not let anyone 
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else die. But it's hurting you inside and it was all I could do not to beat the father. 
The sadness I felt was so heavy. 
Anger. A second responder reflects on his initial emotional reaction which was a 
feeling of intense anger that overrode any feeling of helplessness he felt: 
I 'm looking at this kid, maybe she's 7 and she's looking back at me, she's just 
kind of staring at me, these big blue eyes. It was like looking into death, she knew 
she was going to die. The anger that I felt at that moment, it was all I could do not 
to go at her [the mother] and suddenly the girl dies and I move on to help 
someone else because I know it's not my job to pass judgment on the mother. God 
will do that quite nicely. 
Impending sense of doom. One responder spoke to the feelings he experienced 
even before reaching the scene that would eventually be perceived as critical: 
So I'm on the rescue truck and I can't explain it. I had this sense of foreboding 
when tones went off. I knew that something was going to happen. I had this gut 
feeling and tightness in my heart, like I knew something was going to happen.. . . 
It was insanity . . . never had I felt anything so terrible. . . . But it all changed. In 
that one moment, it all changed. 
The response to the incident can also affect the way a responder reacts during the 
incident causing an internal struggle during the operation that is not easy to deal with: 
My first instinct is that I want to kill the g u y . . . . I've never wanted to kill 
somebody just because . . . but I think it would have been an execution, not self-
defense. . . . It was like it all instantly became clear to me and I questioned myself 
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what I was doing. I used a taser on him and we took him into custody. The anger I 
felt was crippling. 
Perception of the Outcome of the Critical Incident 
The majority of participants experienced positive outcomes for the incidents that 
they later identified as their critical incidents. Most of the incidents involved the death of 
civilians, however, the responders were still able to save others, and given the intensity of 
some of the incidents, that they were able to save anyone can be seen as positive. All of 
the responders spoke to the feelings of sadness and helplessness that they felt while 
working the scene, not necessarily because there was death, rather, because their fellow 
human beings had suffered. Anger, sadness, anxiety, and helplessness, were feelings most 
often experienced on scene. According to one responder, "we often have those kinds of 
reactions when we are working a scene. But it doesn't keep us from doing our job. What 
surprised me was that usually I can swallow it and move on. This time I couldn't." This 
was a sentiment often spoken by the participants: 
These are reactions we expect to have when we are working. You can't help but 
experience them. Normally I can let them go and get on with it. And I thought I 
had. But I guess I didn't. Eight months later I knew I hadn't. I had really thought 
that this incident had a positive outcome. Sure I had the regular emotion from the 
scene, how can you not, there are humans involved, people who no longer have a 
home, or may have to spend time in the hospital, how can you not experience 
some emotion. I thought that I was happy with the way the scene was resolved, I 
guess that I wasn't. Look at what happened. 
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There were three distinct but related views of the perception of the outcome of the 
critical incident that responders had: false sense of the outcome, loss of enthusiasm, and 
lost passion. 
False sense of the outcome. Some of the responders reacted within days of the 
incident they perceived to be critical, others experienced delayed reactions, with 
symptoms appearing within a couple of weeks after the incident. One responder did not 
acknowledge that he was experiencing any stress symptoms until 8 months after the 
incident, but he now realizes that it was a coping mechanism of denial of the stress 
symptoms rather than any delayed reaction. As responders began to experience stress 
symptoms after their critical incident, their perceptions about their job began to change as 
well. "Lack of enthusiasm, didn't care, lost my ability to be compassionate to the people 
that I am supposed to save . . . that scared the hell out of me." 
I wasn't prepared for this. All I've gone through, all I've seen during my career, 
all the training. I was honestly not prepared. I was blindsided by t h i s . . . . I started 
to struggle with things that I thought I enjoyed, but I wasn't enjoying it, in fact I 
was wallowing in it, I was walking the walk, but I 'm not really there, not really 
into it. 
Loss of enthusiasm. A second responder talked about the importance of doing the 
job, no matter how his perception of the job changed after the critical incident. The level 
of enthusiasm that they once felt for the job, however, effected how much they did on 
scene. Individuals who describe themselves as keeners on scene would step off once they 
had completed their tasks, "I wasn't getting in the thick of things like I used to . . . I did 
my task and stepped off . . . . You can't ever stop doing your job." 
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Lost passion. Loss of passion for the job was perhaps the term used most often by 
responders when asked if the perception of their job changed after their critical incident. 
Others spoke about how surreal it felt, "For about 9 months after it was like I was looking 
through this haze. You know that mosquito netting? It was like looking through t h a t . . . 
nothing was clear to me. I felt like I was working through water." 
Another responder stated that he had lost what he valued most about the job and 
how the lost passion affected the way he looked at his life: 
I lost the passion that I felt for the job. That all encompassing excitement I still 
had for the job after 16 years. It was gone, it became a job rather than my life. It 
was drudgery, and I didn't feel whole anymore, who I was disappeared. Did my 
perception of the job change? The perception of my whole life changed. How 
much worse can that be for someone who gave everything they had to the 
department? 
Inappropriate Behavioral Reactions 
Responders spoke to two separate behavioral reactions that occurred on the job: 
alarming behaviors and denial of hesitation. 
Alarming behaviors. The attachment to the service that the responders had before 
their critical incidents was "all encompassing." In addition to the change of their 
perception of the job, the responders acknowledged that the critical incident caused 
behavioral changes as well. Shortly after the incident, the behavioral changes were 
minimal, but as time passed, and the symptoms became more severe, for some 
responders, the behaviors became more extreme and damaging. 
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It was maybe 10 days after i t . . . I knew that I was very angry and I knew I was 
very hurt and I felt like I just hurt a bunch and wanted to be left alone. But I didn't 
know why. There was one guy in the locker room that was in my row of lockers 
that would see this and I called him [name] you have to see if this still fits and I 
turn my gun around and point it at my mouth and . . . I knew it couldn't fire 
because I didn't have the magazine inserted so there was no question it was just 
being black humor or stupid. 
Denial of hesitation. None of the participants in the Fire and Paramedic Service 
admitted to hesitating while on task. This may be because denial that the incident affected 
them was a coping mechanism or it could simply be that the consequences of hesitating 
could have far reaching implications. "You do what you have to do no matter how you 
feel. It's unacceptable when someone hesitates. Lives can be lost in a split second." 
"Absolutely not. Never. We are in the biz of saving lives and property. Somehow that's 
bigger than all of us put together. If we hesitate, people die." Others in the Fire and 
Paramedic Service admitted to hesitating before they began their shift, but this is seen as 
a result of the change of perception of the job, rather than a change of behavior on the 
job. "There has been a time when I've hesitated to go to work, but never, ever on the 
job." Another related the hesitation to go to work was a result of the anxiety he felt as a 
result of the critical incident. 
It was only after the incident that I couldn't bear the thought of going to work. 
But once I was there I was okay, I never hesitated on the job. I just found that 
going to work got tougher and tougher. I would stand on my steps and look at my 
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truck and wonder if I could actually make it there. Hesitation is kind of an 
understatement. I just couldn't face getting into my truck and going to work. 
While those in the Fire and Paramedic Service denied hesitation, the majority of those in 
the Police Service did admit to hesitating: 
Sure I hesitated. I'd get to a situation and I'd stop. I would have to stop and think 
about what was happening. I'd have to give it too much thought. The thoughts 
would race in my head and I couldn't get a sense of where I was or what I was 
doing. Guys would be looking at me, waiting for me to do something and I would 
just stop. I had to get it all straight in my head before I'd make a move. I didn't 
want the same thing to happen on this scene as the other scene. 
Cognitive Meltdown 
Responders spoke to six distinct views of their cognitive experiences after their 
critical incident. They are inability to make instant decisions, fear of confronting similar 
scenes, inability to shake intrusive thoughts of the critical incident, extreme exaggeration 
of regular duties, amplification of minor hassles, and dehumanization. 
Inability to make instant decisions. Police officers that admitted to hesitating on 
scene also admitted to hesitating when they had to make instant decisions. "I couldn't 
make the decisions I needed to make which resulted in hesitation. It was a horrible 
feeling, knowing that someone could get hurt before I made up my mind. But I still 
hesitated." "I suddenly had this need to know everything before I could make a decision. 
But I didn't care. I truly don't think I cared because it was more important that I know 
everything, no matter how trivial." The police officer who stated that he did not hesitate 
is the officer who took another man's life. He spoke to the level of knowledge that he has 
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regarding Critical Incident Stress previous to his critical incident and how it helped him 
to stay level: 
I tried to focus hard and come back and be as effective as I was before [the 
shooting]. I had to be careful that I wasn't engaging in risk taking behaviors and 
started to feel bullet proof. But I had to guard against going too far because I felt 
myself almost wanting to go that way, almost to overcompensate. I did a lot of 
self-monitoring which helped me. I could see how a person could be very rough 
one way or the other. 
Another officer that was involved in a shooting reported flashbacks to his critical 
incident: 
The logistics were the same as the first incident, I could see the corridors and the 
exit, the same as the other incident. Images of where I was in the first scene kept 
flashing into my head and I had to stop, rethink where I was, try to swallow the 
old images, but they came back. The sights and sounds in the building, the 
intensity of the situation, it was like a little movie playing in my head. 
Fear of confronting similar scenes. Even though there was little hesitation on 
scene, most of the responders spoke to the thoughts they had of their critical incident 
while going to a scene they thought might be similar. "The potential for it to be almost 
identical was t h e r e . . . . I thought oh shit, what happens if this happens again. How is this 
going to look happening twice in a year, like a cowboy." 
Others experienced thoughts and images on the way to a scene they thought may 
be similar to the one they perceived as critical: 
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I only think about the incident on the way to the scene. I always stayed 
completely focused on task once I got there. But that's all I would think about on 
the way to a car wreck. That there were going to be dead children and those blue 
eyes would appear and it was all I could do not to bail off the truck. 
Inability to shake intrusive thoughts of critical incident. Most of the responders 
were able to put the incident out of their minds before they reached the scene, however, 
several responders talked about the fear they felt at being confronted with the same scene. 
For a long time, when I heard the code that there was a car wreck, I'd think about 
it. Took about a year before the really intrusive thoughts quit and I'd panic all the 
way to the scene. I didn't want to see children dead, I couldn't handle that at all. I 
remember [coworker] saying to me, why am I green. I didn't realize that the 
thoughts were changing me physically. I thought the panic was just in my head. 
The reactions to the potential for the same type of scene also brought up some 
feelings of anxiety and panic for some of the responders that could have prevented them 
from completing their tasks. However, the majority of responders were able to "swallow" 
the anxiety and do what they needed to do. 
The thoughts were fairly intrusive, haunting. We'd be called to a house fire and it 
was like you could see the anxiety rising in me. Even when the family was safe, I 
was anxious. Going to a car wreck wouldn't bother me, but a fire? It was bad. It 
was a long time before I could keep a clear head on my way to a fire. 
Extreme exaggeration of regular duties. Responders also talked about how 
exaggerated everything seemed on the job after their critical incident. Situations that had 
never bothered the responders before the incident became huge to them, particularly with 
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their coworkers. A responder spoke to his fear of not being able to ever put anything into 
perspective because everything seemed so overwhelming to him. 
For a long time the little things pissed me off. Like if they [coworkers] couldn't 
get the generator going to work the jaws. It was my task. Before it was what's 
another ten seconds. But for a while I'd snap. I'd wonder what the fuck the guys 
were doing. Stuff is going to happen, and when it does, you can't get upset 
because there is nothing you can do. But I felt like they were trying to screw me 
up. 
Amplification of minor hassles. For others, amplification of minor hassles 
occurred when attending scenes that they perceived as a waste of time, particularly when 
there was concern, because of the weather or a holiday, that "legitimate" calls would 
come in and they were busy being "glorified taxi-drivers" instead of doing "what I 
trained hard to do." Those who use the paramedic service for nothing more than a free 
ride were the worst for the responders after their critical incident. Worried that they 
would miss legitimate calls because of having to drive someone to the hospital because 
" . . . they had a relative that lived nearby was huge. I'd get them in the back and not 
speak, I spent a lot of my energy on being angry with them [patients]." 
Dehumanization. One responder spoke to how he felt about the people he had 
tried to be fair with throughout his whole career and how the perception of them changed 
after his critical incident. 
I no longer felt that I was dealing with people. I was dealing with assholes and 
shitheads. I was dehumanizing them. No matter how small or innocent they were, 
I was dehumanizing them. It was the only way that I could respond, it didn't 
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matter what they did. They had to prove to me that they were human and deserved 
my compassion rather than show any compassion first. I was getting way too 
serious about things that don't matter. I felt my training was way over what I was 
dealing with. 
The Fallout for Accessing Support 
A number of variables have been examined to explain the differences in how 
responders perceived their job both before and after their critical incident. All of the 
participants' perceptions of their jobs changed after the critical incident, not only the job 
itself but of the people that the responders deal with on a daily basis. For many of the 
participants, these changes continued for up to two years after their critical incident. The 
majority of responders were consciously aware of how their perceptions had changed 
after the incident, and that their reaction was negative, however, very few felt that they 
could access any kind of support to get the help they needed to move past the incident. 
Driving force behind refusal to access support. Many of the responses from 
participants referred back to the culture of emergency services and how the culture does 
not allow for responders to admit that they need help. 
It all goes back to the culture. You know that you are experiencing something bad 
and that your perspective is changing. You can't help but notice the anger that 
you have inside of you, and that the way you are interacting is changing as well. 
. . . I thought at the time that if I said anything to anyone about how I was feeling, 
they would change the way they interacted with m e . . . . If they found out I would 
be stigmatized so I decided it was best not to access any type of support at all. 
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The perception of what others may think of them was a driving force behind the 
refusal to access services which may have prevented long-term implications of Critical 
Incident Stress that they experienced. "To hear that the fallout from accessing support 
through the system can end your career, you shut yourself off more." 
If other responders did not seem affected by the incident, or were simply not 
talking about it, responders tended to keep quiet because, " . . . over time you've heard 
little stories about guys who are no longer in the service who have tried to get help for 
some issues and the fallout from that," and " . . . whether that's real or not, it was 
something I believed at that time and accessing support is not something that you do." 
The perception of the need for silence. More often than not responders didn't 
attempt to talk about what they were experiencing with their coworkers; rightly or 
wrongly, they all assumed that their coworkers would react negatively to their concerns. 
"Perception or truth, if your brother won't go through the door with you then you're 
fucked to begin with. Why take the chance?" 
Suck it up, deal with it, that's what they would have said in general I think.. . . 
Your platoon chief expects you to be strong when he gives you an order. . . . But 
if he knows you're weak, in a sense, is he going to give you that order? He may 
bypass you and go to someone else. You don't think the officers talk? Of course 
they do. They are a clan among themselves. 
Overwhelming sense of responsibility. Another responder spoke to being in the 
service long enough that he was in the middle of the hierarchy and had senior officers 
looking down at him and junior officers looking up at him, both needing for the 
responder who is experiencing Critical Incident Stress to be able to deal with everything 
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that comes his way. "It's an awesome responsibility. Your senior officers are looking at 
you to carry your weight. The junior officers are looking at you as though you can't do 
the job. The pressure just adds to an already stressful situation." 
Other responders spoke to how their perception changed towards the coworkers 
they had considered friends: "Some of the guys, they were close friends. I talked to them, 
they let me spew but after some time I noticed that they were staying away from me. It 
was like guilt by association." 
Fear of appearing weak. The thought of isolation and the fear of appearing weak 
from those who the responder believes are his close brothers more often than not prevents 
a responder from talking to those who may be able to get him through the situation he is 
experiencing. For those responders who did try to talk to their coworkers, the experience 
was seen as extremely negative and they wished they had never approached their 
coworkers to begin with. For the police officer who dehumanized the people in the 
community, this process carried over to his coworkers as well: 
You are always watching how others are coping. There is one guy in the 
department I told that I was stressed about the incident. I told him I was drinking 
like a fish and couldn't sleep. He told me I should see [psychologist]. That was it. 
I had worked with this guy for close to 15 years and he tells me he doesn't want to 
hear about it. So I thought yup, you're a shithead and asshole too and you need to 
now prove to me you are worthy of being a human being again. The rage I felt at 
his response was terrifying. 
Another responder spoke about his coworker's response when he approached him 
after several months had passed since the incident: 
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He told me I was whacked. That the incident wasn't that big of a deal and thought 
maybe I had a screw or two loose if I thought that that [the incident] was anything 
close to critical. I felt as though he had hung me out to dry. If ever I felt alone, it 
was at that very moment. I withdrew even further. 
Perception of Administration Support 
Another dilemma appeared when responders perceived that the very service "we 
dedicate our lives to" was not aware of the responders needs during a critical time in their 
careers. For the responder involved in the shooting, even though administration made an 
initial show of support, it was too little, too late. 
Any sort of lame branch they passed out to me was basically for rhetoric and I 
viewed it as such so I didn't take much support from the administration.... The 
Chief called me that night but I told him it didn't mean much to me because I 
have no faith in you that you will do what you say. 
Lack of faith in administration. Lack of faith in administration is a common 
thread with all of the responders that participated in this study. In three of the services 
that participated, new administrations have been put in place since the critical incidents 
had occurred and two of the groups of responders have a "wait and see" attitude toward 
the new administration. However, the perceptions they had with their old administration 
during the time that they were looking for support were negative. 
The administration that was in place while I was going through this was still what 
we see as the old boys club. Macho, tough it out, don't do anything that would be 
perceived by the community as a weakness. I don't think they cared if you drank 
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yourself to death or beat your wife or got hooked on drugs. They just didn't want 
you tainting the service.. . . You kept silent. 
Perception that administration is unapproachable. Two responders experienced 
their critical incident when the new administration was in place. While they 
acknowledged that administration is changing the way they think about the needs of their 
members, during the time that they were experiencing their critical incident, they would 
not have approached the administration for support anyway. 
I had this perception that in the service as soon as you approach administration, 
any hope you have of moving up in the ranks is gone. It is my goal to move up, to 
spend my life here. The perception I had at that time, rightly or wrongly, was as 
soon as I said anything to administration my chances of moving up were gone. 
Perception of Employee Assistance Programs 
Perceptions are changing within the service regarding the needs of emergency 
responders; however, responders continue to suffer needlessly because of the 
preconceived idea of the culture. However, in the last decade or so, administration has 
begun to put in place programs that can benefit members who are in need. Debriefing 
teams have sprung up in various departments as well as Employee Assistance Programs 
that offer help to responders. 
Lack of trust in rules of confidentiality. Responders, for whatever reason, rarely 
access their EAP. Those who did access their EAP quit soon after beginning and found 
someone outside of the city in which they live. "I don't know if I trust them enough yet to 
access them. I still have this idea that they are somehow attached to administration and 
that administration will find out about those who seek help." Some responders didn't 
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even think about accessing their local EAP psychologist. In order to ensure that there was 
anonymity and confidentiality, a number of responders went outside of the city to access 
support but had to pay for it themselves. "I still have the idea that they [local EAP 
psychologist] are connected to the department and . . . I won't take that chance when we 
are talking about my life." 
Let us tell our story. Two of the responders accessed their local EAP 
psychologists and had differing opinions of the process. 
They told me that it was a lack of sleep. I had just gone through a period of not 
sleeping well and he attributed it to that. I wasn't comfortable. He didn't seem to 
want to relate it to a critical incident. He didn't seem to understand that I knew 
that I had experienced a critical incident and was beginning to experience some 
pretty severe symptoms from it. It was like he was avoiding going there, like he 
didn't believe that it could happen. I needed confirmation from him. I needed to 
know that I wasn't being judged and that he took what I said very seriously and 
would work with what I told him. But he kept going back to the sleep thing. 
While the responder felt that he couldn't make clear to the EAP psychologist why 
he was feeling the way he was feeling, the second responder had a very positive 
experience. "I was being guided, not bullied through the process. There came a point in 
time when I needed to take some responsibility to get better and she has helped me to do 
that." Yet this same responder believes that he was very lucky to have found someone he 
could talk to, "I've heard from guys that they have had really horrible experiences." 
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Refusal to Consider Career Changes 
The degree to which responders identify themselves through their job produced 
two related views of changing careers: born to do the job and degree of identification to 
do the job. 
Born to do the job. One of the most interesting things to have come out of the 
exploration of the participants systemic experiences was the reaction to the idea of 
quitting their jobs. When asked if they had ever thought about quitting their jobs at any 
time when they were experiencing Critical Incident Stress, the responses ranged from 
seriously offended by the question to humorous. "If you understood the service and who 
we are, you wouldn't have asked that question." Others were a little less forceful in their 
answers. "Many times during the time I wasn't well I thought about quitting. I wanted to 
quit it all." "I honestly love my job . . . [but] this is who I am. I could never, ever leave 
what I do. I was born for this. I will die for it as well." 
Degree of the identification to do the job. Others never considered quitting. "No, I 
can't think of a time when I wanted to quit," or "The only time I will even consider 
quitting is when my heart stops beating and then one of my brothers better be there to get 
it going again." Most all the responders felt the same way, preferring to move up through 
the ranks rather than finding something else to do in their lives. The degree to which the 
responders identify themselves as firefighters, paramedics, or police officers may very 
well prevent them from leaving the service, preferring to teach or move into 
administration rather than leave the service completely. Most responders accept the idea 
that they will continue to do the job "I was born to do" until they are no longer able to 
physically do so, with one firefighter expressing the love for his job in a most eloquent 
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way. "I was born with a hose in my mouth and an axe in my hand. It's the way I 'm going 
out." 
The concept of culture and how it invades the systemic experiences of emergency 
responders is quite clear. The culture of emergency services does, in some way, formulate 
the reactions to the job both before and after the perceived critical incident. The idea that 
culture also determines if a responder seeks assistance, whether it is from coworkers, 
administration or through their EAP, is very real. What is also very real is how the 
responder's perception of the critical incident can begin to affect other aspects of his life. 
Role Confusion 
Under the main theme of role confusion, responders addressed a number of sub-
themes such as changes of role of emergency responder, world view, reactions to life 
stressors, persistent and intrusive thoughts and images, and debilitating psychological 
sequelae as shown below in Table 7. 
Changes of Role as an Emergency Responder 
Responders spoke to the changes that occurred within themselves after the critical 
incident in four ways: all roles are guided by job identification, chaos in role 
identification, fear of vulnerability, and awareness of misrepresentation. 
All roles are guided by job identification. The responders that participated in this 
study spoke to the issue of identification. All of the responders stated that they identify 
themselves as their role as an emergency responder. "I am a police officer. I don't 
identify myself as a husband or father. I am a police officer." Unlike other professions 
that generally are left at the office, it is very difficult for an emergency responder to leave 
his role after his shift. 
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Table 7: Role Confusion: Sub-themes and the Components 
Sub-themes Components 
Changes of Role as an Emergency 
Responder 
Changes in How Responders View the 
World 
Reaction to Life Stressors 
Persistent and Intrusive Thoughts and 
Images 
Debilitating Psychological Sequelae 
All Roles are guided by job identification 
Chaos in role identification 
Fear of vulnerability 
Awareness of misrepresentation 
Loss of faith in humanity 
World doesn't fit with beliefs 
Loss of control 
Lack of will to challenge stressors 
Inability to fix anything 
Strongly self-critical about performance 
Thoughts are on overdrive 
Haunting images 
Self-condemnation 
Extreme depressive symptoms 
Twisted reality 
Loss of interest in activities 
Runaway train 
Suicidal ideation and attempts 
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It is who I am. I take that wherever I go. People say there's [name], he's a 
Paramedic. Not husband or father. Paramedic. But I see myself that way as well. I 
am always aware of what is happening around me, in ways that I don't think most 
people are. I have never seen myself as anything more than that. The rest of my 
roles are guided by me as a Paramedic. 
Another responder defends the way he perceives himself because of the state of 
mind that is necessary for emergency work. According to the responders, the state of 
mind is not shut off when they finish a shift, rather, it is their global perception of how 
they see the world. 
How I act and react at work is the same way that I act and react in other settings. 
How I define myself defines who I am as a firefighter. The same characteristics 
that make me good at what I do also make me good at my other roles. 
When the responders began to experience long-term effects of Critical Incident 
Stress and their perception of themselves as responders began to change, the roles they 
engage in, in other areas of their lives changed as well. A lifetime of how they identified 
who they perceived themselves to be as people had to change and for many of the 
responders, the change was frightening. "It was more terrifying than anything I'd been 
faced with in my career . . . . You start to lose sight of who you are, you begin to question 
everything." 
Chaos in role identification. As the responders began to question their perceptions 
of who they were, they also began to question their other roles as well. As emergency 
responders, their lives were ordered, for good reason. Every responder spoke of the need 
for order, that the obsessive and compulsive traits they have help them to do their job. 
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Chaos was a common thread between the responders and the reaction they had to their 
changing roles. 
My world was perfect before the critical incident . . . . I felt as though it was gone. 
My world became chaotic, I had no idea why I felt that it was falling around me, 
that what I had before was now in ruins. . . . The order that I've always needed in 
order to do what I do was gone. 
Fear of vulnerability. As difficult as it was for the responders to talk about their 
perception of who they were within the relationship with their wives, it was very painful 
for them to talk about how they perceived the change to have affected their children. 
I had always been so strong for my children. I was the one that they could rely on 
to be there. They were proud of who I was. When I started to question who I was, 
I tried to hide it, to be the person that they thought I was. They always said, 
'daddy can fix it' but I couldn't fix it anymore. I didn't know how to fix it 
anvmore. 
Another responder spoke to how well he thought he had hidden the change in 
him, and how it damaged his relationship with his children, however temporarily. 
They could see through me. I kept trying to be the father that they thought I was. 
But they knew and resented that I wouldn't be honest with them. But there were 
reasons for that, I thought I was doing the right thing, they are children for God's 
sake. They were angry for a very long time, even when I quit trying to hide what 
was happening to me. 
Awareness of misrepresentation. Others that relied on the responders were people 
that they had worked with in the community for years. Before the critical incident and for 
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a short time afterwards, the responders continued to do what they could, although the 
effort wasn't there. Others quit working in the community because they didn't have the 
energy or the focus to do the work they once had. As symptoms became more intrusive, 
most of the responders quit working in the community altogether. "I felt like I was a 
fraud. I couldn't represent myself because I didn't know who I was." 
Changes in How Responders View the World. 
There were three distinct reactions to changes in the responders view of the 
world: loss of faith in humanity, world doesn't fit with beliefs, and loss of control. 
Loss of faith in humanity. There was no question that as responders began to 
question their identities; they also began to question their view of the world. Responders 
have deep faith in the innate goodness of the people that they serve, but their critical 
incident changed that. As their worlds became more chaotic, the faith they had was lost. 
Maybe it was naive, but I always thought the world was basically good, even after 
what has happened over the past couple of years. This inc ident . . . it blew me 
away. Suddenly I didn't think the world was so good anymore . . . . I wasn't so 
sure about anything I once believed in. I lost my faith in humanity, in God, in the 
world in general. It made me very bitter and I am not a bitter man. 
World doesn't fit with beliefs. Suspicion of others was a result of the change in 
the responders' perception of the world. One responder stated that he became suspicious 
of everyone he came in contact with, both at work and outside of work. "I didn't trust 
anyone for who they said they were. For a long time I was suspicious of people's 
motives. I couldn't get a handle on the world and that scared the hell out of me." Another 
spoke to what he felt he had lost after the critical incident: 
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. . . I felt like the innocence was gone. It was just gone. And once the innocence 
was gone, it was a cold place to be. I didn't belong. Nothing I was thinking 
belonged with the world. It didn't fit anymore with what I believed in. Then I 
realized that the world hadn't changed it was me that had changed. The world was 
still the same. It was me that didn't fit with the world. 
Most other responders felt the same, but stressed the struggle to find some place 
in the world where they could find the peace they once had had. The harder they 
struggled to find the peace, the more elusive it became. 
My world had become nothing but chaos and I could find no peace within the 
world . . . I couldn't figure out why I wasn't seeing things the way I used to see 
them. I would go to work, find no peace, go home, find no peace. I seemed to 
have to fight to fit in where I had always been. The world had changed and I was 
no longer a part of i t . . . . I was overwhelmed. 
Loss of control. The responders spoke to the need for control, which helps them to 
do their job, but is also a part of their world view. When responders felt they had lost 
control, they also felt that they had lost a part of who they were: 
Control is a necessary part of who I am. If I didn't have control, I certainly 
couldn't do the job. It can't help but be the way I am outside of the job as well. 
The fact that I had lost control of my world was a very terrifying thing for me to 
realize. The harder I tried to regain some sort of control over my life, the less 
control I had. 
Another responder spoke to his need for control in his life and that when his 
world view began to change, his sense of control changed as well. "When I no longer saw 
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the world as a good place to be, I knew I had lost control not only of the world and my 
job, but who I was as a human being. That just about killed me." 
Responders who have been unable to resolve the incident continue to see the 
consequences of the incident as out of their control. One responder attributed his loss of 
control directly to external forces rather than attempting to take any responsibility for his 
own reaction. His emotions towards those he perceives put him in this situation are 
extremely intense: 
I was very angry that some son of a bitch could control me like that and after 
about a week or ten days I found myself getting angrier. If those kids hadn't put 
me into that situation none of this would have been happening to me. I couldn't 
believe that this punk-assed kid could have such control over me, over my life. 
Reaction to Life Stressors 
The reaction to life stressors after the critical incident elicited two different views 
from responders: lack of will to challenge stressors and inability to fix anything. 
Lack of will to challenge stressors. Changes in the way that participants 
responded to life stressors varied, although the majority of responders stated that they 
preferred to walk away rather than see the stressors as a challenge. The reaction to 
stressors outside of the job is much the same as the reactions that many of the responders 
stated were typical throughout their lives during the period of time when symptoms of 
Critical Incident Stress were prevalent. 
I think that stressors of different kinds, I generally would have taken face on, 
taken the full brunt challenge and make it happen . . . . take the karate kid 
approach. Now the best approach is to not be there, to get out of it, to get away 
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from it. Plus I'm taking a much more passive view which doesn't seem to be 
helping. Ongoing, cumulative stressors I avoid. I 'm not dealing with them 
anymore, I'm done. Over. I'm not dealing with it is my first reaction. 
Inability to fix anything. The inability to fix anything after their critical incident 
was something that the responders found difficult to accept. Before their critical incident, 
responders took care of what had to be done, to ensure that their brothers and their 
families were cared for. After the critical incident, they found it easier to try to escape 
from any problems that came up, stating that "It was all too much and I wasn't going to 
deal with anything." The perception was "nothing I did was right anyway so why bother 
trying to fix anything? The world became unfixable." 
Persistent and Intrusive Thoughts and Images 
There were four views of the thoughts and images that responders had after the 
critical incident that were both persistent and intrusive: strongly self-critical about 
performance, thoughts are on overdrive, haunting images, and self-condemnation. 
Strongly self-critical about performance. Responders stated that one of the 
reasons they felt they couldn't deal with life stressors was because they were also dealing 
with fairly intrusive thoughts for a long period of time after the critical incident. Within a 
short period of time after the critical incident, responders reported that the thoughts were 
more self-critical about their performance than anything else, regardless of the outcome 
of the incident. "What was going on in my mind that I wasn't looking more closely? I'm 
a useless firefighter, how could I think that I've been made for this job?" 
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Thoughts are on overdrive. As time passed and the responders did not seek any 
help for the symptoms they were experiencing, the thoughts could become more intrusive 
and intense. 
I could get from looking at a flower to they all know I'm crazy in seconds. My 
thoughts were on overdrive. I beat myself up a lot, cognitively I mean . . . . The 
thoughts were intrusive and time-consuming and emotionally I was drained. 
Sometimes they [thoughts] would become so intrusive I thought my mind was 
going to explode. I couldn't think sometimes. . . . I was in such pain. 
Another responder reported that the thoughts weren't time-consuming and 
emotionally draining, rather, he perceived the thoughts to be more on-going, "For the 
whole year I thought about it all the time. It was always lingering, always there . . . the 
thoughts prevented my life from being orderly and structured." 
Haunting images. Responders also reported that after time, with the intrusive 
thoughts came images. The images would not necessarily be about the incident directly: 
" . . . thoughts and images, dreams or sometimes while doing the dishes, cleaning a knife. 
. . . So almost all the time it would bring me back, not like it was terror, but a quick 
image and that's it." 
Yet the majority of responders did have images from their incidents that were 
"haunting. I couldn't get away from them." Many of the images would come to the mind 
of the responder at any time and many suffered nightmares because of the images. 
"Nightmares, I still see her big blue eyes looking at me and the bodies of the kids in the 
back seat." The longer the responder suffered, the worse the images were, sometimes 
becoming animated. 
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The kids mostly, after a while I had this image in my mind of the girl turning her 
head and looking at me with big brown eyes, big tears in them, knowing she was 
going to die. I could hear her asking me why I wasn't there sooner to help her. I 
could hear her asking me why I let this happen to her. I couldn't get that out of 
my mind. I didn't sleep much until I finally went to the doctor and went on meds. 
Self-condemnation. The majority of responders eventually went to see their 
physicians regarding their inability to sleep, however, the time line was over four months 
after their critical incident. Two of the responders were diagnosed with depression and 
referred to a psychologist, while the remaining responders who saw a physician were 
either referred by the doctor to a psychologist or were encouraged to see a psychologist 
by others, such as a trusted peer team member. 
Guilt, shame, like I hadn't done enough. I remember standing in front of the 
mirror looking at myself thinking what a useless fuck I was. Like I had no 
business being in the business. That I had fooled myself all those years into 
thinking I could do the job. I hated everyone, everything, there was one time 
when I even said that I hated God and that scared the hell out of me. I have 
always had faith, always been spiritual, and here I was hating God. I think that 
was the defining moment for me. I knew I was in trouble. I went to see the doctor 
and he sent me to see [psychologist]. 
Debilitating Psychological Sequelae 
Responders experienced a wide range of psychological symptoms after their 
critical incident with five main views of the symptoms being: extreme depressive 
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symptoms, twisted reality, loss of interest in activities, runaway train, suicidal ideation 
and attempts. 
Extreme depressive symptoms. Six months after their perceived critical incident, 
ten of the eleven responders were still experiencing psychological symptoms that 
interfered with their lives. 
Depression, extremely alert to sights and sounds, I've panicked a little, had 
extreme anxiety, the suicide thing was a big thing. One thing I never expected, a 
lack of sex drive. I've always been very sexual and I couldn't stand the thought of 
touching anyone or them touching me. A very real sense of helplessness and 
aloneness. Extremely lethargic. The guilt for feeling the way I was. I was angry 
because I didn't think the world was such a good place to be. 
Twisted reality. Other responders also spoke to their symptoms that continued 
over a long period of time, even after they had begun to see a psychologist. So much had 
changed in their world that responders felt the reality they had lived in for so long had 
disappeared and they were unable to get any sense of balance. 
I began to wonder how I could do that [the job]. It was like my ability to deal with 
the crisis of everyday life was no longer there. And as soon as I realized that my 
umbilical cord to crisis had been cut, I was no longer able to cope with anything. I 
was living in an alien world. There was so much unconscious thought to doing 
what I was doing that reality now seemed different or twisted or something. As 
soon as I cognitively acknowledged that something was wrong, I had to face that 
different or twisted. 
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Loss of interest in activities. Activities that they had once enjoyed were no longer 
of interest to the responders and were seen as an added to the stressor. Several responders 
talked about how the need for risk didn't stop at the door at work and carried over to the 
other areas of their lives but surprisingly, the result of long-term effects of Critical 
Incident Stress was anhedonia rather than an increase in the degree of risk-taking 
behaviors. 
I realize now that it was because of the symptoms I was experiencing, but I found 
absolutely no pleasure in anything. The greatest joys of my life were no longer of 
any concern to me. I lost the passion of life. I could take it or leave just about 
anything. This is just not me, its just not. 
Runaway train. For some responders, suicidal ideation was a result of the 
psychological symptoms of Critical Incident Stress, as well as the perceived loss of 
control and lack of support. Responders became hypervigilant and defensive, and were 
unable to find any strength within them to work their way out of the darkness. 
I was looking at life as though it were the worst thing that ever happened to me. I 
felt like the world was directing my life, I had no control over anything. I felt like 
a runaway train and couldn't stop myself. But the anger was the worst. And the 
guilt. Death looked good to me. I began to think that it would be a welcome relief 
to the pain I was feeling. 
Suicidal Ideation and Attempts. Three other responders, who reported 
experiencing Critical Incident Stress for the longest period of time, spoke about their 
suicidal ideation, with one responder reporting that he had attempted suicide three times. 
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"I thought about suicide all the time. I just couldn't get my thoughts together enough to 
actually formulate a plan." 
At times I would become so anxious that I thought that if I had a gun I would use 
it. I remember calling in and getting someone to replace me on my shift. I went to 
bed and didn't get out for a long time. Probably the next day, afternoon, I think 
the whole time I was thinking I'd commit. And I knew that if I attempted I would 
be successful. 
Two years after his critical incident, one responder still suffers from such extreme 
symptoms that attempting suicide has become normalized behavior. His explanation of 
the three attempts was spread out through his interview, but the explanations of his 
attempts have been compressed into one paragraph, leaving out the more graphic details. 
His words convey the desperation and pain he continues to feel: 
First time, I tried to do it by going out of the city, I didn't want my coworkers to 
be the ones that clean up the mess. I thought that I'd just gun the engine and drive 
directly into a truck. I chose a quiet traffic night I guess. The second time I tried I 
locked myself in the garage and ran the car. I thought if I could just go to sleep. 
So I went to sleep but my watch was set to alarm at 5 in the morning and ii woke 
me up. The third time I attempted I drove out of the city again with my gun but 
[coworker] was concerned and called me on my cell and talked me out of it. 
Even though this responder has been seeing a psychologist for the past year, he 
admits to not attending on a regular basis and has not told the psychologist about his 
suicidal ideation or attempts. This responder also admits that his administration is not 
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aware of his suicidal ideation or attempts, stating that they would simply "use it as an 
attempt to get me out of the service." 
How responders identify themselves is through their role as an emergency 
responder. When role confusion becomes chaotic and the negative psychological 
symptoms become more extreme, their roles in other areas of their lives become confused 
as well. Responders need to have their lives ordered and when this order becomes 
chaotic, their perceptions of other aspects of their lives become just as chaotic. 
Isolation from Valued Support Relationships 
The thoughts, emotions, and behaviors that resulted from the critical incident also 
began to affect the responders' support systems. It is thought that family and friends can 
be the single most important source of support for a responder after they have 
experienced a critical incident (See Chapter 2). Under the main theme of isolation from 
valued support relationships, responders spoke to the changes in their support network 
within the family as shown in Table 8. 
Renegotiation and/or Dissolution of Spousal Relationships 
There were four distinct views of the renegotiation and/or dissolution of the 
relationship with their spouse. They are: hiding from spouse, spousal fears, spouse's 
integration of service culture and integrating negative reaction into critical incident. 
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Table 8: Isolation from Valued Support Relationships: Sub-themes and their Components 
Sub-themes Components 
Renegotiation and/or Dissolution of 
Spousal Relationships 
Hiding from spouse 
Spousal fears 
Spouse's integration of service culture 
Integrating negative reaction into the CI 
Loss of Attachment with Children 
Unwavering Extended Family Support 
Silence caused break with children 
Fear of relationship changes with children 
Strength found within relationship with 
children 
Positive motivating force for change 
The defining moment 
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Hiding from spouse. Before their critical incident, responders perceived that they 
had strong support from their immediate family. They described the relationship as 
"loving . . . supportive . . . caring about each other's lives." "You have to have that 
support in your marriage or you won't survive." Several responders stated that when their 
critical incident occurred, they thought they would receive the same level of support that 
they had received from their spouse in the past. However, their initial response to the 
critical incident determined when or if they told their spouse about the incident. 
Several responders could not talk about the incident immediately, others talked 
about it right away, but regardless of when they spoke about it, the responders had 
thought that their spouse would respond positively to what they were experiencing. Three 
responders were correct in this assumption, however, the majority of the responders 
talked about how their initial reaction to the critical incident and their inability to talk 
about it determined how their spouses reacted. 
It was probably two months before I could talk about it [the incident]. I wasn't 
prepared to talk about it before, I had to process it within myself first. When I 
finally did talk about it, she [wife] told me that she didn't want to talk about it. 
My moods were erratic. She didn't understand that I needed to be in my own head 
and by the time I was ready to talk, she had shut down. 
Spousal fears. Responders who talked to their wives about their incidents found 
that their behavioral responses began to affect their spouses. There were no reported 
incidents of any physical abuse between the responder and his family, although some 
responders reported being "more verbal than I normally am. Before I never yelled. Now I 
did." Unused to the change in the responder's, spouses were more than likely to be silent 
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themselves to avoid any issue that may cause a change in the responder's mood. For the 
following responder, it did not take much to turn a simple drive downtown into a 
terrifying event for his wife. 
One time, we were driving down the street and she's like watch out for the kid on 
the curb and I think watch out for himself and it got progressively worse to the 
point where she told me what to do when I was driving . . . I would go absolutely 
livid. I could feel myself, my heart rate went up, my face turned bright red. I 
could have choked her . . . so I tell her I do not need your help in telling me how 
to drive or what to do to run my life I think that I can figure it out on my own. She 
got the point where she was afraid to tell me anything. 
Spouse's integration of service culture. A minority of spouses reacted in a 
positive way, with the majority of spouses in this group being in a field that is similar to 
emergency services. "The only thing that she is ever concerned about is the danger. She 
is related to the service so she has a little more intuition about things. She understands 
what I go through." One responder spoke directly to the fact that his spouse is not in 
emergency services and how the incident seemed to affect their relationship even though 
before the incident, the responders felt like their spouses understood. 
I still seek out answers for why we are where we are. I had thought, when we first 
married, that this was it. She seemed open to understanding emergency services. 
She listened to me. But now, no. She doesn't want to know. It's like I betrayed 
her or something. At first I thought I had in some way betrayed us. But I don't 
think so now. I think that she fell in love with the ideal of my job. 
I l l 
Another responder spoke of how his spouse not being in emergency services was 
a detriment to their relationship, as well as to his behaviors with his spouse and children 
before he even attempted to talk about the incident: 
I was no longer the person that they knew. I had never been angry before. Now I 
was yelling at my kids, my wife. I didn't care about any aspect of their lives, 
nothing. There was nothing about them that interested me in the least. They were 
people that lived in the same house as I did. They were people whom I didn't 
know and didn't care to know . . . but she's not in emergency services. She 
doesn't quite get it as much as she has tried to understand. I guess she had her 
own perception of who I was and it doesn't include weakness. 
Integrating spousal reaction into the critical incident. If responders did not receive 
the level of support they needed after their critical incident, responders reacted by 
integrating the perceived negative relationship with their wives into the critical incident: 
I saw her as a part of the critical incident. I couldn't think about the incident 
without thinking about her as well. She became enmeshed with the incident 
because of the way she responded to the incident. The anger and helplessness that 
I felt because of the critical incident was projected onto her as well. She was the 
critical incident in addition to the actual incident. 
Loss of Attachment with Children 
Responders had three distinct views of how responders saw the changes in the 
relationship that occurred after the critical incident: silence causes break with children, 
fear of relationship changes with children, and strength found within the relationship. 
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Silence causes break with children. A number of responders also talked about 
how the relationship with their wives initially prevented them from talking to their 
children about what they were experiencing. 
My kids, this I think, really hurt them. When [wife] and I began to have trouble, 
the kids couldn't help but be effected. Maybe it was the perception I had of who I 
was to them as well, but I turned from the kids too. It cost me in the long run. 
A second responder said that he tried to talk to his children about what was 
happening to him and why their parents were yelling at each other all the time. The 
negative relationship that he was experiencing with his wife initially prevented him from 
doing so and when he finally felt that he could be open with his children, they were no 
longer there for him. 
I tried to tell them what was happening. Maybe they were too young to 
understand what was happening but they didn't get it. By then [wife] was very 
suspicious of everything and I got the idea that she didn't want the kids to know 
the truth. I don't know if she talked about it when I wasn't there but I didn't seem 
to be able to get through to the kids that I would be able to work through it and I 
would really like their support. They didn't seem to be able to give it for whatever 
reason. 
Fear of relationship changes with children. Some of the responders had children 
that they felt were too young to understand at the time they experienced their critical 
incident. They spoke to how it was easier for them knowing that their children were too 
young to understand the changes that were happening, but these particular responders are 
also the ones that had good support from their spouses as well. A couple of the 
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responders had children who were out of the house at the time of the incident and 
admitted to not having good relationships with the children to begin with. 
I think that if I had had a solid relationship with my kids before the incident, they 
would have been good support for me. But they had moved away to go to 
university and . . . they really didn't care that much. My wife and children turned 
their back on me during the worst time of my life. . . . I could deal with the 
department and my coworkers turning away. I couldn't deal with my family 
turning away. 
Strength found within the relationship. One responder who talked to his kids did 
so when he felt that he couldn't survive without someone in his immediate family giving 
him the support he needed. Responders admit that they didn't give their children enough 
credit for understanding that something was occurring with their father and their parents 
relationship was beginning to break down. 
They knew something was happening and it scared them. So finally, one day 
when she [wife] had gone out, when I was on leave, my kids came to me and we 
talked about it. Big tears, very emotional. They understood and told me that 
whenever I wanted to talk about it they were there for me. They became my 
supports although I tried very hard not to say anything to them that might upset 
them. But from this, we have a very close relationship. I'm glad I took the chance 
to talk to them. 
A responder who initially spoke about his children's perception that he could fix 
everything, once again spoke to the perception that his children had of him when he 
talked to them about the critical incident. "They were way more forgiving than their 
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mother was. Now, I was human and I think that they liked knowing that. And I am still 
dealing with the guilt of how I treated them." 
Another responder talked about his children's concern about him going to work 
after he had talked to them about the incident. "My boy told me that he was concerned 
because of the state of mind that I was in might put me into a dangerous situation." 
Unwavering Extended Family Support 
The responders who accessed extended family support spoke to two distinct but 
related views: positive motivating force for change and the defining moment. 
Positive motivating force for change. Responders who did not receive the support 
they needed from their spouse went outside of the immediate family to extended family 
members for the support. 
My parents were great. My brothers were great. When I finally got it through my 
head that [wife] wasn't going to be any support, I turned to them. They listened to 
everything I had to talk about. They drove me to [city] twice a week when I began 
to see [psychologist]. They stood by me and tried to involve the kids as much as 
they could. They supported me without question. Without their help I'm not sure 
where I would have ended up. 
The defining moment. For several responders, the support that they received from 
their extended family was a positive motivating force for seeking help. 
My family, we have always been close. They walked me through my life every 
step of the way, they have never not been there. My father, he wasn't in the best 
of health at the time. But he stood strong for me the whole time. My brother was 
amazing and of course my mother thought I should eat more. I remember one 
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night I sat in my parents living room after [wife] and I had had a fight. The three 
of them, for I don't know how long, listened as I walked through the incident 
once again, let me cry, held my hand, told me that they loved me. It was perhaps a 
defining moment for me. The moment that I didn't feel so alone. The moment 
when I knew that I could make it through. I knew the power of family then. 
Although responders believed they had positive support from their spouses before 
the critical incident, a number of variables such as timing or behavior contributed to how 
the spouse responded to this particular incident. The support of extended family produced 
a defining moment for the responders, a moment when they realized that they were not 
alone. This support enabled the responders to begin the process of putting their lives back 
together. 
Reconstruction and Assimilation of the Experience 
Almost all the responders that participated in this study have managed to make it 
past the critical incident and begin the rebuilding process in all areas of their lives. Under 
the main theme of reconstruction and assimilation of the experience, responders talked 
about growth and change as well as re-engagement with their children, redefining identity 
on the job and enthusiasm for community involvement with several components in each 
sub-theme (Table 9). 
Growth and Change 
There were four main views of growth and change the responders spoke to as they 
began to access support: redefining of the individual responder, positive integration of 
roles, regaining control, and learned adaptive behaviors. 
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Table 9: Reconstruction and Assimilation of the Experience: Sub-themes and the 
Components 
Sub-themes 
Growth and Change 
Re-engagement with Spouse and Children 
Redefining Identity on the Job 
Enthusiasm for Community Involvement 
Components 
Redefining of the Individual Responder 
Positive Integration of Roles 
Regaining Control 
Learned Adaptive Behaviors 
Dissolution of Spousal Relationships 
Struggle to Rebuild Relationships with 
Children 
Growth of Empathy and Compassion 
Deeper Level of Awareness 
A Need to Give Back 
Teachable Moments 
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Redefining of the individual responder. Growth and change occurred when 
responders began to get some sense of how their reactions were beginning to affect the 
people in their lives. Once they had found a psychologist that they felt safe with, the 
majority of responders found strengths within them to make positive changes. The 
responders found the process challenging, and for some, the process is one they will 
continue for some time. "I finally realized I could continue on the way I was or I could 
use this as a learning experience and move on." For others, who have no interest in 
participating in the process, it would take an inordinate amount of strength and courage to 
simply find the faith that someone would be able to help them. The majority of 
responders found the experience as a catalyst for changes in the way they define 
themselves. 
I am still a Paramedic, first, last, and always. It continues to define who I am. It is 
my personality to be a rescuer. Seeing a psychologist that I trusted allowed me to 
take the perception I have always had of myself, which wasn't such a bad thing, 
and build from there. But also see myself as the sum of all my roles in my life, 
father, son, brother, Paramedic, not in that order, but a sum of it all. Before, I 
would see Paramedic as all-encompassing. Now I see Paramedic as a part of who 
I am in all of my life roles. I learned that with [psychologist]. I can accept myself 
as human now. 
Others spoke to how their world view changed back from negative to a more 
positive outlook, but only after they had gained some control of their lives, through the 
therapeutic process. " . . . I started to gain some cont ro l . . . . I was able to accept myself 
as a firefighter, but I was also able to accept that it was okay to define myself that way." 
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Positive integration of roles. The process of redefining who the responder 
perceived themselves to be also included accepting that they didn't have to change the 
perception of who they are: 
I had thought of myself one way for most of my life. I can accept that too, though. 
I'm not sure that I wanted to change who I was, rather, I wanted to enhance who I 
am. I wanted to learn how to become a better person than I was, but my 
perception of who I was, is still who I think that I am. 
One responder spoke to learning to like himself again and how difficult that 
process was for him: 
By the time I sought help, I hated everything about me. I couldn't find one 
positive thing to say about myself when [psychologist] asked me. Nothing. Even 
during therapy, when [psychologist] would point out the positives, I couldn't 
believe him. It was terribly painful to know how I felt about myself. I think the 
first thing that I accepted as positive was that I kept attending therapy. It wasn't 
always easy to see myself in a positive way, it was at times very painful. But over 
time, it got easier. The more I accepted what was good within me, the harder I 
worked at getting better. 
Regaining control. One of the challenges that the responders faced was learning 
new coping styles and skills. "I learned a more flexible style of coping, I think. I was no 
longer rigid in the way I saw the world, so when something occurs now, I am more able 
to adapt to it." 
I learned the tools that I need in order to deal with this type of situation again. I 'm 
still working on it though, I think it's a life-long process that I'll have to go 
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through. But then, it should be a process that all of us go through, know, and 
understand, have the ability to introduce new information and adapt our coping 
styles to the new information. We also need to know when we need help. I 
learned that I need to take responsibility for myself. 
Another responder spoke to the coping skills he has gained through the 
therapeutic process: " . . . I needed to relearn positive coping skills. I needed to learn how 
to think quickly, think cognitively, react positively and sometimes it gets a little tricky in 
the rest of your life, but it's just how it is." 
Learned adaptive behaviors. Other than a positive outlook on life, responders 
spoke to learning how to laugh again, and how their humor has been of benefit in the 
process of change. "I knew that when I was laughing that I was going to survive this. It 
was an incredible moment for me." Other learned adaptive behaviors have been in the 
manner of self-care and finding the balance between a healthy lifestyle and obsession: 
Before the critical incident, I was working out at the gym three times a week and I 
was happy with t h a t . . . a f t e r . . . five, six times a w e e k . . . three, four hours, five, 
six times a week. I wanted to work the pain out, but it only made it worse. Now, I 
am back to three times a w e e k . . . . I try to channel the negative energy I feel into 
a positive workout. 
For responders who have been able to make positive changes in their lives, 
exercise, a healthy diet and good sleeping patterns have become priorities: 
I feel better. I exercise regularly, I eat well, and my sleep, though sometimes I 
wake up in the night or day, depending on my shift. For me, to stay healthy, 
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physically and mentally has become very important. Not just for me but for my 
kids as well. 
As responders began to heal, the activities they had once enjoyed became 
appealing to them again. It was not always easy, many had to relearn how to take time for 
themselves and appreciate the simple things they had once found interesting. 
I took my bike out the first time since this all began a few months ago. It was fall. 
I remember sitting on it, thinking that I had passed through a whole lifetime the 
past year, so many changes. It was like coming home when I fired her up. 
Re-engagement with Spouse and Children 
The re-engagement with their spouse and children was also seen as a positive step 
in responders' attempts for renewal. However negatively the relationships ended with 
their spouses, the attempts to begin communication was seen as positive. There were two 
main views of the re-engagement: dissolution of spousal relationships and struggle to 
rebuild relationships with children. 
Dissolution of spousal relationships. For the responders who had begun healing, a 
part of the process was renegotiating relationships with those they cared about most. A 
majority of responders who participated are in the process of separating, are separated, or 
have divorced their spouses. Those who remain with their spouses, with the exception of 
two responders, continue to have healthy relationships with their wives. The two 
exceptions are the responders who have not taken any active role in a healing process. 
The responders who maintained positive relationships with their spouse, spoke to the 
changes they have made as a family. "I have had lots of changes. I was aware of the 
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changes within me and the support my wife gave me. I was very lucky to be where I was 
at and how positive the experience has been for me." 
Struggle to rebuild relationships with children. Those who have been able to 
rebuild their relationships with their children admit that it has not been an easy process. 
For some responders, the unconditional love of their children made the process a little 
easier, for others; it took more time to build the trust between them. The remaining 
responders spoke to the relationship they now have with their children: 
The kids never wavered in their support of me once they got over the anger of 
what had happened to me. I worked twice as hard to get better for them. We have 
a great relationship now, we are open in the way we communicate, we've even 
taken some classes together, communication classes, they've gone to support 
group for kids, they are wonderful people. I am as proud of them for coming this 
far as they are of me for finding a way back to them. 
One responder said that it was still a struggle to rebuild the relationship with his 
children, but he takes it one day at a time and spends more time with them now than he 
ever did before, "I think that since the divorce, my children have become more proud of 
me for what I do. There are times when we all get very frustrated. And they still get 
angry. But we are dedicated to making it better." 
Redefining Identity on the Job 
The responders spoke to two very distinct and powerful views of redefining 
themselves on the job: growth of empathy and compassion, and deeper level of 
awareness. 
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Growth of empathy and compassion. The responders perceived that they also 
needed to rebuild relationships with their coworkers, even though their coworkers didn't 
seem to be aware of what was occurring in their lives. The skills that helped the 
responders to redefine themselves and to rebuild familial relationships also helped the 
responder to become a better person on the job as well. 
I have learned that I can survive. And I am not invincible. That was a big positive 
to come out of this. I think that it's made me a more compassionate person. I'm 
not as quick to judge as I was before, you know, people whining about trivial stuff 
that's happening in their lives. I listen to what they say now and see their pain. I 
don't trivialize stuff anymore. I think, that because of the growth of my 
compassion and empathy, I am a better person in all aspects of my life. I know 
that I can go through something like this and survive. I know this has made the 
relationship with my coworkers very healthy. 
Deeper level of awareness. Another responder also spoke to how his growth as a 
person helped to improve his relationships with his coworkers: 
I am more open and honest about my feelings and what I think about certain 
incidents that we go to. I listen to the guys more than I did before. I hear what 
they say and I think that some of them trust me more than they did before. Trust is 
not automatic, it has to be earned. I don't mean on scene or something. I mean as 
brothers. 
During the time when the responders felt the most alone, and no matter how they 
perceived their co-workers would react, each responder believed that they were still a part 
of the brotherhood, that when they needed it most, their brothers would be there. One 
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responder, who went back to work after an extended leave and feared returning, 
eloquently spoke about the true essence of the word brother. 
When I came back, my old partner was working with someone new, so one of the 
guy's who knew why I was on leave jumped in and said he'd work with me. I 
think that saved me, his willingness to work with m e . . . . When I asked him why 
he was willing to work with me, he said he'd been through it, knew how scary it 
was to come back, knowing people would think you weak and unable to do the 
job. I can understand why they would think that. He helped me to prove that I was 
reliable. And by him so willing to work with me, it told the other guys that I was 
okay. It's been great ever since. 
This same responder has taken what he has learned from his experience and now 
tries to help his coworkers if he sees that they are reacting in any similar way. It is 
important to responders that have suffered long-term effects of Critical Incident Stress to 
try to assist those who may experience something similar. Not only does this help their 
own healing process, but it helps to build stronger bonds with those he may need to rely 
on in the future. 
I try to pay attention to their reactions and actions. If I see something out of the 
ordinary then I'll approach and ask them how they are doing. I am willing to share 
my experience with them if need be, to let them know that they aren't alone. If 
they tell me they are okay, I back off, but I still watch. It's easier to deal with 
when you know that you aren't alone. By my willingness to share, I hope that 
they know they aren't alone and will come and talk to me when they need to. 
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Enthusiasm of Community Involvement 
As the responders began to rebuild their lives, the interest in community 
involvement grew as well. The responders spoke to two differing views of this interest: a 
need to give back and teachable moments. 
A need to give back. In addition to rebuilding relationships with their families and 
coworkers, responders felt it was important to rebuild relationships with the community: 
I knew that I had to start to give back to the community again. When I started to 
redefine myself, there never was a second thought about getting back into 
community work. It continues to be a part of who I am. Now, I spend time and 
effort in the community not just because I am a firefighter, but because I am a 
human being. We always need to give back. I'm just doing it in a different way 
than I was. 
Teachable moments. Other responders echoed these sentiments; how important it 
was to start to rebuild the relationship with the community, but also used it as a bonding 
moment with their children: 
I felt it was important to get back into community work, but I also felt it just as 
important that I include my children for several reasons. One is so that I could 
spend more time with them and another was that they need to see how important 
it is to give back to the community. Another reason is that it is because it is who I 
am, not just as an emergency responder, but because it is who I have grown to be 
as a person. 
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Conclusion 
Responders who participated in this study have spoken about their experiences in 
their respective service before and after their perceived critical incident. The 
consequences of their experiences have been pervasive, far-reaching, and long-term and 
have impacted three areas of the emergency responder's life: the job, the individual 
responder, and the responder's family. All of the responders in this study spoke of the 
isolation and the perception of being cut off from the very culture in which they 
identified most with and how that perception changed the way in which they interacted 
with family, coworkers, administration, and the community. 
A discussion of the results of the long-term implications of Critical 
Incident Stress in the three areas explored follows in Chapter 5, as well as a look at 
responders' thoughts on debriefing, the limitations and implications of this and future 
research, and the implications for counselling emergency responders. 
Chapter 5 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to explore the experiences of emergency responders 
at least six months after a critical incident in three areas of an emergency responder's life: 
impact on job, impact on the individual responder, and perceived impact on family. The 
results show that rarely are responders able to keep the consequences of the critical 
incident from invading other areas of their lives. The responders who participated in this 
study had the opportunity to tell their stories about their critical incident and the effects it 
had on the three areas explored. These results, the implications the results have for 
counselling emergency responders, and responders' thoughts on the process of debriefing 
will be discussed. The limitations and reliability of the present research and implications 
for future research will then be discussed. 
Any pre-intervention training regarding Critical Incident Stress that responders 
have received left them with the idea that a critical incident only occurs when it is 
experienced as a group. Responders who participated in this study perceived that they 
experienced the critical incident alone; reinforcing an idea that the consequences of the 
critical incident were caused by personal weakness rather than being a normal reaction to 
an event outside of their daily experiences. The results of this study show that single 
responder critical incidents occur more often than has been noted in previous research 
and that the consequences of Critical Incident Stress can be pervasive and long-term and 
can severely impact an individual even when the incident is not large-scale. 
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Long-term Implications of Critical Incident Stress on the Job 
Responders that participated in this study experienced long-term, pervasive 
symptoms of Critical Incident Stress. Thoughts and images were intrusive, behaviors 
were extreme, and the perceptions of how they looked at their work changed radically 
from their perceptions before the critical incident. In order to do the job, emergency 
responders must be able to deal with situations that the majority of the population cannot 
or would not want to deal with. There is a certain state of mind responders have that 
enable them to enter into a profession that most people avoid. Emergency services, no 
matter how one ends up in the profession, is not seen by responders as just a job; it is a 
calling, something that responders know they have to do in order to find fulfillment in 
their lives. Although some responders think about leaving the service when they are 
experiencing Critical Incident Stress, the degree to which they identify themselves with 
their work prevents them from quitting. 
The initial emotions the responders experienced at the incident they identify as 
critical are considered to be normal reactions within the profession of emergency 
services. Frustration, anger, helplessness, and sadness are among the most common 
emotions responders experience and should be expected given that responders encounter 
events that are outside of normal daily experiences. Responders feel an enormous sense 
of responsibility to those they serve in the community, and any emotion they experience 
on scene may be acknowledged by the responders but set aside in order to complete their 
tasks. 
There is no identifiable timeline between when the critical incident occurs and 
when responders begin to experience symptoms of Critical Incident Stress. Responders 
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may perceive the outcome of the incident itself to be positive and continue to do their 
work as though nothing out of the ordinary has happened. Some responders recognize 
immediately that the incident has had some affect on them but for others, it could be 
weeks, or even months before they realize that they are experiencing symptoms of CIS. 
Regardless of the timeline, it appears that responders only acknowledge that they are 
experiencing changes when they realize they have lost the passion and enthusiasm they 
once held for their work, even though they may have experienced other cognitive and 
behavioral reactions during this time. Whether it is because of the culture of emergency 
services or because denial is used as a coping mechanism, responders attempt to 
normalize their reactions to the critical incident. 
Emergency responders feel that after their critical incident, the "umbilical cord to 
crisis" has been severed. This goes back to the idea that responders have a calling to work 
in emergency services; that somehow, responders need the constant level of crisis in their 
work in order to be fulfilled as firefighters or paramedics or police officers. What others 
may consider a trauma event, emergency responders consider normal; everything is a 
crisis so there is no crisis. However, when that umbilical cord is cut by means of their 
critical incident, the driving force behind the passion and enthusiasm they once had for 
their work is lost as well. The new reality of their lives looks different or twisted from the 
reality of how they had perceived their lives to be. 
When responders perceive that no one else is affected by the critical incident, they 
begin to isolate themselves from their coworkers. Responders spend an enormous amount 
of time and energy trying to keep up the facade that nothing has changed. However, they 
have little tolerance for minor mistakes, station duties seem insurmountable, and non-
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emergent calls are an irritant. The more frustrated responders become with themselves for 
the negative reactions they are experiencing, the more frustrated and fearful they become 
with those they work with and the work that they do. 
When tones or codes are sounded sending responders to scenes that may be 
similar, thoughts and images of their critical incident invariably come to mind. Feelings 
of anxiety and panic can be overwhelming and difficult to set aside in order to work the 
present scene. For those in the Fire/Paramedic Service, assigned tasks are completed 
automatically. In the Police Service, however, flashbacks occurred more often if the 
scenes are similar to their critical incident and will cause some hesitation before the tasks 
are completed. 
As thoughts and images become more intrusive, responders begin to isolate 
themselves from their coworkers and perceive that they have no control over their lives. 
They rarely talk to their coworkers about what they are experiencing for fear their 
coworkers will see them as being weak. Weakness is a responder's greatest fear; if their 
coworkers perceive them as being weak, the trust between coworkers that is needed to do 
the job and keep the other person alive is gone. If the responder is perceived as 
untrustworthy, they may be put on light duty, or to the extreme, on leave, which to some 
responders, is a punishment worse than anything they can imagine. 
Behaviors that are extreme are exhibited and the fallout from these behaviors can 
be enormous. When responders are healthy, behaviors such as aiming an unloaded gun at 
their mouths is understood to be completely inappropriate and would most likely never 
occur. When responders aren't provided with interventions to deal with the long-term 
effects of Critical Incident Stress, their behaviors often spiral out of control and others are 
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put at risk. This complicates the intensity of thoughts and emotions as responders 
perceive they are betraying the trust of the brotherhood or breaking the code by 
potentially putting their coworkers at risk. 
The perception responders have of the culture of emergency services forces this 
extreme way of thinking. Responders do not believe there is any middle ground when 
they are experiencing CIS. In departments that have not fully acknowledged the potential 
for CIS among their members, responders prefer to suffer in silence because of the belief 
that they either do the work or they get fired. The level to which responders identify 
themselves with their work and the culture in which they work promotes the need to keep 
silent. Without their work, and without resolution, responders begin to lose the perception 
of who they are as individuals. 
Long-term Implications of Critical Incident Stress on the Individual Responder 
The degree to which responders identify themselves by their work influences the 
way in which they identify themselves in other areas of their lives. As responders begin 
to lose sight of who they are as responders, the perception of whom they are as 
individuals' change. Responders may be able to deal with the chaos and tragedy in other 
peoples lives, however, without intervention, their own world becomes chaotic. 
Generally, the various roles that individuals have in their lives, such as teacher, 
father, husband, friend, community member, all influence who the person is as an 
individual. The degree to which one role influences the other roles may shift and change 
depending on which role the individual is engaged in at that moment. For those in 
emergency services, the perception of who they are as emergency responders guides all 
the other roles in their lives. 
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Responders perceive the world and humanity as basically good. The intensity with 
which they react to their critical incident changes the way they view the world and the 
perception that the world is perhaps not so good does not fit with their beliefs. The 
critical incident they experience changes their faith in humanity, in God, and their world. 
As the symptoms of Critical Incident Stress became more intrusive, the conflict that they 
experience forces responders to change their view of the world in an attempt to fit with 
how they currently perceive the world to be; the world is no longer good. 
Responders perceive that they lose control, not only on the job but within 
themselves as well. The need for control cannot be seen as negative in the world of 
emergency services; rather, it is a necessary personality characteristic that helps 
responders do the job. The need for control outside of work is not seen as a need to be 
controlling in the negative sense as much as it is viewed as a having control over who 
they are and how they perceive their world. As their world view begins to change and the 
lack of control over their lives diminishes, responders perceive that their world is 
becoming more chaotic. The more chaotic responders perceive their world to be, the less 
control they perceive they have. 
As their lives become more chaotic, responders find it extremely difficult to 
handle the daily stressors they are faced with. Before their critical incident, responders 
took stressors as a challenge to be met head on. After the critical incident, and as their 
world is perceived as spiraling out of control, responders find that they lack the strength 
and will to challenge anything in their world. Responders have the perception that they 
are not able to fix anything anyway so they prefer to walk away from stressors rather than 
face something that may add to the strain they are already feeling. 
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The prolonged period of time without intervention intensifies the symptoms of 
Critical Incident Stress. Thoughts and images of the critical incident become so intrusive 
that it is difficult for responders to focus on anything but the critical incident. Initial 
thoughts about the event are self-critical about their performance on the job, but as time 
passes, thoughts about the outcome of the incident turn towards their performance in all 
roles of their lives. The intrusive thoughts become time-consuming and emotionally 
draining for responders that in turn reduces their ability to gain any sort of control over 
what is occurring within them. 
Images of the critical incident haunt emergency responders and initially, the 
images are fairly close to what the responders remember from the incident. However, 
over time, the images often take on a life of their own. In the minds of some responders, 
it is almost as if the victims of the incident began to verbally condemn the responders. 
The images seem to produce a life-feeding cycle: as the images intensify, responders take 
on a level of blame for the incident, which produces more haunting images. The more 
haunting the images become, responders take more responsibility and ownership of an 
incident that they could not have prevented in the first place. The responders react with 
self-condemnation of both their incident performance and of themselves as human 
beings, which seems to feed the imagery, which in turn feeds the self-condemnation. 
The psychological symptoms of Critical Incident Stress that emergency 
responders experience after a critical incident has been well documented (Mitchell & 
Everly, 1993). Symptoms such as anxiety and panic, anhedonia, guilt, hypervigilance, 
and anger are experienced by the responders who participated in this study. The reality 
they have lived in for so long suddenly seems alien to them and they are unable to cope 
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with the changes that are occurring. Over time, the symptoms become debilitating and 
painful for the responders. 
As symptoms became more extreme and as responders struggle to understand 
what is occurring to them, thoughts of suicide become a regular occurrence. The 
symptoms that responders experience become so overwhelming that they feel suicide is 
the only way to ease the pain. For some responders, suicidal ideation becomes a catalyst 
for seeking help but for other responders, suicide is perceived as the only means to end 
their pain. 
The devastating impact of long-term Critical Incident Stress alters the way in 
which responders perceive their world. What was once structured and ordered is now 
chaotic and out of their control. Thoughts and images of the critical incident are intrusive 
and emotionally exhausting resulting in further isolation from the world and over time 
become potentially life-threatening. For responders who experience Critical Incident 
Stress and are married with children, the relationships with those they value as their 
primary supports are altered as well. 
Perceived Impact of Long-term Critical Incident Stress on the Family 
Before the critical incident, responders perceived that their spouses provided the 
support that they needed, and that the support was unconditional. Responders value their 
support systems; when they are not able to talk about their thoughts and emotions with 
anyone else, responders rely upon their spouse to listen and to understand what they are 
experiencing. When responders experience a critical incident, whether the initial reaction 
is acknowledged or not, they need time to process their thoughts and emotions. Whether 
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they spoke to their spouse immediately or after some time, responders had faith that the 
support they would receive from their spouses would be positive and helpful. 
Regardless of the time frame of when responders spoke with their spouse about 
their critical incident, spouses are unprepared for the intensity of the responders' 
emotional and behavioral reactions. By the time they are able to talk to their spouse about 
their thoughts and feelings, responders perceive that their spouse is no longer interested 
in listening and have emotionally shut down from their husband. As the silence ensues 
between the responder and their spouse and negative behaviors are exhibited, spouses 
become fearful of any interaction with the responder. The responder isolates himself 
further and basic trust between the responder and his spouse is lost. 
Responders are not unaware of how their spouses perceive them to be both as 
emergency responders and as husbands. Responders acknowledge that within their 
marital relationship, their spouses depend on them to be as strong at home as they are on 
the job, that they will be able to handle all of the stress and fix the situations that need 
fixing without losing control. When responders can no longer live up to this ideal, they 
experience an overwhelming sense of failure. This sense of failure is then projected onto 
the person that responders rely on the most to support them during this critical time. Their 
spouses are then perceived as responsible for the relationship breakdown, which causes 
responders to integrate the negative relationship with their spouse into their critical 
incident. 
The overwhelming sense of vulnerability that responders feel is an emotion they 
have rarely experienced before. Responders constantly put themselves into vulnerable 
situations on the job, which they are trained to handle. However, when responders feel 
135 
that they are vulnerable within their family relationship, they perceive the vulnerability as 
a weakness and begin to use avoidance as a coping mechanism. The more vulnerable 
responders feel, the more they avoid taking care of the responsibilities they had 
automatically taken care of before the critical incident. This perceived vulnerability and 
avoidance of responsibility carries over into the relationship that responders have with 
their children. 
Responders fear that any outward expression of emotion they show will change 
the perception their children have of them, so responders hesitate to talk to their children 
about the critical incident. They prefer to keep silent and avoid their children in order to 
preserve what they think is their children's perception of them. Responders acknowledge 
that perhaps this is not the best tactic to employ. Their children are able to see the 
emotional and behavioral changes occurring with their father, as well as the change in the 
relationship between their parents. Unlike the consequences of opening up to their wives 
about their critical incident, once responders speak to their children about what had 
occurred and why they were seeing changes in behavior, the children often become a 
powerful support for their fathers. 
Without the support of their children and their extended family, it is difficult for 
responders to take the next step towards seeking help. The realization that they had the 
unwavering support of their parents, siblings, and children is viewed as a defining 
moment for them. Responders no longer feel isolated from the world; rather, their family 
is a connection they can hold on to that they know will not be severed. This connection 
gives them the strength they need to take the next step towards rebuilding their lives. 
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Synthesis of Findings across Three Areas of Impact of CIS 
Given the theory of habituation and desensitization (Thompson, 1993), it should 
follow that the high numbers of years of service (11+) of those who participated in this 
study would contribute to their development of appropriate coping skills needed to 
insulate the responders from traumatic events. As in the work of Moran and Britton 
(1994), this study found that it is unlikely that any coping mechanisms that the 
participants have developed over the years to defend against a barrage of trauma events 
could totally insulate the responders all of the time. Eventually, responders begin to 
decompensate, creating a vulnerability in their coping strategies that cannot prepare them 
for their reaction to the critical incident they experience. 
The reaction to the critical incident that responders experience challenge who 
responders believe they are as individuals, the culture and brotherhood of emergency 
services, and the perception of their families. This challenge creates a major source of 
cognitive dissonance and reappraisal for the responders, which confirms the work of 
Everly and Rosenfeld (1981), who found that the response to a critical incident can have 
such an impact on emergency responders that their basic beliefs about the world, 
themselves and others may be compromised. 
It is not the incident itself that creates the difficulties that emergency responders 
experience but the inability to assimilate the experience of the incident into their 
schemata, a finding that is not in concert with Green, Wilson, and Lindy (1985) in that 
the most reliable predictors of stress reactions are duration and intensity of exposure to 
the trauma event. This study found that the responders perceive the incident to be no 
more intense or severe than usual but that the longer responders were unable to assimilate 
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the experience, the greater the risk became for development of symptoms of Critical 
Incident Stress, which leads to decreased resistance to further stress. 
Mitchell (1986b) asserts that if responders have a delayed response or no response 
to a critical incident, there is potential for self-destructive behaviors and in the extreme, 
suicidal ideation and attempts. The participants in this study had either immediate or 
delayed responses to their critical incident, which leaves the door open for the assumption 
that no matter when the response occurs, if a responder cannot integrate the experience 
into his existing schemata, behaviors will become self-destructive. 
The reactions of the responders who participated in this study were severe. Denial 
is initially used as a coping mechanism because of the responders' perception that the 
incident itself was not out of the ordinary. When responders perceive they are the only 
ones who experience the incident as critical, they begin a process of isolating themselves 
from their support systems, retreating and reliving their own experience, reinforcing their 
own beliefs that they are weak and unable to do the job, or accomplish anything else in 
their lives. Their sense of identity is threatened, they perceive their world is crashing 
down around them, and the thoughts and images become so overwhelming that suicide 
seems the only way out. Given the extreme psychological distress and the amount of loss 
that the participants in this study experienced, it is a wonder that the majority of 
responders have managed to rebuild their lives. 
The findings of this study suggest that the response to a critical incident is 
extremely unique for each emergency responder. The numbers of variables that will 
determine if a responder will react to a certain incident are numerous and have been 
widely researched. We have a good understanding about the personalities of responders, 
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possible antecedent conditions, cognitive and behavioral reactions, and the numerous 
responses and experiences of emergency responders. However, because of the 
idiosyncratic nature of each experience, it is necessary to remember that while we may 
have a solid foundation for understanding the psychology of emergency services and 
Critical Incident Stress it will be the emergency responder that defines the experience, 
rather than the foundation. 
Implications for Counselling Psychology 
There appears to be several specific, interrelated consequences to the incident that 
emergency responders experience: the event creates cognitive dissonance which shatter 
responders assumptions about the world and who they are as responders, individuals, and 
family members. Over a period of time, as responders are unsuccessful in their attempt to 
adapt to the new experience, they begin to experience psychological symptoms of Critical 
Incident Stress. The more extreme the symptoms of CIS became, the harder it is for 
responders to adapt the new experience into their schemata. As the cognitive conflict 
grows, responders grow more anxious, depressed, and so on. 
First, responders perceive their particular incident as critical. Whether immediate 
or delayed, responders' perceptions of the critical incident are negative and so overwhelm 
their usual coping mechanisms that they find it difficult to adapt the experience into their 
cognitive schemata. The inability to adapt to the experience creates cognitive dissonance, 
and as the high stress levels continue, responders attempt to reassess both the incident 
and their coping mechanisms in an attempt to adapt. This study reflects the findings of 
Janoff-Bulman (1992) who stated that schemas are influenced by the social environment. 
In the profession of emergency services, responders are influenced by the culture so that 
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when an incident is perceived to be critical, the reaction is based on the perception of 
who responders perceive themselves to be within the culture. 
When the dissonance creates a new challenge to the responders and they are 
unable to adapt the experience into their schemata, the assumptions that they held about 
themselves and their world becomes conflicted as well. Responders' assumptions are 
experienced through the culture of emergency services and are built on years of service 
within the culture. As Janoff-Bulman (1992) states, these assumptions are not easily 
changed. The responders feel that they have lost control and the basic assumptions about 
their world change dramatically. They no longer fit with how they now perceive the 
world to be. The experience does not fit with the assumptions that responders have about 
themselves and their culture, and they are cognitively challenged not only by their role as 
a responder, but by their role as an individual and as a family member. The experiences 
of the responders in this study echo the conclusions made by Mitchell and Bray (1990) 
when they state that as responders begin to lose the ability to gain some control over their 
world and their lives, those who are closest to the responders are negatively affected as 
well. Responders react by isolating themselves and withdrawing further from the world 
they perceive had sustained them for so many years. 
Over a prolonged period of time, as responders continue to struggle to gain 
control and make some sense of their world, symptoms of Critical Incident Stress develop 
that further inhibits attempts at recovery. The psychological sequelae reported by the 
responders are similar to the findings of Mitchell and Everly (1993, 1995, 1997). The 
symptoms that are experienced include anger, anxiety, helplessness, depression, blame, 
fear, suicidal ideation, suicide attempts, and sadness, etc. The inability of the responders 
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to adapt and assimilate to the new experience as well as the psychological symptoms of 
CIS, the perception of isolation from the brotherhood and other support systems all 
contributed to the awareness that they have lost their sense of identity, a perception which 
only serves to isolate them more. 
The perception of the culture of emergency services from both within the 
profession and from those they serve perpetuates the myth of the 'hero,' however, the 
responses of emergency services personnel to a critical incident are typical of people who 
are faced with a traumatic event. The culture, right or wrong, changing or not changing, 
is still a culture in which the responders live, both on the job and off. Individuals who do 
emergency work define themselves by the work they do, the system in which they work, 
and of how their families and communities perceive them to be. The culture of 
emergency services does not stop at the door at work; it carries over into all aspects of the 
emergency responder's life. It is the way they think, the way they act and interact, and the 
way that they view the world. When responders are affected by a particular incident, the 
symptoms need to be treated within the context of the culture in which they live. The 
culture cannot be ignored and attempts at changing the responder's perception of the 
culture should not be a goal in therapy. 
Cultural perspectives of emergency services notwithstanding, the idiosyncratic 
nature of the individual responder and his or her experience demand counselling 
interventions that are just as unique as the responder who attends counselling. 
Interventions must be based on responder need rather than on counsellor goals and 
motives. While it is acknowledged that emergency responders are cognitive individuals 
and that the reaction to the critical incident has fundamentally changed the responder, 
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counsellors should also utilize basic counselling goals and outcomes (Magnusson, 1991; 
1992) in order for responder needs to be fully met. 
If responders believe that the source of their problems lie with the critical 
incident, then it is necessary for the counsellor to affirm the responder's sense of self-
worth by attempting to normalize the critical incident and the responder's reaction to the 
critical incident. This can be accomplished in two ways: by providing a therapeutic 
environment where the responder feels safe in order to talk about the incident, and by 
consistently reflecting back to the responder that his or her perceptions of the critical 
incident are real and are understood to be real by the counsellor. 
Responders who experience long-term effects of Critical Incident Stress have 
found that the need to be silent about their experiences is necessary for self-preservation 
both on the job and off. The culture of emergency services promotes the need to be silent 
about the responses to their critical incident which causes the responders to isolate 
themselves from the people closest to them. In order for the counsellor to understand both 
the incident and the response to the incident, responders should be encouraged to talk 
openly and honestly about their experiences. Responders will only do so when they feel 
safe within the counselling setting. They must have the sense that they are being heard by 
the counsellor and that their experiences are important. By denying the responder the 
opportunity to tell his or her story, counsellors deny the reality of the response to the 
experience and the responder is apt to walk away from the therapeutic process, once 
again feeling that judgment has been passed without being heard. A feeling of safety can 
only be reached when responders comprehend that they can tell their story without 
judgment, in their own time, and in their own words. 
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By helping to reconstruct meaning, hope, and trust, the responder should find 
within himself the life-sustaining power of human resilience to achieve emotional 
stability, peace of mind, and some semblance of control over his life again. Emotions and 
perceptions are validated as the barriers to recovery are explored to encourage the 
responder to take an active role in taking charge of his or her life. 
In order to fully explore the issues presented, the experiences of emergency 
responders and their reaction to their critical incident must be integrated into the recovery 
process. Time must be spent in understanding the incident, the response to the incident, 
and in developing new schemata that is as unique to the individual responder as the 
incident he experienced. In other words, counsellor goals are to assist each emergency 
responder reconstruct themselves within the culture in which they live without attempting 
to change the responder's perception of the culture or of who he is. 
Following Beck (1995), six specific goals of counselling should include: 1) a 
method of crisis intervention that eases the acute process of psychological deterioration 
that is affecting the responder cognitively, emotionally, and behaviorally; 2) the 
stabilization and development of cognitive and affective processes; 3) management of the 
symptoms of psychological distress; 4) restoration of adaptive functioning; 5) self-care 
techniques and; 6) the reduction of stress through the development of new coping skills 
and a return to normalization. 
Cognitive strategies that are utilized within the therapeutic process cannot ignore 
responders' experiences or the perception that responders have about the culture of 
emergency services. Responders identify themselves through their role in emergency 
services. If this perception is not included in the intervention, the responder denies an 
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important part of who he or she is. Ignoring the culture sets the responder outside of the 
very culture in which they work. By validating the culture of emergency services as an 
important part of the responder's life, and guiding the responder to positive mental health 
through cognitive restructuring, the outcomes of the counselling process cannot help but 
be positive for the responder. 
Responders' Perceptions of the Process of Debriefing 
The majority of responders that participated in this study have experienced the 
process of debriefing and found it to be extremely beneficial when it was utilized and run 
by peer team members. Any negative opinions that responders have are more to do with 
who presently runs the program and how it has been implemented in their service rather 
than the program itself. As responders become more educated about Critical Incident 
Stress and CISM, the less tolerant they have become with those who they perceive to 
have "hijacked" the process for "their own motives rather than our needs." The majority 
of responders had an opinion as to what the process would look like if they had the 
opportunity to develop and implement their own program. 
The most important recommendations that responders made during their 
interviews to improve the process are to implement a full city service-wide CISM team 
that is developed with trained firefighters, paramedics and police officers as the group 
leaders; qualified mental health professionals would be on the team but only in the 
capacity of consultant rather than as a leader. Peer team members should provide pre-
incident training, debriefing, family support training, and one-to-one counselling that is 
supported and promoted by administration. Follow-up care, including referrals to 
qualified psychologists should also be provided by peer team members. 
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Emergency responders support a full management program that focuses on their 
needs rather than "what the mental health guys tell us our needs are." It should be noted 
that the responders recommendations follow the philosophy of the Critical Incident Stress 
Management program, but that the program set up within their service does not follow 
this philosophy. A process that is purely peer-driven would be more efficacious than a 
mental-health driven process, and holds great potential but only with training and support 
from all levels within their particular service. Responders understand the need for taking 
responsibility for what is happening to them, but are not convinced the program that is in 
place is confidential and hesitate to make the initial call for help. Responders, if 
convinced that the process is confidential, would be more apt to open up to a trained peer 
team member than anyone outside of the service. 
Implications for Future Research and Research Integrity 
The results of this study should encourage future research into the long-term 
effects of Critical Incident Stress for single responder critical incidents. It is clear that 
responders are affected by long-term Critical Incident Stress after single responder 
critical incidents more often than has been acknowledged in the past. Understanding 
responders experiences through qualitative study is difficult and time-consuming; 
however, quantitative studies do not capture the power and emotions behind the stories of 
emergency responders. By understanding the depth to which responders experience long-
term Critical Incident Stress, the knowledge base to develop appropriate interventions for 
emergency responders can only grow. 
Future research should include the experiences of female emergency responders 
and the experiences of the families of emergency responders to determine their needs 
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after their spouse/partner experiences a critical incident. As was stated in Chapter 4, even 
though seven of the responders lived within the same geographical location, no one 
experienced the same incident as critical. An interesting study then would be to not only 
examine the experiences between Fire/Paramedic and Police Services, but the difference 
in the experiences of responders between events. 
Quantitative studies could explore the prevalence rates of single responder critical 
incidents. By understanding how often single responder critical incidents occur, the 
prolonged emotions, behaviors, and thoughts experienced, as well as different coping 
mechanisms utilized by emergency responders, an intensity/risk scale could be developed 
to assess Critical Incident Stress. 
Longitudinal studies could examine the experiences of novice responders who 
have been trained in Critical Incident Stress throughout their career and compare those 
experiences with responders who are not trained in CIS. The knowledge and 
understanding from any future research regarding long-term implications of Critical 
Incident Stress for those responders who experience single responder critical incidents 
can only be of benefit to all responders in order to have long, healthy, active careers and 
lives. 
The power of any research is a function of the integrity of the research: being true 
to the process and the experience. In addition to researcher integrity laid out in Chapter 3, 
integrity of this research was further achieved on three levels. The first level of integrity 
is the responders' experience. This research provided space for each responder to tell his 
story and the stories were recorded verbatim. The second level of research integrity was 
to check the analysis to ensure there was consistency of integrity between responders 
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stories. Verification with the responders regarding their experiences ensured that the 
researcher's reflection was a reflection of their true experiences. The third level of 
researcher integrity was the description of the experiences within the context to provide a 
framework for the novice reader to understand what the experiences of emergency 
responders were all about. 
Limitations of this Research 
The qualitative method of this study was designed to explore responders 
experiences at least six months post critical incident. The interview protocol was 
developed in order to understand the impact that a critical incident had on three areas of 
an emergency responder's life that were deemed by the researcher as the most important: 
the job, the individual responder, and the responder's family. The data from the 
interviews are a reflection of the perceptions of responders in that one moment when they 
were interviewed and are not a complete representation of all the complexities of their 
experiences. 
Although it was apparent early in the interview process that those in the Police 
Service have a completely different state of mind than those in the Fire and 
Fire/Paramedic Service, it was not within the scope of this research to separate and 
compare the two services. While the experiences of those in both services are similar, 
there are enough differences between the two services to warrant a comparison. 
Another limitation with this research was the exclusion of the female population 
within emergency services. The exclusion was not meant to imply that the experiences of 
women in the service are any less important however; in this investigation, females were 
deliberately excluded in order to prevent any confounding variables.. 
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The sample size of this research does not necessarily allow for generalization 
across all emergency service professions in all cities. Other limitations include the lack of 
consideration for any antecedent conditions that may have contributed to the responders 
reactions to their critical incident and the experiences of those who are considered novice 
responders. 
Concluding Comments 
This study has reported the experiences of emergency responders at least six 
months post critical incident. Long-term effects of Critical Incident Stress have the 
potential to debilitate emergency responders, change their perceptions about their work, 
themselves, and their families. Silence continues to be the key word. No responder wants 
to appear weak and unable to do their job, so they keep silent. The need for silence 
carries over into other areas of their lives as well; they would rather not talk to their 
wives and children about how they are feeling, again, because of the perception of 
appearing weak. 
The reaction to the silence is deadly. Separation from their wives and children, 
debilitating psychological symptoms, and suicidal ideation and attempts are all results of 
long-term effects of Critical Incident Stress. It is clear that the consequences of both 
silence and the stigma of mental health issues have the potential to end careers and lives. 
It is not only good business but best practice as well if emergency responders, 
administration, and mental health professionals work together to provide programs that 
take care of firefighters, paramedics, and police officers throughout their careers and 
lives. 
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Appendix A 
Sample Letter Requesting Approval for Access to Members 
Deb E. Beaton 
[Association or Administration Address] April 18, 2002 
Dear [Association or Administration Representative], 
I am a graduate student at the University of Lethbridge beginning work on my Masters 
thesis. I am investigating the long-term effects of critical incident stress on emergency 
responders, including Fire Fighters, EMT/Paramedic and Police. There is much anecdotal 
evidence that the process of Critical Incident Stress Debriefing is helpful to emergency 
responders. Unfortunately, for whatever reason, to date there is little research on the long-
term effects that a critical incident may have on emergency responders. This research is 
timely and may bring about results that can be of benefit to the personnel. 
My research question is: What are the experiences of emergency services personnel post 
critical incident? Specifically, I am looking at three areas, impact of the critical incident 
on the individual, the impact of the critical incident on their job, and perceived impact on 
their family. The criterion for possible participants are: the individual has to have 
experienced a critical incident, undergone the debriefing process, and the time frame is at 
least six months post critical incident. 
At this time, I am seeking the approval of the executive of [Association or 
Administration] to approach your members after my proposal has passed the University 
of Lethbridge Ethics Committee. All participant identities will be kept confidential, that 
is, names and identifying information will not be used. I would be pleased to present my 
research proposal to the executive at your convenience. I will contact you by phone in the 
next week to see if you have any questions. In the meantime, please feel free to contact 
me with any questions that you may have. 
I look forward to hearing from you regarding my request. 
Respectfully Yours, 
Deb E.Beaton BA (Psy) 
Appendix B 
Letters of Approval 
Medicine Hat Fire Fighters Assoc. 
International Association Of Fire Fighters Local 263 
Alberta Fire Fighters Association 
Affiliated With: Alb erta Federation Of Labour 
Canadian Labour Congress 
440 Maple Ave. S.E. Medicine Hat AB T1A 7S3 
Phone/Fax: (403) 528-3541 
May 22,2002 
Ms. Deb Beaton 
303 7a Ave. S. 
Lethbridge, Ab. 
T1J-1N3 
Dear Ms. Beaton; 
In response to the letter sent to me dated April 18, 2002 requesting permission to work 
with our members in studying the long term affects of stress and its relationship to 
emergency responders. 
Our executive believes that research of this nature will help emergency agencies such as 
ours in helping to provide long active healthy careers to it's membership. In saying this it 
would be our pleasure to help you with you research in developing your thesis. Please 
keep in mind, and I stress the need for complete confidentiality in all matters pertaining 
to our membership and their cooperation in this endeavor. 
Please feel free to contact me at your earliest convenience in order for us to set up the 
start of your project. I can be reach at (403) 548-0713. 
lorn Coney-' i 
President 
Medicine Mat Firefighters Association 
Local 263 of IAFF 
Medicine Hat 
The Gas City 
440 Maple Avenue S.E. 
Medicine Hat, Alberta 
TLA 7S3 
Telephone: (403) 529-8282 Fax: (403) 502-8 
FIRE SERVICE 
May 15 t h, 2002 
Deb E. Beaton 
303 7 A Avenue, South 
Lethbridge, Alberta 
T1J1N3 
Dear Ms. Beaton: 
Subject: Critical Incident Stress 
I am responding to your letter addressed to Fire Chief Gary Mauch requesting permission to 
work with our Department to study the long-term effects of stress on emergency services 
responders. 
Please consider this letter as you permission to proceed with this project with the understanding 
that all interviews and information shared with you be held in strictest confidence in terms of 
names, locations, and events. 
As I understand, your first point of contact will be Fire Fighter Tom Coffey. Tom is well versed 
in critical incident stress issues as he has helped to organize our Critical Incident Stress 
Debriefing Team and has conducted a number of training sessions and consultations. 
I would like to wish you every success with your study and would look forward to receiving a 
copy of your report when it is completed. 
Sincerely yours, 
AllanvC. Guest 
Deputy Fire Chief 
c: Chief Garry Mauch 
Fire Fighter Tom Coffey 
LETHBRIDGE FIREFIGHTERS LETHBRIDGE 
§tty Mxu meters' Union 237 
AFFILIATED WITH 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS. AFL-CIO 
ALBERTA FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION 
ALBERTA FEDERATION OF LABOUR. CLC 
LETHBRIDGE & DISTRICT LABOUR COUNCIL 
LOCAL 237 
Deb E. Beaton May 24,2002 
303 7 "A" Ave. South 
Lethbridge AB. 
T1J 1N3 
Dear Deb Beaton: 
The Executive and members of IAFF local 237 do support and approve your work 
on your Masters thesis. We feel the long-term effects of critical incident stress in 
our job need to be dealt with for us to live healthy and productive lives. Our 
understanding is all participation will be on a voluntary basis and will be kept 
confidential. 
Please do not hesitate to call me if you require some assistance. 
Respectfully Yours, 
Rob Chollak 
Secretary 
IAFF Local 237 
232 - 12 "C" ST. N., LETHBRIDGE, ALBERTA T1H2M7 • PH: (403) 329-9088 • FAX: (403) 329-9290 
OFFICE OF 
THE FIRE CHIEF 
June 19,2002 
To Deb Beaton: 
I am pleased to have Lethbridge Fire and Emergency Services participate in your study. 
Evaluating the impact of critical incident stress is a priority for management and staff, 
and as a result, we are anxious to participate in this project and see the results. Any 
information that helps us to understand the issues surrounding critical incident stress and 
assist our staff in dealing with those issues will benefit our Department and our industry 
as a whole. 
Respectfully; 
Richard Ffildebrand 
Deputy Chief-Emergency Medical Services 
Lethbridge Fire and Emergency Services 
RH 
FIRE HEADQUARTERS - 2825 - 5th AVENUE NORTH - LETHBRIDGE, ALBERTA T1H 0P2 
TELEPHONE (403) 320-3800 FAX NO. (403) 327-3503 
Medicine Hat City Police Association 
ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS 
TO THE SECRETARY 
AN AFFILIATE OF THE ALBERTA FEDERATION OF POLICE ASSOCIATIONS 
AND OF THE CANADIAN POLICE ASSOCIATION 
Deb E. Beaton BA (Psy) 
303-7AAve. South 
Lethbridge, Alberta 
T1J 1N3 
Dear Deb E. Beaton BA (Psy) 
The Executive Board of the Medicine Hat Police Association reviewed your request to 
interview our members at our Board meeting, April 30 th, 2002. 
The Board does not object to your request with the understanding that all personal 
information obtained remains confidential. We have advised our membership of your 
upcoming survey and have stated it is on a volunteer basis only. 
Good luck with your study. If we can be of further assistance don't hesitate to me 
personally at 403-529-8498. 
Lindsay Fraser 
President 
Medicine Hat Police Association 
Medicine Hat 
"Serving and Prelecting Our Community With Pride'' 
June 6, 2002 
Deb E. Beaton, 8A (Fsy) 
303-7A Ave. South 
Lethbridge, AB T1J1N3 
Dear Ms. Beaton: 
The Executive Team of the Medicine Hat Police Service reviewed your request to 
interview our members. 
The Medicine Hat Police Service does not object to your request with the understanding 
that all personal information obtained remains confidential and is on a voluntary basis. 
For further assistance, please feel free to contact Sgt. Lindsay Fraser, Training Unit, at 
403/529-8498. 
Good luck with your survey! 
Sincerely 
Gordon Earl 
Inspector i/c Administrative Services 
Address all correspondence to the Chief of Police 
884 - 2nd Street S.E., Medicine Hat, Alberta T1A 8H2 - Tel. (403) 529-8400 Fax: (403) 529-8444 
LETHBRIDGE POLICE ASSOCIATION 
June 11, 2002, 
Deb Beaton 
303 7A Ave South 
Lethbridge, Alberta 
T1J 1N3 
Dear Miss Beaton, 
SUBJECT: L O N G TERM EFFECTS O F CRITICAL I N C I D E N T STRESS 
The Lethbridge Police Association has received your letter seeking approval to interview our members in 
relation to researching the long-term effects of critical incident stress. The Association has approved your 
request to approach our members to participate in your research as per your correspondence. If you require 
additional assistance please advise. 
MAILING ADDRESS: AN AFFILIATE OF THE CANADIAN POLICE ASSOCIATION 
A MEMBER OF THE ALBERTA FEDERATION OF POLICE ASSOCIATIONS 
OFFICE A D D R E S S 
BOX 1476 
LETHBRIDGE, ALBERTA 
T1J 4K2 
C/O L E T H B R I D G E P O L I C E S E R V I C E 
135 - 1 ' AVE. S O U T H 
L E T H B R I D G E , A L B E R T A 
T1J OA1 
Sincerely, 
Tom Kramer 
President 
Lethbridge Police Association 
May 6, 2002 
Deb E. Beaton 
303 - 7A Avenue South 
Lethbridge, Alberta T1J 1N3 
Dear Ms. Beaton: 
This letter is further to our meeting of April 22 n d and your letter dated April 24 t h , 2002. 
To reiterate our discussion and your letter, you are a graduate student at the University of 
Lethbridge working on your Masters thesis under the supervision of Dr. Kris Magnusson. You are 
investigating the long term effects of critical incident stress on emergency responders as part of 
your Masters thesis. At this time you are seeking approval from the Lethbridge Police Service to 
approach our members to seek their participation in your study. You have indicated that all 
participant identities will be kept confidential, that is names and identifying information will not be 
used and that participation in this study will be totally voluntary. Further, that your study will be 
looking at the physical and emotional impact of the critical incident on the members rather than 
focusing on the incident itself. 
I believe you have already contacted and spoken to Sergeant Darcy Murray of the Lethbridge 
Police Association, who will be assisting you in your study and research in providing you with 
volunteers for your study. 
At this time the Leadership Team of the Lethbridge Police Service is giving you approval to 
approach our officers to seek their voluntary participation in your study and bearing in mind that 
all participant identities and identifying information regarding the incidents will be kept 
confidential. 
If you have any further questions or concerns, please advise. 
K. Mielke, Inspector 
i/c C.I.S. / Support Services 
for: I.B. Cameron, Chief of Police. 
Lethbridge Police Service 
KM:me 
cc: Chief Cameron 
Constable Kramer, President Lethbridge Police Association 
Address all correspondence to "Chief of Police" 
135-1 Avenue South • Lethbridge, Alberta • T1J 0A1 
(403) 327-2210 • Fax (403) 329-4245 
AN ACCREDITED 
POLICE SERVICE 
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Appendix C 
Interview Questions 
1 . C r i t i c a l I n c i d e n t 
1.1. When you hear the term critical incident, what does it mean to you? 
1.2. Describe for me, in your own words, the critical incident that you experienced. 
2 . D e b r i e f i n g 
2.1. After your critical incident, were you taken through a process of debriefing? 
2.2. What time frame expired between the critical incident and the debriefing? 
2.3. Describe what the process of debriefing was like for you. 
2.4. In what ways did the debriefing process have an impact on you? 
2.4.1. In what ways, if any, did CISD help your recovery? 
2.4.2. In what ways, if any, did CISD hinder your recovery? 
2.4.3. What effect did debriefing have on any negative thoughts or feelings you 
had? 
2.4.4. How did debriefing provide you with the tools necessary to positively deal 
with occupation and life stressors that followed this particular incident? 
3 . P o s t C r i t i c a l I n c i d e n t - I m p a c t o n J o b 
3.1. How did you look at your job before the incident? 
3.1.1. How has the way you look at your job changed since the incident? 
3.1.2. How has the way you looked at your job changed if there was an extended 
period of time between the incident and the debriefing? 
3.1.3. How has this incident interfered with your work? 
3.1.4. Has there ever been a time since the incident when you've hesitated with 
your tasks? 
3.1.5. In what ways have you found that your reactions to situations that once 
seemed minor are now exaggerated? 
3.2. When you are called to a similar scene, do you think about the critical incident? 
3.2.1. What is your reaction if you are called to a similar scene? 
3.2.2. Do you think about the incident while working the scene? 
3.3. What kind of support have you received from your coworkers since the critical 
incident? 
3.4. What kind of support have you received from administration since the critical 
incident? 
3.5. In what ways, if any, has your relationship with your coworkers changed? 
3.6. In what ways, if any, has your relationship with administration changed since the 
critical incident? 
3.7. Have you at any time since the critical incident, thought about quitting work? 
3.7.1. If you thought about it, what was happening at that time? 
3.7.2. What prevented you from quitting? 
175 
4 . P o s t C r i t i c a l I n c i d e n t - I m p a c t o n I n d i v i d u a l 
4.1. What are some of the thoughts you have regarding the critical incident when you 
are off shift? 
4.1.1. What negative thoughts are you still experiencing regarding the critical 
incident? 
4.1.2. How has this incident changed the way you think about your life outside 
of work? 
4.2. What are some of the continuing symptoms of stress that you are experiencing 
since the critical incident? 
4.2.1. Have you noticed any physical changes in yourself since the critical 
incident? 
4.2.1.1.How are your sleeping patterns? Do you experience nightmares? 
4.2.1.2.How are your eating patterns? 
4.2.1.3.Are you exercising more or less now than you were before the critical 
incident? 
4.2.2. Have you noticed any psychological changes in yourself since the critical 
incident? 
4.2.2.1.Do you experience any anxiety, depression, agitation, or increased 
ancrer? 
4.2.3. In what ways do you react differently to stressors now than before the 
critical incident? 
4.2.4. In what ways do you react differently to stressors now than before the 
critical incident? 
4.3. In what ways has the critical incident influenced the way you make decisions 
about your life? 
4.4. In what ways has this incident changed the way you think about your life outside 
of work? 
4.5. What are some of the strengths that you found within yourself since the critical 
incident? 
4.6. Have you sought out further intervention since the critical incident? 
4.6.1. Have you accessed your peer team member? 
4.6.2. Have you accessed a mental health professional? 
5 . P o s t C r i t i c a l I n c i d e n t - P e r c e i v e d I m p a c t o n F a m i l y 
5.1. In what ways do you believe that this experience has had an impact on your 
family? 
5.2. Did you talk to your spouse/partner about the critical incident? 
5.3. Has your spouse/partner shown any concern about you going to work? 
5.3.1. If they have, in what ways did you react? 
5.3.2. Have you been able to resolve this issue with your spouse/partner? 
5.4. Has your spouse/partner indicated, since the incident, that they would like you to 
change occupations? 
5.4.1. If they have, in what ways did you react? 
5.4.2. Has this issue been resolved? 
5.5. Did you talk to your children about the critical incident? 
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5.5.1. If you talked to your children about the incident, in what ways has your 
relationship with them changed? 
5.5.1.1.Do you believe that the incident has made you more protective of your 
children? If it has, in what ways? 
5.5.1.2.Do you believe that this incident has made you less caring? If it has, in 
what ways? 
5.5.1.3.In what ways do your children verbalize any concerns they have about 
you going to work? 
5.5.2. If you did not talk to your children about the incident, is there a particular 
reason why you did not talk to them? 
6 . C o n c l u s i o n 
6.1. Is there anything you believe you need at this time to assist you in dealing with 
any of the issues that have come up during the interview? 
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Appendix D 
Email Invitation to Participate 
Deb E. Beaton, Department of Graduate Studies, University of Lethbridge, is conducting 
a study into the long-term implications of Critical Incident Stress among emergency 
responders. The purpose of this study is to investigate if there are any long term 
implications that a critical incident may have on three areas of an emergency responders' 
life: impact on the individual, impact on job, and perceived impact on family. I believe 
that not only is this study timely, but it will help your Associations and Departments 
understand what the long term implications of critical incident stress are in order to better 
the lives of all emergency responders, both on the job and off. 
The only criterion necessary to participate in this study is that the emergency responder 
must have experienced what they perceive to be a critical incident on the job at least six 
months prior to August 1, 2002. As part of this research, I am requesting an audio taped 
interview that will take approximately one hour. This study is completely voluntary and 
all information received will be dealt with in a professional manner. Only the principal 
investigator will have access to the data. Each interview is strictly confidential. All names 
and identifying information will be removed from the data and will not be present or 
included in any discussion of the results. You have the right to withdraw from this study 
at any time without prejudice or penalty. 
Due to the nature of this research, all necessary precautions have been taken to ensure the 
participant's emotional well-being. However, you must be aware that discussion of your 
critical incident may bring up memories and emotions that may cause some anxiousness. 
Two referral options are available: referral to a peer team member and, if requested by 
the participant and the peer team member, referral to a qualified psychologist. All 
necessary precautions have been taken to ensure your emotional well-being. 
I would very much appreciate your participation in this study. If you choose to 
participate, or if you have any questions regarding your participation in this study, please 
contact me at [researcher email address and phone number]. Please leave a message if 
necessary and I will contact you as soon as possible. You may also contact my 
supervisor, Dr. Kris Magnusson at [phone number]. Your Association is also aware of the 
study and, if you prefer, you may have your Association contact me. You are also free to 
contact Dr. Cathy Campbell, Human Research Committee, at [phone number]. 
Respectfully Yours, 
Deb E. Beaton 
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Appendix E 
Poster Invitation to Participate 
Deb E. Beaton, Department of Graduate Studies, University of Lethbridge, is conducting 
a study into the long-term implications of Critical Incident Stress among emergency 
responders. The purpose of this study is to investigate if there are any long term 
implications that a critical incident may have on three areas of an emergency responders' 
life: impact on the individual, impact on job, and perceived impact on family. It is hoped 
that the results of this study will help Associations, Departments, and mental health 
agencies understand what the long term implications of critical incident stress are in order 
to better the lives of all emergency responders, both on the job and off. Your respective 
Associations and Departments are aware of, and have approved this study. 
The criteria necessary to participate in this study is the following: 
• The emergency responder must have experienced what they perceive to be a 
critical incident on the job before April, 2002. 
• The emergency responder must be male. 
• The emergency responder must have been living with his family at the time of the 
critical incident. 
As part of this research, I am requesting an audio taped interview that will take 
approximately two hours. This study is completely voluntary and all information received 
will be dealt with in a professional manner. Only the principal investigator will have 
access to the data. Each interview is strictly confidential. All names and identifying 
information will be removed from the data and will not be present or included in any 
discussion of the results. You have the right to withdraw from this study at any time 
without prejudice or penalty. 
I would very much appreciate your participation in this study. If you choose to 
participate, or if you have any questions regarding your participation in this study, please 
contact me at [researcher email address and phone number]. Please leave a message if 
necessary and I will contact you as soon as possible. You may also contact my 
supervisor, Dr. Kris Magnusson at [phone number] or your Association representative if 
you have further questions. You are also free to contact Dr. Cathy Campbell, Human 
Research Committee, at [phone number]. 
Respectfully Yours, 
Deb E. Beaton 
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Appendix F 
Second Letter of Invitation to Participate - Firefighter Trained 
Deb E. Beaton, Department of Graduate Studies, University of Lethbridge, is once again 
requesting participants to be interviewed for the study into the long-term effects of 
Critical Incident Stress on Emergency Responders. The purpose of this study is to 
investigate if there are any long term implications that a critical incident may have on 
three areas of an emergency responder's life: impact on self, impact on job, and perceived 
impact on family. I believe that not only is this study timely, but it will help Associations 
and Departments understand what the long term implications of critical incident stress are 
in order to better the lives of all emergency responders. 
It is very important that the story of the fire fighter be included in this study, therefore, I 
ask that individuals who fit the following criteria contact me if you are interested in 
participating: 
• The participant should be trained originally as a firefighter. 
• The firefighter must have experienced what they perceive to be a critical incident 
on the job at least six months prior to April 1, 2002. 
• The firefighter must be male. 
As part of this research, I am requesting an audio taped interview that will take 
approximately two hours. This study is completely voluntary and all information received 
will be dealt with in a professional manner. Only the principal investigator will have 
access to the data. Each interview is strictly confidential. All names and identifying 
information will be removed from the data and will not be present in any discussion of 
the results. You have the right to withdraw from this study at any time without prejudice 
or penalty. 
Due to the nature of this research, all necessary precautions have been taken to ensure the 
participant's emotional well-being. However, you must be aware that discussion of your 
critical incident may bring up memories and emotions that may cause some anxiousness. 
A referral process will be in place if the participant agrees: referral to a peer team 
member and, if requested by the participant and the peer team member, referral to a 
qualified psychologist. 
I would very much appreciate your participation in this study. If you choose to 
participate, or if you have any questions regarding your participation in this study, please 
contact me at [researcher email address and phone number]. Please leave a message if 
necessary and I will contact you as soon as possible. You may also contact my 
supervisor, Dr. Kris Magnusson at [phone number]. Your Association is also aware of the 
study and, if you prefer, you may have your Association contact me. You are also free to 
contact Dr. Cathy Campbell, Human Research Committee, at [phone number]. 
Deb Beaton 
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Appendix G 
Consent for Research Participation 
I hereby give consent to participate as a subject in the research project entitled "Long 
Term Implications of Critical Incident Stress Among Emergency Responders" conducted 
by Deb E. Beaton under the supervision of Dr. Kris Magnusson, of the School of 
Graduate Studies, at the University of Lethbridge. The research project is expected to 
identify what the long term effects a critical incident may have on three areas of an 
emergency responder's life: impact of the critical incident on the responder's job, impact 
of the critical incident on the individual emergency responder, and the perceived impact 
that the critical incident has had upon the family of the responder. 
• I understand that the study will involve my cooperation in completing a confidential 
audio-taped interview. 
• I understand that my participation is completely voluntary, and I am free to 
withdraw from the study at any time I choose, without penalty. 
• The general plan of this study has been outlined to me, including any possible 
known risks. I understand that it is not possible to identify all potential risks in any 
procedure but that all reasonable safeguards have been taken to minimize the potential 
risks. Due to the nature of this study, I am aware that during the interview, some 
memories and emotions may arise. I am aware that should this occur, a referral will be 
made to a peer team member, and if it is deemed necessary, a referral to a qualified 
psychologist will occur. 
• I understand that the general results of this project will be coded in such a way that 
any identifying information will not be physically attached to the final data that is 
produced. The key listing my identity will be kept separate from the data in a fire safe 
locked file accessible only to the principal investigator, and it will be physically 
destroyed at the conclusion of the project. The remaining data will be kept in a 
separate fire safe locked cabinet in the principal investigator's home for one year after 
the thesis is in print. 
• I understand that the results of this study will be made available to participants upon 
request. I also understand that the data used in this study will be for the purpose of the 
research project only and possible submission for publication with the author's 
permission only. Furthermore, the general findings may be presented to the 
appropriate Associations and Departments 
• I understand that if at any time I have questions, I can contact Deb E. Beaton at 
[phone number] or the thesis supervisor, Dr. Kris Magnusson, at [phone number]. 
Date 
Participant's Signature 
Participant's Name, Printed 
Investigator's Signature 
Investigator's Name, Printed 
